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Lijian Lu
The service industry has become increasingly competitive. This dissertation addresses a number
of outstanding and fundamental questions of competitions in service operations and supply chains.
The challenges are characterization of the equilibrium behaviors, estimating the impact of firms’
interactions, and designing of efficient market mechanisms.
The first chapter of this dissertation considers price competition models for oligopolistic markets,
in which the consumer reacts to relative rather than absolute prices, where the relative price is
defined as the difference between the absolute price and a given reference value. Such settings
arise, for example, when the full retail price earned by the “retailer” is reduced by virtue of a third
party offering a subsidy or a rebate or in prospect theoretical models in which customers establish a
reference price and base their choices on the differentials with respect to the reference price. When
choosing among the various competing options, the consumer trades off the net price paid with
various other product or service attributes, as in standard price competition models. The reference
price may be exogenously specified and pre-announced to the competing firms. Alternatively, it may
be endogenously determined, as a function of the set of absolute prices selected by the competing
firms, for example the lowest or the second lowest price. We characterize the equilibrium behavior
under a general reference value scheme of the above type; this in a base model, where we assume
that the consumer choice model is of the general MultiNomialLogit (MNL) type. We also derive
comparison results for the price equilibria that arise under alternative subsidy schemes. These
comparisons have important implications for the design of subsidy schemes.
The second chapter applies the results of the first chapter to the Medicare insurance market,
both in terms of its existing structure, as well as in terms of various proposals to redesign the
program. Based on an oligopoly price competition model tailored towards this market, and actual
county-by-county data for the year 2010, we estimate the impact such reforms would have on the
plans’ market shares, equilibrium premia, the government’s cost, and the out-of-pocket expenses of
the beneficiaries. We employ two different methodologies to derive the parameters in the county-
by-county competition models: (i) a calibration model, and (ii) parameter distributions obtained
from models estimated in Curto et al. [2015]. The predicted impacts on the above performance
measures are remarkably consistent across the two methodologies and reveal, for example, that the
government cost would decrease by 8% if the traditional fee-for-service(FFS) plans are kept out of
competitive bidding process and by 16.5%-21% if they are part of the process.
The third chapter studies a class of buy procurement mechanisms, framework agreements (FAs),
that are commonly used by buying agencies around the world to satisfy demand that arises over a
certain time horizon. We are one of the first in the literature that provides a formal understanding
of FAs, with a particular focus on the cost uncertainty faced by bidders over the FA time horizon.
We introduce a model that generalizes standard auction models to include this salient feature of
FAs; we analyze this model theoretically and numerically. First, we show that FAs are subject to a
sort of winner’s curse that in equilibrium induces higher expected buying prices relative to running
first-price auctions as needs arise. Then, our results provide concrete design recommendations that
alleviate this issue and decrease buying prices in FAs, highlighting the importance of (i) monitoring
the price charged at the open market by the FA winner and using it to bound the buying price; (ii)
investing in implementing price indexes for the random part of suppliers’ costs; and (iii) allowing
suppliers the flexibility to reduce their prices to compete with the open market throughout the
selling period. These prescriptions are already being used by the Chilean government procurement
agency that buys US$2 billion worth of contracts every year using FAs.
The fourth chapter considers the preference of contractual forms in supply chains. The sup-
ply chain contracting literature has focused on incentive contracts designed to align supply chain
members’ individual interests. A key finding of this literature is that members’ preferences for
contractual forms are often at odds: the upstream supplier prefers more complex contracts that
can coordinate the supply chain; however, the downstream retailer prefers the wholesale price–only
contract because it leaves more surplus (than a coordinating contract) that the retailer can get.
This chapter addresses the following question: under what circumstances do suppliers and retailers
prefer the same contractual form? We study supply chain members’ preference for contractual
forms in three different competitive settings in which multiple supply chains compete to sell substi-
tutable products to the same market. Our analysis suggests that both upstream and downstream
sides of the supply chains may prefer the same “quantity discount” contract, thereby eliminating
the conflicts of interest that otherwise typify contracting situations. More interesting still is that
both sides may also prefer the wholesale price–only contract, which offers a theoretical explanation
to why the simple inefficient contract is widely adopted in supply chain transactions.
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1.1 Introduction and Summary
Ever since the seminal paper by Bertrand [1883], a vast literature has developed on price competition
models in oligopolistic markets, see e.g. Tirole [1988], Topkis [1998] and Vives [2001]. Almost
invariably, these models assume that customers choosing among various products, react to the
absolute (unit) prices charged by the competing firms, hereafter referred to as the “retailers”.
There are, however, many contexts in which the consumer reacts to relative rather than absolute
prices, where the relative price is defined as the difference between the absolute price and a given
reference value.
Such settings arise, for example, when the full retail price earned by the “retailer” is reduced
by virtue of a third party offering a subsidy or a rebate, e.g., via a coupon. The subsidy or rebate
acts as the reference value and the consumer only relates to the relative prices of the competing
products. The third party may be a government agency or international organization interested in
promoting the adoption of the product or technology, e.g., solar panels, hybrid cars, electric cars,
vaccines, or because they consider the full cost of an essential product or service prohibitive, e.g.,
health insurance, as in the US Medicare program. Alternatively, the third party may consist of
manufacturers offering a subsidy or coupon program for their product(s) to stimulate retail sales, or
insurance companies covering a large part of the product or service cost.( Pharmaceutical products
are an example; here, the insured consumer only pays the so-called co-payment.)
At the same time, empirical studies and laboratory experiments have, consistently, demonstrat-
ed that consumer choices often defy the predictions of standard rational choice models. The most
important breakthrough in the field of behavioral economics is “Prospect Theory”, developed by
Kahneman and Tversky [1979] and Tversky and Kahneman [1991]. The principal idea of prospect
theory is that individuals evaluate different alternatives or outcomes, based on the differentials with
respect to some objective or subjective reference point, rather than the absolute values of the rele-
vant attributes. In terms of price comparisons, this implies that consumers establish a “reference
price” and that their utility measures are explained by the relative price differentials of the various
products with respect to the reference price.
Within the Marketing literature, this paradigm was first addressed by Winer [1986]. He pro-
posed a MultiNomial Logit (MNL) model, in which the relative price appears as a (linear) term in
the specification of each brand’s utility measure. The author proceeded to fit this model to data for
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a retail coffee market with three competing brands, estimating that the coefficient of the relative
price is significant in at least two of the three brands’ utility equations. Winer [1986] entertained
multiple structures for the determination of the relative price.
Subsequent to Winer’s seminal paper, at least 16 similar models were proposed in the premier
Marketing journals, in the subsequent 20 years, as reviewed by Mazumdar et al. [2005], building
on an earlier survey article by Briesch et al. [1997]. Some follow Winer’s specification, in that the
relative price appears as a linear term in the products’ utility measures.(Mazumdar et al. [2005]
refer to this structure as the “symmetric sticker shock model”.) Others recognize, that a positive
relative price causes a larger reduction in the product’s utility, as compared to the increase in this
measure due to an equally large negative relative price, introducing a piecewise linear dependence
of the utility measure on the relative price.(Mazumdar et al. [2005] refer to this generalization as
the “asymmetric reference price model”.) Empirical evidence consistently suggests that “losses” are
weighted more heaviliy than equally sized “gains”, a paradigm called “loss aversion”, see Tversky
and Kahneman [1991].
The main features of the above 16 MNL models are summarized in Table 2 of Mazumdar et
al. [2005]. The models were used to explain brand choices in various food industries, as well as
the liquid detergent industry, see Mazumdar and Papatla [2000] and the detergent, paper towel
and tissue industries in Bell and Lattin [2000]. The impact of the reference value, and hence the
relative, as opposed to the absolute price was confirmed by the estimation results, in virtually all
of the 16 studies.
Similarly, in Section 1.4, we review a variety of industries in which the retail price is subsidized
by a third party, whether a government agency or a private company, so that the consumer’s
actual expense is given by a relative price. These include the Medicare insurance and various green
technology industries with very sizable government subsidies and industries in which manufacturer
coupons are offered to the consumer. As with the above behavioral marketing models, see equation
(5)-(7) in Mazumdar et al. [2005], almost all of the proposed models are of the MNL type.
Thus, the MNL model with utility measures that depend on a relative price, has become the
workhorse model in many settings, and has the potential to be used as such, in various other
applications. However, in spite of its 30 year history, little is known about its competitive dynamics,
in particular its equilibrium behavior, specifically the following questions:
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(I) Is a pure Nash equilibrium guaranteed to exist?
(II) Assuming it exists, is (are) the equilibrium (equilibria) globally stable, in the sense that, if
the industry starts at an arbitrary price vector and firms iteratively adjust their prices in
response to their competitors’ price choices, this process will converge to an equilibrium?
(III) Assuming a pure Nash equilibrium exists, is such an equilibrium unique, and if not ,what can
be said about the structure of the set of equilibria?
(IV) Assuming an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, how does the equilibrium or the set of equi-
libria, vary as the reference value is altered?
As explained in more detail, below, a change in the reference value may involve a simple shift in its
level, as when an exogenously specified subsidy or coupon amount is increased or decreased. Alter-
natively, the change may be structural, when the very structure of the reference value’s dependence
on the competitors’ prices is modified.
The objective of this paper is to resolve all of the above questions (I)-(IV) for a general MNL
model in which the products’ utility measure is a monotone, generally non-linear, response function
of its relative price, and this under various prevalent structures for the reference value.
The above questions are not just of theoretical importance. They are, often, at the heart of
private or public policy debates. Consider, for example, the above Medicare industry, discussed
in more detail in Section 3.1: private insurance companies offer plans to eligible consumers, as
an alternative to the traditional (fee-for-service) Medicare plan offered by the federal government.
In the current system, the government announces, every year, a (county specific) capitation rate
or subsidy, before the private insurance firms submit their plans and associated prices (premia).
There are continuous proposals to alter the capitation levels, some of which have been legislated,
for example in the 2000 Benefits Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA) and the 2011 Affordable
Care Act (ACA). Policy makers struggle to predict what impact these level changes would have
on the new equilibrium premia, the firms’ market shares, the consumers’ out of pocket costs,
government expenditures etc. Several prominent recent studies, e.g., Song et al. [2012b], Song et
al. [2013], Cabral et al. [2014] and Duggan et al. [2014] have applied regression models to estimate
the pass-through rates, i.e., the absolute change in the premia due to changes in the capitation rates.
These studies reach rather different conclusions, with estimated pass through rates varying between
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37% and 100% across the different studies, leaving policy makers with a great deal of ambiguity.
Moreover, these reduced form approaches assume a specific structural form, for example linear or
log-linear, for the dependency of the firms’ premia on the subsidy (capitation) levels, which may
not be consistent with any plausible underlying price competition models.
For example, based on the results of this paper, Federgruen and Lu [2016b] calculate pass
through rates in an MNL-model calibrated to the actual county-by-county data in the 2010 Medicare
market. Their results show: (1) the pass through rate fails to be constant, neither in absolute nor
in relative terms, as implied, respectively, by a linear or log-linear regression model. Instead, as
the capitation rate is reduced by up to $30 from their prevailing average ($802), the pass through
rate varies in a close to a 3:1 ratio; (2) different competing plans adopt rather disparate pass
through rates, and (3) the estimated (average) pass through rates are considerably lower than
those estimated from the above regression equations, see Figure 1.1 in Section 1.4.
Finally, even if the pass through rates are estimated correctly, to assess the various above
performance measures, there is a need to predict how the changes would affect the firms’ market
shares. To this end, Curto et al. [2015] develop and estimate an MNL-like consumer choice model1
for the Medicare industry, along with a regression model to predict pass through rates. These
models are then applied to conduct several counterfactual studies. Among them, is an assessment
of an across the board $50 reduction in the monthly capitation rate. The regression equations are
used to estimate the new premia bids; these are then entered into their consumer choice model
to evaluate the firms’ new market shares. It seems preferable to conduct the entire counterfactual
study within a single consistent estimated consumer choice model, but this requires a resolution of
all of the equilibrium behavior questions (I)-(IV), raised above, including the ability to compute
the new price equilibrium.
Moreover, reform proposals for the Medicare program have by no means been restricted to
level changes in the benchmark or subsidy level. Instead, there have been proposals to determine
each county’s subsidy to the private plans, endogenously, as either the second lowest or a weighted
average of the bids. These ideas were the core of proposals by The Bipartisan Policy Center’s Debt
Reduction Task Force, various House passed Budget resolutions, the 2012 bipartisan reform plan
1More precisely, the model is an application of the so-called nested MNL model with all private plans in a single
group and the traditional government plan , by itself, in a second group.
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initiated by Senator Wyden and Congressman Ryan, and, most recently, the proposals in Rivlin
and Daniel [2015], as part of an NBER conference, entitled “Strengthening Medicare for 2030”.
A variety of studies have tried to examine the implications of these endogenously determined
capitation values. For example, Song et al. [2012a] and more recent estimates by the Congressional
Budget Office (2013) concluded that the average capitation rate, and hence the government’s overall
expenditure, would be reduced by 9% and 11% respectively, were it to be determined by the second
lowest bid among the private plans.
However, these estimates are based on the assumption that all plans would continue to be
offered at the same premium and attract the same market share. In reality, firms, of course, adjust
their prices to the new rules, also resulting in a new set of market shares. But to assess these price
and market share changes requires an (MNL-like) consumer choice model, as in Federgruen and Lu
[2016b], Einav and Levin [2015], and Curto et al. [2015] and a full resolution of the above questions
regarding the model’s equilibrium behavior under various mechanisms to determine the reference
value or capitation rate. Indeed, based on the results in this paper, Federgruen and Lu [2016b] are
able to show that firms would reduce their premium bids, significantly, resulting in an additional
decrease of the capitation rates and an effective decrease of government expenditures by 16% (, as
opposed to 11%)!
Our main results
As mentioned, we resolve the above questions (I)-(IV) for general MNL models with the products’
utility measures specified by a general monotone response function of the relative price, und this
under the following 5 reference value structures:
(R1) an exogenously given constant,
(R2) an exogenously given fraction of the absolute price,
(R3) the lowest price in the market,
(R4) the n-th lowest price,
(R5) a (weighted) average of the selected market prices.
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(This spectrum covers most applications we are aware of, including the above mentioned Marketing
papers with reference pricing, see Mazumdar et al. [2005].) See Cadotte et al. [1987] and Köszegi
and Rabin [2006] for an in-depth discussion and derivation of reference value structures.
The importance of considering a general monotone response function is driven by behavioral
models, as in the above asymmetric reference price models, or even more general response functions
suggested by prospect theory. They are also motivated by concrete subsidy structures as in the
Medicare market and ACA exchanges, discussed in section 1.4.1.
As to the first question (I), we show that a pure Nash equilibrium exists under reference value
structures (R1)-(R4), and very general conditions for the response function. Under (R5), i.e., when
the reference value is specified as the average price (or, more generally, a weighted average of the
selected prices), we show that the products fail to be substitutes, i.e., a price increase of one product
may result in a decrease of the demand volume of one of its competitors. Since the products are
no longer substitutes, the existence of a Nash equilibrium can not be guaranteed, a well known
phenomenon, see e.g. Vives [2001] Section 2.3.2.
Global stability, i.e., an affirmative answer to question (II) is proven, under mild conditions, for
reference value structures (R1)-(R3), arguably the most important cases from a practical perspec-
tive. (Given the fact that a pure Nash equilibrium cannot be guaranteed under (R5), question (II)
is moot under this structure.) While a strong form of equilibrium, global stability, ensures that the
set of equilibria has a componentwise smallest and a componentwise largest element, and a lattice
structure. It also provides a simple algorithm to compute an equilibrium using a tâtonnement
scheme. Moreover, the scheme can be used to verify whether the equilibrium is unique, thus
answering question (III).
To address question (IV), it is useful to differentiate between the following two cases, both of
which have ample applications, see Section 1.4.
(I) (PIOG) Price Invariant Outside Good: here no price choice is made for the outside good and
its utility measure is independent of the reference value.
(II) (PSOG) Price Sensitive Outside Good: here the utility measure of the outside good depends
on the price and the reference value, via the same response function as the other goods.
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(I) (PIOG): Under (R1), we prove that the equilibrium prices are monotonically increasing in the
exogenous, constant reference value, under a mild condition for the outside good’s market share.
Similarly, we show, under (R2), that the equilibrium prices are monotonically increasing in the
discount percentages specified by the reference value, provided the latter is sufficiently large. When
comparing the equilibria under (R1) with those under (R2), we establish a threshold result for a
widely applicable class of response functions: that includes the above “symmetric sticker shock”
and the “asymmetric reference price” models: fix the constant exogenous reference value under
(R1); for any given product, the equilibrium price under (R1) is exceeded by that under (R2), if
and only if, the discount percentage is larger than the threshold. A similar threshold result applies,
when the equilibrium under (R1) is compared to that under (R3), where the reference value is
determined as the lowest price. All of the above results apply both to the component-wise smallest
and the component-wise largest equilibrium.
(II) (PSOG): Our numerical experiments show that, in general, monotonicity of the price equi-
librium vector in an exogenous constant reference value continues to hold. However, monotonicity
is sometimes violated, as a counterexample demonstrates. In contrast, under (R2), we are able to
prove that monotonicity of the equilibrium price with respect to the discount percentages contin-
ues to hold, similar to this monotonicity result under (PIOG). When comparing (R1) and (R2), a
similar threshold result as under (PIOG) continues to prevail. When comparing (R1) and (R3),
i.e., an exogenous constant reference value vis-a-vis one determined by the lowest price, we prove,
under a mild condition, that the equilibrium under (R3) is always exceeded by that under (R1).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides a literature review.
In Section 2.4, we present the general model. Section 1.4 contains a brief discussion of several
applications. Section 1.5 characterizes the equilibrium behavior when the reference value is an
exogenous constant or a given fraction of the absolute prices. Section 1.6 covers the case where the
reference value is endogenously determined as the lowest price, or more generally the n-th lowest
price. The above discussed comparison results of the price equilibria under various reference value
schemes are derived in Section 1.7. Section 2.7 concludes our paper and discusses several extensions.
Most of the proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
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1.2 Literature Review
Several papers have addressed the equilibrium behavior in MNL-type models, but all under the
assumption that the utility measures’ price dependence is confined to a dependence on the the
product’s own and absolute price. It is well known that an equilibrium exists, in the standard
MNL models, see Anderson et al. [2001], Bernstein and Federgruen [2004] and Gallego et al. [2006].
However, an equilibrium may fail to exist in various generalizations of the basic MNL model,
for example Mixed MNL models (MMNL) where the market is segmented and the structure of
the utility functions varies by segment.(In the latter case, Allon et al. [2013] have shown that an
equilibrium may fail to exist while providing specific market share conditions under which the
existence question can be answered in the affirmative.) Liu [2006], Li and Huh [2011], and Gallego
and Wang [2014] study various conditions under which an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in a
nested logit model.
To our knowledge, our paper provides the first characterizations of the equilibrium behavior of
a price competition model based on a MNL consumer choice model, in which utilities depend on
relative prices. Heidhues and Kőszegi [2008] recently analyzed a Hotelling type price competition
model in which the utility measure of each product depends on its price via a piecewise linear func-
tion of the difference between the price and an exogenous reference value, i.e., the (R1) structure.
In this model, customers are uniformly dispersed on a unit circle and N firms are located on this
circle as well. All heterogeneity among customer preferences is represented by a “distance cost”
term in their utility measures, assumed proportional to the distance (along the circle) between the
customer’s location and that of the selected firm. The firms face a firm-specific stochastic cost rate.
The authors provide conditions under which a symmetric price equilibrium exists and other condi-
tions under which every equilibrium is symmetric. Several authors, in particular, Zhou [2011] and
Karle and Peitz [2014] have characterized the equilibrium behavior in variants of the Heidhues and
Kőszegi [2008] model, but all for a special case of a duopoly. See Ellison [2006] and Spiegler [2011]
for discussions of the importance of price competition models in which consumers are assumed to
be loss averse relative to a reference value.
A similar prospect theoretical competition model has recently been proposed by Yang et al.
[2014], to model competition in service industries. Here, firms select and announce waiting time
standards, for example the steady-state average waiting time. However, individual customers’
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utility depends on the relative waiting time defined as the difference between the actual waiting
time and a reference value. The authors address the case where the reference value is given by
the lowest waiting time standard, as in (R3), as well as where it is specified as a weighted average
thereof, as in (R5). Among others, the following are four important differences between the Yang et
al. [2014] model and ours. First, in an MNL model, like ours, heterogeneity among the customers
is expressed via the unobserved noise terms in the utility measures. In Yang et al. [2014], similar
to Heidhues and Kőszegi [2008], all heterogeneity among customer preferences is confined to a
distance cost term in the utility measure, assumed to be proportional with the distance between
the customer’s initial position and the location of the chosen firm, where, in this model, the former
is uniformly distributed on a symmetric hub-and-spoke network. Second, Yang et al. [2014] is
confined to a duopoly, i.e., N = 2. Third, their model assumes that the two firms have identical
characteristics, with the exception of their waiting time standards, and fourth, it assumes that each
customer has to select one of the two providers, without a no-purchase or outside option.
Recently, several areas in operations and revenue management have come to realize that demand
volumes should be represented as functions of relative prices, i.e., absolute or relative differentials
of the nominal price vis-a-vis a reference value. For example, Chen et al. [2016]’s dynamic pricing
model, represents the demand volume as an asymmetric reference price model, similar to Marketing
papers surveyed in Mazumdar et al. [2005]. Similarly, Johnson-Ferreira et al. [2016] present a price
optimization model developed for an online retailer, Rue La La, in which the demand for an item
is represented as a function of the ratio of item’s price and a reference value, defined as the average
price across all competing items in the product category, see (R5).
1.3 Model
Consider an oligopolistic market with N competing single-product firms each selling a product
or service. The firms differentiate themselves via an arbitrary collection of observable product
characteristics, as well as their nominal or absolute price. Potential customers react to relative
prices when comparing the various product alternatives, either because of third party subsidies or
because of prospect theoretical considerations, see the Introduction. A product’s relative price is
defined as the difference between the absolute price and a reference value. The reference value
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(i.e., subsidy or prospect theoretical benchmark value) may be an exogenously specified constant,
which is pre-announced to the competing firms. Alternatively, it may be endogenously determined,
as a function of the set of nominal prices selected by the competitors, for example the lowest, the
second lowest, or an average price, see the reference values (R1)-(R5). Each firm’s cost structure
is assumed to be affine. For each firm i = 1, 2, . . . , N , let
ci = the marginal cost rate of providing product i
pi = nominal price of the product or service provided by firm i, to be selected from an
interval [pmini , p
max
i ]
p−i = price vector for all firms other than i, i.e., p−i = (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN )
p−i(n) = the nth smallest price excluding pi if n ≥ 1, and ci if n = 0
p(n) = the nth smallest price, n ≥ 1
gi(p) = the reference value for product i
∆pi = net price of product i = pi − gi(p)
di = market share of firm i
We choose pmini = ci, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. Based on the structures encountered in various applications,
we consider the following specifications of the reference values, corresponding with structures (R1)–
(R5) in the Introduction:
gi(p) =

C, exogenous and constant (R1)
δipi, a percentage discount of the nominal price (R2)
p(1), specified by the lowest price (R3)
p(n), specified by the n-th lowest price (R4)∑
j






(In most of the above specifications, all products share an identical reference value, i.e., g1(p) =
g2(p) = · · · = gN (p). However, under (R2), for example, when a third party (e.g., a manufacturer)
offers a given percentage discount as a subsidy, the discount percentage δi may be product specif-
ic.) The reference structures (R1)-(R2) are studied in Section 1.5 and (R3)-(R4) in Section 1.6.
Structure (R5) is discussed as part of Section 2.7.
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Each customer j assigns a utility measure to each of the N available products, as follows
uij = ai − bi · f (pi − gi(p)) + εij , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 1, 2, . . . . (1.2)
Here, the intercept ai denotes the aggregate impact of all of the product’s observable attributes,
with the exception of the price. The, generally non-linear, function f(·) characterizes how the
relative price impacts on the utility measure. A non-linear and not necessarily differentiable choice
for this function may often be necessary; for example, in the Medicare industry, if the net price
is negative, the customer receives less than (the absolute value of) this net price as a rebate, in
accordance with a specific rebate percentage. In addition, the marginal disutility due to an extra
$10 of out-of-pocket expenses, may not be constant. Likewise, in prospect-theoretical models, it is
well known that changes from the reference value are weighted differently, depending upon whether
they are gains or losses, again requiring a non-linear response function f(·). We allow for the price
sensitivity coefficient bi to be product specific. Finally, the last term εij in (2.2) represents a random
unobserved component of the customer j’s utility for product i, which varies by customer.
We represent the outside good as a product 0, with a utility measure
u0j = a0 − b0f (p0 − g0(p)) + ε0j , j = 1, 2, . . . , (1.3)
where a0 is a constant and ε0j is a random unobserved component.
Price Invariant Outside Good (PIOG): In some applications, consumers may choose not to
purchase any variant of the product, in which case the utility measure is best described without
the second term in (2.4), i.e., selecting b0 = 0. In other applications, e.g., the Medicare market,
discussed in the Introduction and Section 1.4.1, all Medicare beneficiaries enroll in one of the plans,
but we use product 0 to refer to the traditional Medicare plan, whose enrollees currently pay nothing
beyond the basic premium charged to all beneficiaries. Here, too, a specification with b0 = 0 is
called for.
Price Sensitive Outside Good (PSOG): However, in some of the the Medicare reform proposals,
those enrolled in the traditional Medicare program would be charged on the basis of the net price,
relative to the same capitation rate that applies to the MA plans. To model these settings, a
specification with b0 = b > 0 is required.
To complete the specification of the utility functions (2.2), the random variables {εij} for the
unobserved utility components are assumed to be i.i.d across firms and customers, following a
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standard type 1–extreme value or Gumbel distribution, i.e., P (εij ≤ x) = exp (− exp(−x+ γ))
where γ is Euler’s constant (0.5772).(The mean and variance of εij are E[εij ] = 0 and var[εij ] =
π2/6.) This gives rise to a variant of the famous MNL model, with the following expected demand
functions:
di(p) =
exp (ai − bi · f (pi − gi(p)))
exp (a0 − b0f (p0 − g0(p))) +
∑N
j=1 exp (aj − bj · f (pj − gj(p)))
, i = 0, 1, . . . , N, (1.4)
see for e.g., Anderson et al. [2001]. The above specification treats the utilities of all customers
as identically distributed. Often, the market needs to be segmented into several customer classes,
each with its own specification of the utility measures. This generalization is referred to as a
Mixed-MultiNomialLogit (MMNL) model, briefly described in Section 2.7.
The response function is taken as a general increasing and usually non-linear function, subject
to a minor regularity condition:
Assumption 1 f(·) is strictly increasing and continuous everywhere; it is continuously differen-





sup{f ′(pi − gi(p)) : pj ∈ [pminj , pmaxj ] ∀j and pi − gi(p)) 6∈ P},
β = min
i=0,1,...,N
inf{f ′(pi − gi(p)) : pj ∈ [pminj , pmaxj ] ∀j and pi − gi(p)) 6∈ P}.
Lemma 1 0 < β ≤ α <∞.
We refer to the ratio β/α ∈ [0, 1] as the degree of non-linearity of the response function. This
index plays a fundamental rule in many of our results. For some of our results, stronger conditions
are required for the response function, in particular convexity. Convexity holds in many of the
applications, in particular the above mentioned asymmetric reference price model adopted in the
Marketing literature, see Mazumdar et al. [2005]. It also applies in the Medicare market described
in Section 1.4.1, as well as the base model in prospect theory. However, some prospect theoretical
models, employ an S-shaped response function which fails to be convex on its full domain.
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Each firm earns its selected nominal price, under all circumstances, for each of its customers,
and its profit function is given by
πi(pi, p−i) = (pi − ci)di(p). (1.5)




di(p)f(pi − gi(p)). (1.6)
For any function H(x), we denote the left-limit and right-limit at a particular point x0 by







∂x (x0) = limu↘x0
∂H
∂x (u), respectively, whenever these limits exist. For any
real number x, x+ and x− denote the positive and negative part of x.
1.4 Applications
In this section, we provide a brief description of several industries to which the competition model
of Section 2.4 is applicable.
1.4.1 The Medicare Advantage Market
In the US, all citizens and permanent residents, 65 years or older, are eligible to enroll in the
Medicare program. In 2014, the Medicare program, covered approximately 54 million individuals,
at an annual cost close to half a trillion dollars, or 14% of total federal spending. Moreover, without
any restructuring, Medicare costs are estimated to grow at twice the rate of the GDP, the result
of the upcoming retirement of many baby boomers, increased longevity, as well as the escalating
costs of healthcare. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that the government’s
healthcare liabilities, as a percentage of the GDP, would grow from 5% to 12% in the next 40 years,
a situation most politicians and economists consider untenable, see e.g., Rivlin and Daniel [2015].
An individual who is eligible for Medicare coverage, has the choice of enrolling in the traditional
government plan or one of the approved private plans, since 2003, referred to as the Medicare
Advantage (MA) plans. In 2003, private MA plans captured only 13% of the potential market;
however, their share has steadily grown to 30% in 2014.
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As mentioned, in the MA program, the government pays most of the insurance premium of the
different plans that are offered to the beneficiaries. Insurance companies submit, each year, by a
given deadline, one or several plans, each covering one or a collection of counties. In the current
structure, the government announces a county-specific capitation rate or premium. All individuals
covered by Medicare pay a monthly base premium, irrespective of their plan choice, When choosing
a private plan, a beneficiary pays an additional premium given by the relative premium (= nominal
premium - capitation rate), when positive, or receives a 75% rebate when the relative premium is
negative.
Among other such proposals, the 2011 Wyden-Ryan (W-R) plan, prominently debated in the
2012 presidential campaign, advocates replacing the exogenous capitation rate by the second-lowest
bid. More recently, the Congressional Budget Office [2013] has considered, as an alternative to the
second lowest bid scheme, one which specifies the subsidy as a weighted average of the premium
bids (with the past year’s market shares as the weights). The report estimates that the second
lowest bid option [average bid option] results in an 11% [4%] reduction of federal spending, while
increasing payments by affected beneficiaries by 11% [-6%]. As with prior such estimates, e.g., Song
et al. [2012a], they are based on the simplifying assumption that the premium bids and market
shares would not be affected by the change in the subsidy scheme, when, in reality, of course,
they would. To assess the changes in the bid prices and market shares, one needs to model the
competition among the insurance companies as a price competition model with consumer utility
measures dependent on relative prices, for example, the model in Section 2.4.
To fit this model to the MA market in a given county, one needs to specify ai as a function
of the plans’ non-premium attributes. For example, Curto et al. [2015] consider indicator vari-
ables describing whether a plan has a given quality standard, and whether it is associated with
several supplemental benefits, e.g., vision and dental coverage. To capture the above asymmetric
consequences of positive versus negative relative prices, the response function should be specified
as
f(x) = x+ − 0.75x− (1.7)
a convex piece-wise linear function, of type (1.9). Depending upon whether the capitation rate is
exogenously announced, or endogenously determined as the second lowest bid or a weighted average
CHAPTER 1. PRICE COMPETITION BASED ON RELATIVE PRICES 16







Finally, “product 0” with utility measure u0 in (2.4), represents the option to enroll in the traditional
Medicare program as opposed to one of the private MA plans.
Thus far, the out-of-pocket cost for those enrolled in the traditional Medicare program are
unaffected by the level or the structure of the capitation rate. The same would apply to several
of the reform proposals, for example, the Dominici-Rivlin plan and the so called “Plan One” in
Rivlin and Daniel [2015], otherwise advocating a replacement of the exogenous constant capitation
rate (R1) by either (R4) or (R5), see (1.8). Under all such programs, the traditional Medicare
program is to be treated as the “outside good” or “product 0” with b0 = 0 (PIOG). However, the
Wyden-Ryan plan prescribed that the traditional Medicare plan would compete along side with
the private MA plans, and this provision is also part of the so-called “Plan Two” option in Rivlin
and Daniel [2015]. These types of proposals are to be modelled by setting b0 > 0, more specifically
b0 = b1 = · · · = bn = b > 0 (PSOG).
In Federgruen and Lu [2016b], we have applied our model to the Medicare market in 2010,
using nation-wide county-by-county data. The model was applied to all 2478 (out of a total of
2727) counties with 2 or more private MA plans. The county-by-county data were used to calibrate
the model. We have computed the price and market share equilibria in counterfactual studies,
under the above three subsidy schemes in (1.8). On this basis, we have estimated that, if the
second lowest bid was adopted in 2010, this would have resulted in a reduction by 16% in federal
spending, and an increase by 60$ per month for an average beneficiary enrolled in the traditional
Medicare program. (The reduction is considerably larger than when premium and market shares
are assumed to remain unaffected by the change of the subsidy scheme.)
As mentioned in the Introduction, we have also used the model to estimate the pass-through
rate, associated with an across-the-board reduction of the capitation rate, leaving the remainder
of the market structure unchanged, in particular the (PIOG) assumption. Figure 1.1 displays the
pass-through rate, on the interval [722, 802]. The pass through rates are evaluated by computing
the price equilibrium that would arise if the capitation rate was reduced by $10 from its current
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value. (In all scenarios, the equilibrium was verified to be unique.) Note that the pass through rate
fails to be constant, either in absolute or relative terms as implied by a linear or log-linear regression
equation, with the premium as the dependent variable and the capitation rate as an explanatory
variable. The average pass through rate is 12%, considerably lower than the range of estimates from
regression studies, see Section 1.1. In traditional settings, the pass through rate measures what
percentage of an increase in the product’s cost rate, is passed on to the consumer by an increase
in the retail price. In our setting, an increase in the capitation rate, does not affect the profit
margin so there is no incentive to increase the retail price. To the extent, modest price increases
are implemented, they serve to increase the profit margin, while the consumer’s net price for the
product is reduced anyway. However, any firm’s unilateral price increase causes many consumers
to migrate to other plans, therefore limiting its appeal.
1.4.2 Manufacturer Coupons
Manufacturers use coupons to stimulate sales of their products. While paper coupons have been
in use for a century, modern delivery methods include internet and so-called mobile coupons. The
latter is an electronic ticket delivered to a mobile phone that can be exchanged for a fixed dollar
amount rebate, or a percentage discount when purchasing a specific product or service. While
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newspaper inserts are still the primary method of distribution, the use of internet coupons has
mushroomed by 263% in the year 2009 alone, see Wall Street Journal [May 8 2010]. As mentioned
in the Introduction, the marketing literature has studied brand choice models, with the relative
price as the explanatory variable in the products’ utility measures. In other words, customers base
their brand choices on the relative price (= nominal price - the coupon value), even though, often,
only a minority of customers end up redeeming their coupon. Examples of such brand choice papers
with a MNL consumer choice model include Gonul and Smith [1999] and Mela et al. [1997].
The model in Section 2.4 applies to these settings, this time with gi(p) = Ci or gi(p) = δipi, as
in (R1) and (R2), respectively, and with the response function f(·) a general, increasing linear or
non-linear function. Product 0, now, represents the no-purchase option, so that b0 = 0, as discussed
in Section 2.4.
1.4.3 Green Technologies
Many governments are interested in promoting the production and sales of “green” technologies,
for example, solar panels and electric vehicles. For the former, sales have been stimulated by
offering Feed-In Tariffs, a long term guaranteed purchase agreement for producers to sell their
electricity into the grid, see Alizamir et al. [2016] and the references therein. As an alternative
stimulus mechanism, major subsidies have been provided in the US, both at the federal and state
level, mainly in the form of tax rebates. In 2009, for example, the federal government raised the
tax credit for solar panels to 30% of the nominal price, as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act(ARRA). Similar programs exist in Europe, in particular in Germany, one of the
countries leading the adoption of solar panels, see e.g., Jaeger-Waldau [2007] and Lobel and Perakis
[2016].
The ARRA also aimed to stimulate the adoption of electric vehicles. Here, a constant tax rebate
of $7,500 per vehicle was instituted, reducing the effective manufacturer’s suggested retail price for,
say, the Chevy Volt, from $39,145 to $31,615, or the Tesla model S from $59,350 to $51,850. See
Cohen et al. [2016] and King et al. [2014] for more detailed descriptions of the green technologies
industries.
The model in Section 2.4, can, again, be applied to characterize the competition in the oligopolis-
tic industries of solar panel manufacturers and the electrical automobile industry. The subsidy
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scheme for solar panels is of type (R2) while that for electric vehicles is of type (R1).
1.4.4 Pharmaceuticals
The vast majority of the US population has a medical insurance plan that covers drugs in most
categories. Drugs that treat the same medical condition are said to be in the same category. Every
insurance company specifies within each category, an approved list of drugs, called the formulary.
Each drug, within the formulary, comes with a co-payment. Even though the co-payment is often a
small part of the full cost, it is well known that most consumers are sensitive to differences among
them.
As a consequence, many drug manufacturers have offered coupons for specific drugs. Cahn
[2012] estimates that the manufacturers spend “between $3 billion and $6 billion annually on
coupon programs”, and that “coupons will be applied to 50 million brand name prescriptions by
2021”. As a further indication of the prevalence of the coupon practice, in 2009, coupons were
offered for half of the top selling drugs, see Cahn [2012].
The competition among the manufacturers within a given category may be analyzed by the
model in Section 2.4. In this case, it is insurance companies that provide a subsidy to the consumers
covered by their plans. For a given insurance plan and drug i, let
pi = the nominal price, per unit of dosage
copayi = the co-payment, per unit of dosage
couponi = the coupon, per unit of dosage
The manufacturer of product i earns a net reward = pi − couponi, while the insurance company
offers a subsidy gi(p) = Ci = pi− copayi, see (2.1a), resulting in a net price = copayi− couponi for
the consumer. (The net price is sometimes negative.) With nominal or list prices set in advance
of the formulary and co-payments, the manufacturers compete by selecting their coupon values
{couponi}.
On the global scene, one finds national governments, international organizations and private
foundations subsidizing specific drugs and vaccines to combat infectious diseases. Such interna-
tional organizations include the World Health Organization and UNICEF. The Global Alliance
for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI) is a public-private global health partnership committed to
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increasing access to immunisation in poor countries, specifically with the help of subsidy programs.
Indeed, GAVI is the primary subsidy source for many vaccines. Finally, the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation is an example of a private foundation, pursuing the same goals, among other global
health campaigns.
Two very specific examples are (i) vaccines to immunize against yellow fever, that has more
than 900 million people at risk, and (ii) drugs to combat malaria, a disease afflicting 300-500
million individuals, with 2 million lethal cases, annually. As to the former, there are four global
suppliers2 providing 33 billion vials, annually, while GAVI estimates the global demand to be
between 78 and 137 billion vials. To promote the vaccination program in developing countries,
GAVI offers a country dependent constant subsidy per vial3. Artesiminin Combination Therapies
(ACT) represent the most effective drug to treat malaria. In 2007, the World Bank created the
Affordable Medicines Facility for malaria (AMFm) to provide a uniform subsidy for each treatment
unit, again to stimulate the consumption of these drugs. Levi et al. [2016] model the competition
among the suppliers as a homogenous Cournot competition game with a linear inverse demand
function. Subsidies are provided by a central planner, the focus of the paper is when a uniform
subsidy per unit is optimal among all, possibly firm-dependent constant subsidies.
1.4.5 Prospect Theoretical Models
As mentioned in the Introduction, the price competition game in Section 2.4 also serves as an
adequate representation of prospect theoretical models for oligopolies, even when customers pay
the full price, without any subsidization. Behavioral economists have demonstrated that consumers
evaluate alternative products or services on the basis of relative prices, i.e, their differentials with
respect to a given reference point. Moreover, these differentials are weighted in non-linear ways;
in particular, it is well established that positive price differentials are weighted more heavily than
equal sized negative differentials. To represent this loss aversion phenomenon, often a piecewise
2Bio-Manguinhos(Brazil), Institut Pasteur de Dakar (Senegal), FSUE Chumakov (Russia)and Sanofi Pasteur
(France).
3Except for Latin American countries where subsidies are provided by the Pan American Health Organiza-
tion(PAHO).
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linear, convex response function f(·) of the type:
f(x) = βx, if x < 0 and f(x) = αx, if x > 0, with β < α, (1.9)
is used. This is the “asymmetric reference price model” adopted in almost all marketing studies,
see the Introduction and Mazumdar et al. [2005]. In the following sections, we pay special attention
to this type of response function among more general nonlinear functions required to represent the
phenomenon of diminished sensitivity, i.e., the fact that the impact of a $200 differential may not
be double that of a $100 differential. Our comparison results in Section 1.7 are focused on the
structure in (1.9).
1.5 Exogenous Constant or Percentage Reference Value
In this section, we study the price competition model with the reference value exogenously set as a
constant or a given fraction of the absolute price, i.e., when gi(p) satisfies (R1) or (R2). We start
with the case of constant reference values.
1.5.1 Constant Reference Values (R1)
Under constant reference values, the market-shares in (2.5) are given by
di(p) =
exp (ai − bif (pi − C))
exp (a0 − b0f (p0 − C)) +
∑N
k=1 exp (ak − bkf (pk − C))
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (1.10)
Taking derivatives with respect to the price variables, we get, in view of Assumption 1:
∂di
∂pi




′ (pj − C) didj , if ∆pj = pj − C 6∈ P for any j = 1, 2, . . . , N, j 6= i. (1.12)
When ∆pi or ∆pj ∈ P, formulae, similar to (1.11) and (1.12), apply to the left-derivatives and
the right-derivatives of di with respect to pi and pj , respectively. Note that each firm’s demand is
decreasing in its own price and increasing in any of its competitors’ prices, as in the classical MNL
model.
Theorem 1 Under an exogenously specified subsidy, the competition model is log-supermodular. In
particular, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium price vector p∗, and the set of all price equilibria is
a lattice and, therefore, has a componentwise largest and smallest element, p̄∗ and p∗, respectively.
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An additional implication of the price game being (log-)supermodular is the fact that an equilibrium
may be computed with a simple tatônnement scheme: starting with an arbitrary price vector p(0),
one iteratively computes a best response price for each of the N firms to the most recently generated
prices of the competitors. The scheme is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. Moreover,
when the tatônnement scheme is started at pmin[pmax], it is guaranteed to converge to p∗[p̄∗]. It is
therefore possible to unequivocally determine whether the game has a unique equilibrium by starting
the tatônnement scheme, both at pmin and at pmax, and checking whether the two schemes converge
to the same limit point. We are, at this point, unaware of any, a priori, theoretical conditions which
guarantee the uniqueness of the price equilibrium under (R1); see, however, Theorem 3(b). It can
also be shown that
Proposition 1 Assuming that the response function f(·) is increasing and convex, each firm’s
profit function is strictly quasi-concave in its own price.
The quasi-concavity property, of course, greatly simplifies the computation of best-response prices.
More specifically, when f(·) is convex, there is a unique best response price, for any set of prices
selected by the competitors. This best response price, for given choices of firm i’s competitors p0−i,











i ]. Note first that
lim
pi↘ci
















− bif ′(pi − C)(1− di)
]
= +∞,
since the second term within the squared brackets is bounded in pi ↘ ci. This implies that, for
any equilibrium p∗, p∗i > ci for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Similarly,
lim
pi↗∞












−bif ′+(0)(1− di(pi, p−i))
]
≤ −bif ′+(0)(1− di(C, p−i)) < 0,
since di is decreasing in its own price pi and f is convex. This implies that, for p
max sufficiently
large, p∗ < pmax. Thus, if pmax is sufficiently large, any equilibrium p∗ is an interior point of the
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feasible price space, so that
(p∗i − ci)bif ′ (p∗i − C) (1− di) = 1, if p∗i − C 6∈ P. (1.13a)
(p∗i − ci)bif ′+ (p∗i − C) (1− di) ≥ 1
(p∗i − ci)bif ′− (p∗i − C) (1− di) ≤ 1
 , if p∗i − C ∈ P. (1.13b)
This set of equations (or inequalities) may be used, in any empirical study, to infer the firms’ cost
rates c from the observed price equilibrium in the market. In particular when p∗i − C 6∈ P, for all






bif ′(p∗i − C)(1− di(p∗))
, i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (1.14)
When p∗i − C ∈ P, for some firm i, the cost rate ci can be determined only within an interval,
the width of which depends on the difference between the right hand and left hand derivatives
[f ′+(p
∗





i − C)(1− di(p∗))




i − C)(1− di(p∗))
. (1.15)
We complete this section with an exploration of whether the price equilibrium is monotone in
the reference value C. This conjecture is intuitive: after all, interpreting the reference value as a
subsidy to the consumer by a third-party, it appears intuitive that the larger the subsidy, the more
firms are incentivized to increase their nominal prices. Assuming the increase in the firms’ nominal
prices is smaller than the increase in the reference value, i.e., assuming pass through rates of up to
100%, this generates a setting with lower net prices, yet better marginal profit rates. Indeed, the






≤ 0. ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (1.16)
( See (1.11) and (1.12) with the understanding that, when ∂di(p)∂pj fails to exist, it is replaced by the
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, any diagonal element dominates, in absolute value, the sum of its
off-diagonal elements. This condition appears intuitive: it states that when all firms in the market
reduce their prices by the same amount, this will not result in a decrease of any of product’s sales
volume. The diagonal dominant condition goes back to Arrow et al. [1959] and Hadar [1965], and
is a standard assumption in many price competition models, see e.g., Vives [2001], Bernstein and
Federgruen [2004], Farahat and Perakis [2011] and Allon et al. [2013].
Theorem 2 Assume that f is convex and (D) applies on the feasible price cube [pmin, pmax]. Then,
the component-wise smallest and component-wise largest price equilibrium p∗ and p∗ are monoton-
ically increasing in C.
In the standard MNL model, condition (D) is known to hold, see e.g., the proof of Theorem 5 in
Bernstein and Federgruen [2004], as well as Proposition 2 below. Under the PIOG-structure, the
diagonal dominant condition (D) – and hence monotonicity of the price equilibrium in C – can be
shown as well, as long as the market share of the outside good is above a given threshold value,
which depends on the degree of non-linearity of the response function.
Proposition 2 (PIOG) Assume b0 = 0, b1 = · · · = bN = b. If f is convex and d0 ≥ 1 − βα
on the feasible price cube [pmin, pmax], then the diagonal-dominant condition (D) holds, and the
component-wise smallest and component-wise largest price equilibrium p∗ and p∗ are monotonically
increasing in C.
In the standard MNL model, α = β, so that the market share condition d0 ≥ 1 − β/α = 0 holds
trivially. In our general model, the market share condition easily applies, in many applications. For
example, in the above Medicare insurance market, α = 1, β = 0.75 and the traditional Medicare
program, representing the outside good, has a current market share of 70%, well above the 25%
(= 1 − β/α) threshold required by Proposition 2. The managerial implication in that market is
clear: an across-the-board reduction of the capitation rate by a given amount, will result in a decline
of all premia. This monotonicity structure is widely assumed by policy makers and underlines the
structure of the reduced form regression equations employed in various studies, see the Introduction.
In the PSOG case, where b0 = b1 = · · · = bN = b, the diagonal-dominant condition (D) is harder
to guarantee, as the following counterexample demonstrates. The example considers a market with
n = 3 products, along with an outside good. The model parameters are specified in the caption
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of Figure 1.2 below. The example shows, that the product with the lowest price adjusts its price
downward when the reference value C is increased. ( By Theorem 2, this implies that the diagonal-
dominant condition (D) fails in this example. ) Note that, under PSOG, as all net prices decline
by the same amount, the outside good gains in attractiveness, along with all in-market products,
forcing some products to reduce their normal prices. Indeed, as the reference value increases, the
price spread increases as well.





































product with the lowest cost
Notes: The parameters are: N = 3, bi = 0.0134, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, [a0, a1, a2, a3] = [0,−3.25,−4.24,−4.70], [c1, c2, c3] =
[720.84, 593.16, 487.06], p0 = 850, f(x) = x
+ − 0.75x−. (These parameters are calibrated from Medicare data, see
Federgruen and Lu [2016b].) Product 0 is the traditional Medicare program.
1.5.2 Percentage Reference Values
Assume, now, that the reference values {gi(p)} are given by (2.1b), for specific fractions δi < 1.
Theorem 3 (a) Under exogenously specified percentage discount subsidies, the competition model
is log-supermodular. This implies that the price game has a pure Nash equilibrium, and that
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the set of equilibria is a lattice, with a componentwise smallest and largest element.
(b) If the response function f(·) is convex, the equilibrium is unique.
In conclusion, under the basic Assumption 1, the price competition model is log-supermodular, both
when the reference value is an exogenous constant, and when it is specified as a given percentage of
the absolute price. This implies the existence of a component-wise smallest and largest equilibrium,
which can be computed with a simple tatônnement scheme. It is difficult to identify sufficient
conditions guaranteeing the existence of a unique equilibrium under a constant reference value. In
contrast, convexity of the response function provides such a guarantee when the reference value is
specified as a discount percentage of the absolute price.
Consider now the case where all reference values are determined as a uniform fraction δ of the
nominal price, that is δpi for all i. It is, again, of interest to explore whether a larger reference
value due to an increase of δ, results in larger equilibrium prices. We prove this monotonicity result
for a response function f , which is linear on the positive half line, for all δ in excess of a minimum
threshold value. ( Under (R2), net prices are never negative, rendering the shape of the response
function on the negative half line immaterial. )
Let δ = 1 − 1
bp−bp , where b = min{bi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N}, b = max{bi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N}, p =
min{pmini , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N}, p = max{pmaxi , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N}, the following proposition shows
the monotonicity of the price equilibrium with respect to the discount factor δ when δ ≥ δ.
Proposition 3 Assume that f(x) = αx for x ≥ 0 and δi = δ for all i. Then, the unique price
equilibrium is monotonically increasing in the discount factor δ when δ ≥ δ.
The lower bound condition δ ≥ δ is required to provide a theoretical guarantee for the monotonicity
result, however, in our extensive numerical studies, we found that the monotonicity prevails at any
level of the discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1).
1.6 The n-th Lowest Price Reference Value
In this section, we study the competition model with a reference value endogenously determined
as the lowest or n-th lowest among the nominal prices selected by the competing firms, namely,
g(p) = p(n).
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1.6.1 Reference Value Determined by The Lowest Price
We start with the case of the lowest price, i.e., reference value structure (R3). Some additional
structure is needed for the response function f(·), i.e., we replace Assumption 1 by the a somewhat
stronger condition regarding the shape of the response function:
Assumption 2 f(x) is increasing, convex and differentiable everywhere with the possible exception
of x = 0.
We allow for non-differentiability in x = 0, to capture the application of our model to the Medicare
market in Section 1.4.1, as well as prospect theoretical models discussed in Section 1.4.5. We first
derive expressions for the sales volumes {di(p) : i = 1, 2, . . . , N} and their derivatives {∂di∂pi : i =
1, 2, . . . , N}. To this end, we distinguish among (i) the case where pi < p−i(1), (ii) the case where
pi > p
−i
(1), and (iii) pi = p
−i
(1).
(i) For any pi < p
−i
(1), the reference value g(p) = pi. By (2.5) and the fact that f(0) = 0, we have
di(p) =
exp (ai)
exp (a0 − b0f (p0 − pi)) +
∑N
k=1 exp (ak − bkf (pk − pi))
, (1.18)






k 6=i exp (ak − bkf (pk − pi)) · (bkf ′ (pk − pi))(
exp (a0 − b0f (p0 − pi)) +
∑N






′ (pk − pi) . (1.19)
(ii) For any pi > p
−i
(1), the reference value g(p) = p
−i






























(iii) When pi = p
−i
(1), it is easily verified that both (1.18) and (1.20) represent correct expressions
for the sales volume di(p). Hence, the derivative
∂di
∂pi
may fall to exist for the value pi = p
−i
(1).
However, the left- and right hand derivatives ∂−di∂pi and
∂+di
∂pi
exist; the former is given by (1.19)
and the latter by (1.21).
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We first demonstrate that when the reference value is determined by the lowest price, the demand
volume continues to have the desired monotonicity properties: each product’s demand volume
decreases in its own price and increases in the price of any of the competing products. While highly
intuitive, we will see that these properties may fail under alternative reference value structures,
e.g., (R5), see Section 2.7.
Proposition 4 Let Assumption 2 hold.
(a) Every product’s demand volume is a decreasing function of its own price.
(b) The products are substitutes, i.e., the demand for any product is increasing in the price of
any of the competing products.
Proposition 4(b) shows that, when the reference value is specified as the lowest price, the products
act as substitutes. Note also that if the demand for any product i is non-decreasing in the price
of any alternative product, the same monotonicity property applies to the associated profit values,
and vice versa. The latter monotonicity property (of the profit functions) is often referred to as
“the competitive market” property, see e.g., Assumption 1 in Cabral and Villas-Boas [2005].
In addition to Assumption 2, we assume the following two conditions hold: For any product













is quasi-convex in pi ∈ [ci, p−i(1)). (M)
Condition (D̃) is a weaker version of condition (D), a classical dominant-diagonal condition, em-
ployed in Section 1.5. Recall that it merely precludes that a uniform price increase by all firms
would result in an increase of any of the firms’ sales volumes. Moreover, under D̃, the dominant
diagonal condition is required only when the firm’s price is close to the lowest price offered by the
competitors. In Lemma 2 below, we show that conditions (D̃) and (M) apply when f is a two-part
piece-wise linear function and all products share the same price sensitivity coefficient (PSOG).
We now show that a pure-strategy price equilibrium exists in the lowest subsidy model by
showing that each firm’s profit function is quasi-concave in its own price .
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Theorem 4 Assume that Assumption 2 and conditions (D̃)-(M) apply in the lowest subsidy model.
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
The following lemma shows that conditions (D̃) and (M) apply when the function f(·) is a two-part
piece-wise linear function and the price sensitivity coefficient is the same for all firms.
Lemma 2 The conditions of Theorem 4, i.e., conditions (D̃)-(M) and Assumption 2 apply, when
(i) bi = b for all i and (ii) f is a two-part piece-wise linear function, i.e., f(x) = αx
+ − βx− with
α, β > 0, see (1.9).
We now show that under the conditions of Lemma 2, the model is (log-)supermodular.
Theorem 5 Assume (1) bi = b for all i and (2) f(x) = αx
+ − βx− with α, β > 0. The price
competition game with the reference value specified as the lowest price is log-supermodular.
Following the arguments provided in the previous section, it is easily verified that any price equi-
librium must be an interior point of the feasible price region, provided the upper bounds pmax are
sufficiently large. Moreover, as shown in (A-11), each profit function πi(pi, p−i) is differentiable
everywhere, with the possible exception of the point pi = p
−i
(1). Together with (A-12) and (A-13),
this implies that any equilibrium p∗ satisfies the following system of equations and inequalities:




′ (p∗k − p∗i ) = 0, if p∗i < p
−i
(1), (1.22a)
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Similar to the system of equations and inequalities in (1.13), (1.22) allows us to determine the cost
rates {ci} from any observed price equilibrium p∗. For any product with p∗i 6= p
−i
(1), the unique





an interval can be determined for the corresponding marginal cost rate ci by inequalities (1.22c)
and (1.22d).
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1.6.2 Reference Value Determined by the n-th Lowest Price
In this subsection, we study the price competition model when the reference value is endogenously
determined as the nth-lowest price among the set of nominal prices selected by the competing
firms, i.e., g(p) = p(n), for some n ≥ 2, see (R4). The Medicare market in Subsection 1.4.1
provides the motivation for this generalization of the lowest price subsidy; as mentioned, several
bipartisan proposals, in particular the Wyden–Ryan and Domenici–Rivlin’s plans, advocate setting
the capitation rate as the second lowest price. As above, we assume that Assumption 2 applies.
Note that the reference value satisfies the following relationships:
g(pi, p−i) = p(n) =






(n−1) < pi ≤ p
−i
(n)



















)) , pi ≤ p−i(n−1)
exp(ai)∑N
k=0 exp(ak−bkf(pk−pi))















)) , pi > p−i(n)
, (1.24)
As in the previous section, we need the following variant of condition (D) and (M) which we now



























The first inequality in (D′) is identical to (D̃). Lemma 3, below, provides sufficient conditions for
both inequalities in (D′).
Similar to Theorem 4, we show that a pure-strategy price equilibrium exists by showing that
each firm’s profit function is quasi-concave in its own price for any given price choices of the other
alternatives.
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Theorem 6 Assume that Assumption 2 and conditions (D′) − (M ′) hold. A pure-strategy price
equilibrium exists, when the subsidy is determined as the nth-lowest price.
The following Lemma shows that conditions (D′) − (M ′) hold under the same conditions as in
Lemma 2, for (D̃) and (M), plus an additional assumption which stipulates that a positive relative
price weighs more heavily than a negative relative price of the same magnitude. (In prospect
theoretical models, the assumption reflects the fact that losses weigh more heavily than equal sized
gains.) The assumption α ≥ β applies in the Medicare insurance market, where each beneficiary
pays the full excess of the premium above the subsidy, but receives only part of any shortfall, when
the premium is lower than the subsidy.
Lemma 3 Conditions (D′)− (M ′) hold when (i) bi = b for all i = 1, . . . , N and (ii) f is a two-part
piece-wise linear function, i.e., f(x) = αx+ − βx− with α ≥ β ≥ 0.
We conclude that the price competition model has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, under minor
technical conditions, irrespective of whether the reference value is determined as the lowest price
or the n-th lowest price. The question remains whether the same fundamental invariance with
respect to the subsidy structure applies to the stronger property of the price competition game
being (log-)supermodular. It follows from the proofs of Theorem 5 that this (log-)supermodularity
property applies whenever each firm’s sales volume increases with its alternatives’ prices, that is,
when products may be viewed as simple substitutes, or, equivalently, markets maybe viewed as
competitive, see Assumption 1 in Cabral and Villas-Boas [2005]. In the absence of any subsidy,
the MNL model clearly represents products that are strict substitutes. Theorem 5 shows that the
same applies in our model, when the reference value is determined as the lowest price, subject to
minor technical conditions, see Lemma 2(b). However, under a more complex subsidy structure,
such as one based on the second lowest price, products may cease to interact as strict substitutes;
in particular, an increase of the second lowest price in the market, now, has two opposite effects: on
the one hand, the net prices of all other products decrease by the same amount, by itself resulting
in an increase of each of their market shares. However, the non-linearity of the function f , even in
its simplest form when f(x) = αx+ − βx−, implies a smaller increase of the utility attributed to
the cheapest product as supposed to the utility increases for the other alternatives. This has the
opposite effect of shifting some of the market share from the lowest priced product toward those
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other alternatives; the net effect of an increase of the second lowest price, may therefore involve a
decrease of the market share of the cheapest alternative. Indeed, this phenomenon may well occur
depending on the response function’s degree of non-linearity β/α and the relative market shares of
the cheapest and the second cheapest products. More specifically, one can show
∂d(1)(p)
∂p(2)








where d(n)(p) denotes the sales volume of the (lowest indexed) product with the n-th smallest price.
1.7 Comparison of Subsidy Schemes
In this Section, we derive several comparison results across different reference value structures.
These results have important implications for the design of subsidy schemes, among other applica-
tions. We focus on the comparisons of the price equilibria between reference value structures (R1)
and (R2), and (R1) and (R3), in Subsection 1.7.1 and 1.7.2, respectively. To simplify and unify
our results, we confine ourselves, in this section, to the asymmetric reference price model, i.e., a
two-part piecewise linear response functions and settings where all in-market products share the
same price sensitivity coefficient. [(C1) b1 = b2 = · · · bN = b and (C2) f(x) = αx+ − βx− with
α ≥ β > 0.] Recall that under these conditions, the price competition is log-supermodular under
any one of the reference value structures (R1)–(R3).
1.7.1 R1 vs R2: Constant vs Discount Based Reference Value
In this subsection, we compare the price equilibrium that arises when the reference value is an
exogenous constant, i.e., gi(p) = C, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N , as in (R1), with reference values, specified








Obviously, δi ∈ (1− βα , 1).
Theorem 7 Fix C > 0; assume δi ≥ δi for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
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(a) For any given price vector of the competing products, each firm’s best response under the
discounted price reference value scheme is larger than its best response under the exogenous
constant reference value:
p∗DISCi (p−i) ≥ p∗EXOi (p−i), for any firm i and any p−i. (1.25)
(b) The unique price equilibrium (p∗DISC) under the discounted reference value scheme is com-
ponentwise larger than any price equilibrium (pEXO) under the exogenous constant reference
value C.
Proof. (a) We show that, for any given price vector p, the best response price vector under the
discounted reference value scheme is larger than the best response under the constant reference
value. A unique best response vector exists under both schemes, since each firm i’s profit function
πi is strictly quasi-concave in its own price pi, under both reference value schemes. Proposition 1
shows this property for scheme (R1), while Proposition 2 in Gallego et al. [2006] establishes the
property for scheme (R2).
Under the discounted reference value scheme, the market share for firm i is given by
dDISCi (p) =
exp (ai − bαγipi)
exp (a0 − b0αγ0p0) +
∑N
j=1 exp (aj − bαγjpj)
,
where γi = 1− δi. Under the constant reference value scheme, the market share for firm i is given
by
dEXOi (p) =
exp (ai − bf(pi − C))








where f(pi − C) = α(pi − C) if pi ≥ C and f(pi − C) = β(pi − C) if pi < C. Note that,














 1pi−ci − bα
(
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1− dEXOi (pi, p−i)
)
, pi < C
Given the log-concavity of both functions πDISCi (pi, p−i) and π
EXO
i (pi, p−i) in pi, for any given
vector p−i, it suffices to show that
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1− dDISCi (pi, p−i)
)
, pi < C
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The proof of (1.26) is relegated to Appendix.
(b) Let ΨEXO : RN −→ RN denote the best response operator in the competition game with
an exogenous constant reference value C, i.e., ΨEXOi (p) is defined as the unique best response for
firm i to the price vector p−i in the game. Similarly, let Ψ
DISC denote the best response operator in
the competition game when the reference value is specified as in (R2). (Best responses are uniquely


















Since f is convex, the equilibrium under (R2) is unique, see Theorem 3. It suffices to prove the






The two equalities follow from Theorem 4.3.2 in Topkis [1998], since the price competition game
is (log-)supermodular under both reference value schemes, by Theorems 1 and 3. To prove the
inequality, we show, by induction that
ΨDISC(r)(pmax) ≤ ΨEXO(r)(pmax) for any r = 1, 2, . . ..
For r = 1 the inequality holds by part (a) of this theorem. Assume the inequality holds for some














The first inequality follows from the fact that the best response operator in a (log-)supermodular
game is a monotone operator, while the second inequality follows from part (a) of the theorem.
Remark 1 Theorem 7 holds for both PIOG (i.e., b0 = 0 ) and PSOG (i.e., b0 > 0). In the PIOG
case, the minimum discount factor δi is increasing in C. In the PSOG case, the monotonicity
property fails: δi is increasing in C if C ≥ p0, and decreasing in C when C < p0.
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Theorem 7 leaves us with the question, how the equilibria p∗EXO and p∗DISC compare, when (some
of) the discount percentages δi fall below their threshold value δi. We focus on the case where all
δi = δ, i = 1, 2, . . . , N . In our numerical results, we have observed that, for any given firm i, the
following threshold result applies: there exists a threshold value δ∗i such that
p∗DISCi ≤ pi∗EXO iff δ ≤ δ∗i. (1.27)
A similar result prevails for the componentwise smallest equilibrium pi
∗EXO. These results follow
from Theorem 7 and the monotonicity of p∗DISC in δ, a property we proved for δ sufficiently large,
see Proposition 3, and numerically observe to hold on the entire interval δ ∈ [0, 1). Note that
when δ ↘ 0, p∗DISC approaches the (unique) equilibrium in the absence of subsidization, which
also corresponds with p∗EXO when the exogenous reference value equals zero. Thus, in general, for
sufficiently small δ, p∗DISC falls below p∗EXO, see Theorem 2 and Proposition 2. The threshold
result (1.27) now follows immediately from the monotonicity of p∗DISC in δ and Theorem 7.
We have characterized the comparison result of the price equilibria under (R1) and (R2), as a
function of δ, for a fixed value of the constant reference value C. Conversely, it is of interest to
characterize the relation for a fixed discount percentage δ, as the constant reference value C varies.
Here, we prove a rigorous threshold result, for the most common (PIOG) structure.
Corollary 1 Assume (PIOG) and d0 ≥ 1− βα on the feasible price space. Fix δi ∈ [0, 1]. For each
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , there exists a threshold value C0i such that pi
∗EXO ≤ p∗DISCi iff C ≤ C0i . A similar
threshold result holds for the componentwise smallest equilibrium price pi
∗EXO.
1.7.2 R1 vs R3: Constant vs Lowest Price Reference Value
In this subsection, we compare the price equilibria under an exogenous constant reference value
(R1) with those that arise when the reference value is determined as the lowest (nominal) price,
i.e., (R3). Here, it is, again, useful to provide a separate treatment for the (PIOG) and the (PSOG)
cases. We start with (PIOG), i.e., the most common structure.
Let p̄∗EXO (p∗EXO) and p̄∗LOW (p∗LOW ) be the componentwise largest (smallest) price equilib-
rium under (R1) and (R3), respectively. We now show that, for any product, the largest equilibrium
price under the minimum price reference value is componentwise smaller than the largest equilib-
rium price under an exogenous constant reference value, if and only if the latter is larger than a
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given threshold value.
Theorem 8 (PIOG) Assume b0 = 0 and b1 = b2 = · · · = bN = b > 0:
(a) If C ≤ cmin, p̄∗LOW ≥ p̄∗EXO and p∗LOW ≥ p∗EXO.
(b) Assume d0 ≥ 1− β/α on the feasible price region. Fix i = 1, 2, . . . , N , there exists a critical
threshold level C0i ≤ ∞ for the exogenous reference value such that
p̄i
∗EXO ≥ p̄i∗LOW iff C ≥ C0i .
The same threshold result applies to the componentwise smallest equilibria.
Thus, in the (PIOG) structure, the price equilibria are lower under (R3), as compared to (R1), only
if the exogenous constant reference value C is in excess of a given threshold value. Under (PSOG),
this dominance relationship prevails, throughout, even when the constant exogenous reference value
is relatively low. In Theorem 9, below, we prove the dominance relationship, specifically for a
constant reference value C below a given threshold; this result can be extended for larger, hence,
arbitrary values of C, as long as the component-wise smallest and largest equilibria under (R1)
is known to be increasing in C. This is guaranteed to be the case under the dominant-diagonal
condition (D), see Theorem 2. Recall, however, from the discussion and counter-example in Section
1.5, that monotonicity of the price equilibrium in the constant reference value may fail to hold.
Theorem 9 (PSOG) Assume that bi = b, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N .
(a) p∗LOW ≤ p∗EXO and p∗LOW ≤ p∗EXO if C ≤ cmin + ln(α)−ln(β)b(α−β) .
(b) Assume the diagonal-dominant condition (D) holds. Then, p∗LOW ≤ p∗EXO and p∗LOW ≤
p∗EXO for any constant reference value C.
We illustrate the above comparison results with the help of the example used in Figure 1.2. (Recall,
this example reflects a market with three products, in addition to the “outside” good.) Note that,
the discounted reference value with discount fraction δi = 0 for all i results in the well-known
standard MNL model. As proven in Theorem 8, the equilibrium prices under a constant reference
value C = $750 are componentwise higher than those under a reference value given by the lowest
price. However, this ranking breaks down when the reference value is given by the second–lowest
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price. (Product-3’s price under the constant reference value is smaller than when the reference
value is given by the second–lowest price). The equilibrium prices under a percentage discount
reference value are componentwise smaller than those under a constant reference value when this
discount percentage is sufficiently small. This corresponds with the conditions in Theorem 7.
Figure 1.3: Comparison of Equilibrium Prices under Different Reference Value Struc-
tures
product‐1 product‐2 product‐3
Constant 800.02 703.24 601.94
Lowest 799.32 675.68 581.90
2nd‐Lowest 799.70 676.43 602.54
Weighted Average 807.62 701.73 599.73
Discount 0% 799.32 675.68 581.90























Constant Lowest 2nd‐Lowest Weighted Average Discount 0% Discount 30%
Notes: The parameters are the same as in Figure 1.2, in addition, the constant reference value C = 750, the weighted
average reference value structure uses weights (w0, w1, w2, w3) = (75.51%, 5.72%, 6.86%, 11.90%). These weights
reflect the prior year’s market shares of the Medicare plans in this county.
1.8 Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, we have analyzed a general price competition model for settings where the (random)
utility attributed to a given product depends on its price, via a non-linear response function f(·)
of the net price, i.e., the differential between the nominal price and a reference value gi(p), see
equations (2.2) and (2.4). Our model is motivated both by settings where the product or service
is subsidized by a third party and gi(p) represents the subsidy level, as well as prospect theoretical
models, in which consumers react to relative prices, as opposed to absolute prices. In Section 1.4,
we have discussed five different application areas for these models.
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We have characterized the equilibrium behavior of the price competition model under various
specifications of the reference value gi(p), addressing each of questions (I)-(IV) in the Introduc-
tion. In particular, we have derived comparison results across different reference value structures,
and different parameters within the same reference structure. These comparison results provide
important insights, for the design of subsidy schemes, see e.g. Section 1.4.1, addressing the current
debate about the Medicare Advantage Market.
Another common reference value structure is (R5), i.e., the reference value is a weighted average
of the selected absolute prices, see for example, Subsection 1.4.1 ad 1.4.5 addressing the Medicare
Advantage market and prospect theoretical models, respectively. As mentioned in the Introduction,
under this structure, the products (may) cease to be substitutes in the sense of cross price elasticities
being positive. Substituting gi(p) =
∑
k wkpk (, see (2.1e), ) into (2.5) and taking the partial




wjgi + (1− wj)djgj − wj∑
k 6=j
dkgk
 , i 6= j, (1.28)
where gk = bkf
′(pk −
∑
`w`p`), k = 0, 1, . . . , N . Thus, for any i 6= j,
∂di
∂pj
< 0⇐⇒ wjgi + (1− wj)djgj − wj
∑
k 6=j
dkgk < 0⇐⇒ wj(gi − ḡ) + djgj < 0, (1.29)
where ḡ =
∑N
k=0 dkgk ∈ (min{gk}, max{gk}) is weighted average of the quantities {gk}. In other
words, even with identical price sensitivity coefficients b1 = b2 = · · · = bN , a negative cross price
elasticity may easily arise; in particular, an increase in the price of a product j, with a modest
market share (i.e., relatively modest dj value), and hence an increase in the reference value g(p),
may end up decreasing the market share of a low–cost competing product i (, with a relatively
low value of gi.). This phenomenon arises, in particular, under significantly non-linear and convex
response function f(·). Alternatively, even when the response function f(·) is linear, negative cross
elasticities may arise under heterogenous price sensitivity coefficients {bk}.
As mentioned in the Introduction, when products fail to be substitutes throughout the full price
region, the existence of a Nash equilibrium can, in general, not be guaranteed. Indeed, elementary
structural properties of the profit functions, such as (log-)supermodularity or (log-)quasi-concavitity
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This function fails in general to be decreasing, i.e., the profit function πi fails to be log-concave
unless the products are substitutes (i.e., ∂dk∂pi > 0 for k 6= i) and the quantities {gk} are independent
of the price pi. As discussed above, this situation arises only when the response function f(·) is
linear and the price sensitivity coefficients {bk} are identical.
Future work should address various generalizations of the MNL–based consumer choice model.
First, the specification of the utility measure in (2.2) and (2.4) is broad and captures almost all
applications we are aware of. However, in some studies a variant of the specification is desired,
thus requiring an adaptation of the analysis in the paper. For example, in some applications, one
may wish to specify the utility measure as a function of both the absolute and the relative price,
for example, ui,j = ai − ηipi − bif(pi − gi(p)) + εi,j , see Chen et al. [2016] for such a specification.
Other generalizations relate to Mixed MultiNomial Logit models and nested MNL models. The
former are important in applications where the market needs to be partitioned into segments, each
with its own utility measures {ui(p)}. For example, econometric models for the Medicare Advantage
market, e.g., Nosal [2012], identify inertia and switching costs, as a major factor in describing the
industry dynamics. To model this phenomenon, the market needs to be segmented into N segments,
based on the beneficiary’s plan choice in the prior year. The same applies to prospect theoretical
models in which the reference value is given by the price of the most recently purchased brand.
In addition, socio-economic factors may induce the need for segmentation. Generalizations of our
results to nested MNL model are required to understand the equilibrium behavior in one of the
models used by Curto et al. [2015].
Chapter 2
Medicare Reform: Estimation of the
Impacts of Premium Support Systems
Awi Federgruen and Lijian Lu
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2.1 Introduction and Summary
Medicare provides health insurance to all US citizens and permanent residents, ages 65 and older,
as well as younger people with specific disabilities. The current Medicare system was put in place in
2003, with the adoption of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA), and the adoption of Medicare
Advantage (MA), formerly known as Medicare Choice or Medicare Part C. In 2015, Medicare has
covered more than 55 million individuals, at an annual cost of approximately 600 billion dollars.
Moreover, without any restructuring, Medicare costs are estimated to grow at twice the rate of
the GDP, the result of the upcoming retirement of many baby boomers, increased longevity, as
well as the escalating costs of healthcare. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the
government’s aggregate healthcare liabilities, as a percentage of the GDP, would grow from 5%
to 12% in the next 40 years, in the absence of a fundamental restructuring of the system. It is
generally understood that this would bankrupt the Medicare system.
Prominent members of Congress, bipartisan policy centers and think tanks have launched pro-
posals to rescue the program. A major part of these proposals consists of changes in the way
capitation rates or subsidies for the insurance premia would be determined. Some advocate reduc-
ing the exogenously pre-specified capitation rates, while others call for an endogenous determination
as a function of the premium bids of all plans competing in the county, for example the lowest bid,
the second lowest bid or a weighted average of the bids. Attempts to quantify the implications
of such reforms have been hampered by the fact that the equilibrium behavior of the resulting
price competition games has not been known. As a consequence, estimates of cost savings for the
Medicare program or out-of-pocket costs for the beneficiaries, among other performance measures,
have been made, on the basis of the assumption that all plans premium bids and, hence, all market
shares would not be affected by the modified subsidy schemes. See e.g. Congressional Budget Office
(2013).
Even the impacts of mere level changes within the current system with exogenous capitation
rate are difficult to predict. Song et al. [2012b], Song et al. [2013], Cabral et al. [2014], Duggan et
al. [2014], and Curto et al. [2015] have applied regression models to estimate the pass-through rates,
i.e., the absolute change in the premia due to changes in the capitation rates, with estimated pass
through rates varying between 37% and 100% across the different studies, leaving policy makers
with a great deal of ambiguity. However, in Federgruen and Lu [2016a] we have calculated the pass
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through rates that result from equilibrium charges within fitted competition game models. Our
results show: (1) the pass through rate fails to be constant, neither in absolute nor in relative
terms, as implied, respectively, by a linear or log-linear regression model. Instead, as the capitation
rate is reduced by up to $30 from their prevailing average ($802), the pass through rate varies in
a close to a 3:1 ratio; (2) different competing plans adopt rather disparate pass through rates, see
Figure 1.1 ibid in Chapter 1. In any case, the above regression approaches are intrinsically confined
to evaluating level changes in the existing exogenous capitation scheme.
Based on a full characterization of the equilibrium behavior of a broad class of price competition
games in Federgruen and Lu [2016a], the objective of this paper is to provide the first estimates,
under the various reform plans, of the above performance measures by computing the changes in
the price equilibria and market shares. This in contrast to the unrealistic assumption that no bid
changes would occur, the current system, as opposed to the above regression approach or, in the
case of level changes within the current system, as opposed to the above regression approaches. We
have applied our methodology to various consumer choice models whose parameters fit the year
2010’s data for all 2478 counties with two or more private plans, offered in conjunction with the
traditional FFS plan. Accounting for changes in price equilibria has a major impact on various
performance measures. For example, if all subsidies were determined as the second lowest bid, The
Congressional Budget Office estimates a cost saving for Medicare of 11% while our estimates range
between 16.5% and 21%.
Medicare Advantage has allowed private insurance companies to offer private plans, as an al-
ternative to the traditional Medicare option, which continues to be run by the Federal government.
In 2003, private MA plans captured only 13% of the potential market; however, their share has
steadily grown to 31% in 2015, see Figure 2.1.
In the MA program, the government pays most of the insurance premium of the different plans
that are available to the beneficiaries. Currently, the federal government announces, each year, a
county-specific capitation rate or premium subsidy1. In response to these pre-announced capitation
1Individuals have a specific risk score based on their prior medical history. This score is an estimate of the
individual’s expected covered costs, expressed as a multiple of the average individual’s cost. The actual subsidy
received for any given individual is determined as the ”normalized’ capitation rate , multiplied with the individual’s
risk score.
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Figure 2.1: Total Private MA Enrollment
rates, insurance companies submit, each year, to the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS), by a given deadline, one or several plans, each covering one or a collection of counties. For
a plan to be eligible it must satisfy various criteria: In particular, it must provide benefits that are
actuarially at least equivalent to those in the traditional Medicare plan, even though the specific
provider network, menu of services and devices covered, as well as any associated copayments,
etcetera, may be varied freely. All individuals covered by Medicare pay a monthly base premium,
independent of their plan choice. When choosing a private plan, a beneficiary pays an additional
premium, given by the net premium = nominal premium - capitation rate, when positive, or she
receives a 75% rebate when the relative premium is negative. (In some cases, the rebate is offered
in the form of additional benefits, as apposed to a cash rebate.) In an open enrollment period,
beneficiaries choose one of the available alternative plans, i.e., the traditional Medicare plan or one
of the private MA plans, with full knowledge of the associated net premia and rebates.
In an attempt to reduce the staggering costs of the Medicare program, there have been con-
tinuous proposals to alter the capitation levels. Some of these proposals have been legislated, e.g.,
the 2000 Benefits Improvement and Protection Act (BiPA) and, more recently, the 2011 Affordable
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Care Act (ACA), often referred to as the Obama-care Act. Much more boldly, in 2011, Senator
Wyden and then House Budget Committee Chairman Ryan advanced a proposal, the so-called
Wyden-Ryan plan (W-R), to modify the competitive bidding process to one in which the capita-
tion rate is no longer exogenously specified and pre-announced, but endogenously determined by the
second lowest bid2. Those adopting the lowest premium plan would receive a rebate in the amount
of 75% of the difference between the second lowest and the lowest bid. A similar proposal had been
offered, in 2010, by the The Bipartisan Policy Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force, chaired by Sen-
ator Pete Domenici and Alice Rivlin, the former Director of Office of Management and Budget in
the Clinton Administration. The W-R plan became a focal point of the 2012 presidential campaign
by the Romney-Ryan ticket, after Democratic senator Wyden had withdrawn his support.
In parallel, the W-R plan was widely discussed in the medical literature. For example, The
New England Journal of Medicine published two articles, Antos [2012] and Aaron and Frakt [2012],
presenting diametrically opposing arguments regarding the merits of the competitive bidding pro-
posal, neither one with any formal analysis. More recently, the Congressional Budget Office (2013)
evaluated, as an alternative to the second lowest bid scheme, one which specifies the subsidy as a
weighted average of the premium bids (with the past year’s market shares as the weights). Finally,
in 2015, the Center for Health Policy at the Brookings Institute held a conference with the title
“Strengthening Medicare for 2030”. Rivlin and Daniel [2015] argued there that “changes to Medi-
care as we know it, are necessary to ensure that this popular, successful program is able to deliver
high quality care at sustainable cost to the much larger population of older beneficiaries who will
be eligible by 2030”. Rivlin and Daniel focus on the same structural change in the Medicare insur-
ance market, where the exogenous pre-announced capitation rate is replaced by either the second
lowest bid or a weighted average thereof. The authors distinguish between “Plan One” where only
the private MA plans would be part of the bidding process, and “Plan Two” where all plans, the
traditional Medicare plan included, would do so.
As mentioned, the objective of this paper is to develop realistic estimates of the impacts any
of the above reform plans would have on various performance measures of national interest, in
particular: the cost savings to the Medicare program, out-of-pocket expenses for the beneficiaries,
2The actual formula is somewhat more complex in that it specifies the minimum of the second lowest bid and the
traditional Medicare nominal premium. However, the latter is rarely lower than the second lowest bid.
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the market shares of the traditional Medicare and the MA programs, as well as a social aggregate
welfare measure. Thus far, all studies of these structural changes from an exogenous to an en-
dogenously determined subsidy have been based on the restrictive assumption that all plans would
continue to be offered at the same nominal premia and that their market shares would not be
affected either. For example, the JAMA article by Song et al. [2012a] has estimated how much
beneficiaries would have to pay in 2009, under the W-R plan, were they to stay with the traditional
Medicare plan. (They also estimate that, on average, a beneficiary would have paid an additional
$64, monthly, this represents 9% of the cost of the plan3.) Based on the same assumption, the
Congressional Budget Office (2013) estimated that the second-lowest bid option [weighted average
bid option] would have resulted in an 11% [4%] reduction of federal spending, while increasing
payments by affected beneficiaries by 11% [-6%].
In reality, of course, a change in the subsidy scheme, would result in significant changes in the
nominal premium bids and market shares for the various plans, as firms would adjust their prices
to the new rules and competitive dynamics, and beneficiaries would react to different net premia.
This fact is, of course, recognized by the public health policy makers. In their above mentioned
position paper, Rivlin and Daniel [2015] wrote: “These [Song et al. 2012a] calculations suggest
that competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage could produce substantial cost-savings under
either method of defining the benchmark. However, our analysis and other studies assume that
Medicare Advantage plans will submit bids to the CMS according to their historical tendencies.
Unfortunately, it is hard to know what the MA bids would be under a new system not anchored
to the cost of FFS Medicare.”
The objective of this paper is to show how such estimates can, in fact, be derived from an
appropriately estimated or calibrated oligopoly model for the county-by-county Medicare markets.
Indeed, when incorporating the impact of competitive dynamics, we conclude that the government’s
cost savings associated with an endogenous capitation rate determined as the second lowest bid or
3Much larger estimates of annual costs of $6000 or more, for those reaching the age of 65 in the year 2030, have
been propagated by the Obama campaign. However these numbers are based on a different provision in the W-R
plan, where any given year’s capitation rate, in any county, is capped at the prior year’s value multiplied by the
growth rate of the GDP plus one percentage point. These estimates assume that traditional Medicare costs will
continue to grow at a rate significantly in excess of the growth rate of the country’s GDP. In any case, the impact of
this provision in the W-R plan is beyond the scope of this paper.
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a weighted average of the bids, are even larger than what was estimated in Song et al. [2012a] and
other such studies, and by a significant magnitude, indeed! For example, we estimate that, under
the second lowest bid scheme, the cost savings would be between 16.5% and 21%, if “Plan Two”
were adopted, and 8% under “Plan One”.
Structural estimation of the changes in premium bids and market shares, requires one to (i)
develop and estimate a competition model based on an underlying consumer choice model, (ii)
characterize its equilibrium behavior and (iii) be able to compute the Nash-equilibrium or equilibria
under the various subsidy schemes under consideration.
As to the first challenge, i.e., the estimation of a competition model for the Medicare market,
such models were estimated by several authors, in particular Dowd et al. [2003], Hall [2007], Lustig
[2008] and Nosal [2012]. All of these employ a MultiNomialLogit Model (MNL) or a variant thereof.
However, all of the above models specify the plans’ utility measure as linear in the nominal premium.
As explained, in the Medicare markets, the consumer is only affected by the net premium, i.e., the
difference between the nominal premium and the (very large) subsidy and her out-of-pocket costs
or gains depend in a non-linear fashion on this net premium: recall that the beneficiary pays the
full net premium, when positive, but receives, as a rebate, only 75% of (the absolute value of)
the net premium, when negative. Curto et al. [2015] therefore specify and estimate a MNL model
in which the consumer’s utility measure depends on the net price in accordance with the above
piecewise linear function. These authors employ detailed county-by-county data pertaining to the
years 2006-2010. (The authors also estimate a nested MNL model, assuming beneficiaries first
decide whether to enroll in the traditional Medicare plan, or one of the private MA plans. When
choosing for the latter alternative, they make a second choice for a specific MA plan based on a
second MNL model.)
After identifying an appropriate MNL-type competition model for the various county-by-county
Medicare markets, its equilibrium behavior needs to be characterized and the equilibria computed,
for each of the considered subsidy schemes. Here, we rely on results in Federgruen and Lu [2016a]
covering a broad class of price competition models, with many diverse applications, in which the
products’ utility measure depends on its relative price in accordance with a general non-linear
response function.
Part of our analysis is based on estimated models in Curto et al. [2015]; a second set of estimates
CHAPTER 2. MEDICARE REFORM: ESTIMATION OF THE IMPACTS OF PREMIUM
SUPPORT SYSTEMS 47
is generated on the basis of MNL-competition models that are calibrated to the actual county-by-
county data, for the year 2010. In a pure MNL-model, all beneficiaries in a given county are
assumed to assign a utility value to each of the available plans that is drawn from a single, common
distribution. This implies, for example, that those who in the past were enrolled in the traditional
Medicare plan are just as likely to (re-)enroll there as the beneficiaries who had adopted a private
MA plan. In reality, there is much inertia in these plan choices, as there is in many other markets,
a phenomenon addressed and documented in Nosal [2012]. See Dube et al. [2009] for a treatment
of inertia in general marketing models.
We therefore evaluate how our estimates vary when a switching cost is added to the utility
measures. This requires segmenting the market based on the prior year’s plan choice by the benefi-
ciaries, and gives rise to a so-called Mixed MultiNomialLogit model (MMNL), again with a complex
dependence of the utility measures on the plans’ relative premia.
Here are some of our key findings: based on the 2010 calibrated competition models for the
various counties, we observe a significant reduction of the equilibrium premia, compared to those
selected under the prevailing, exogenously specified capitation rates. As a consequence, we estimate
that the W-R plan would result in a reduction of approximately 18.5% in the capitation rates and
of 16.5% in the government’s costs. Based on the results for the estimated model, the decrease
in the government costs would be 21%. A 16.5% reduction in the Medicare budget would have
saved close to $80 billion in the 2012 calendar year alone; this, compared with a total of $68
billion from 2012–2016, predicted to be saved under the Affordable Care Act, due to its mandated
reduction of capitation rates. For beneficiaries continuing to opt for the traditional Medicare plan,
the average monthly cost is roughly $64, comparable to those estimated in Song et al. [2012a],
under the assumption of unaltered premia and market shares.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of the related
literature. Section 2.3 describes the relevant institutional facts about the Medicare Market. Section
2.4 describes the competition model and its equilibrium behavior. Section 2.5 and 2.6 develop
estimates based on calibrated vs estimated competition models, respectively. Section 2.7 provides
a concluding summary.
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2.2 Literature Review
Our paper is a contribution to the recent literature on competition models for the Medicare industry.
As mentioned, the total subsidy cost in this industry, as covered by the Medicare budget, exceeded
$600 billion in 2014; this is approximately three times the total revenues in the US hotel industry
or the pharmacy and drug sales industry.
As mentioned in the Introduction, most of the existing competition models for the Medicare
industry have used a MNL model as the underlying consumer choice model. With the exception
of the recent paper by Curto et al. [2015], these models have specified the utility measure for the
competing insurance plans as linear functions of the nominal premium. We have explained that
both of these structural assumptions fail to be satisfied in the Medicare market where consumer
choices are only affected by the net premium, i.e., the difference between the nominal premium
and the government subsidy, or capitation rate. Moreover, out-of-pocket costs are a non-linear
function of the net premium. Examples include Dowd et al. [2003], Hall [2007], Lustig [2008] and
Nosal [2012]. Some of these models treat some of the coefficients as random or introduce other
segmentations of the population of eligible beneficiaries. In contrast, Curto et al. [2015] specify
each plan’s utility measure as a piecewise linear function of its net premium.
Curto et al. [2015] use their model to assess the impacts of level changes in the current capitation
system. To this end, they estimate a linear regression equation to predict how premium bids respond
to changes in the (exogenous) capitation level. They also estimate a consumer choice model for
these markets, enabling them to predict how the plans market shares, in turn, would respond to
the premium changes. In contrast our approach is geared to estimating the impacts of general
premium support schemes, not just level changes within the current structure; moreover, we obtain
all of our estimates, consistently, from computed equilibria within the same competition model.
In this paper, we employ the same structural assumptions as Curto et al. [2015], directly an-
chored on the Medicare payment structure. Depending upon the choice of the subsidy scheme, this
implies that each plan’s utility measure is, in general, a complex function of all nominal premia
in the market. Even if the subsidy or capitation rate is an exogenously given constant, as in the
current Medicare structure, the fact that out-of-pocket costs or rebates depend on the net price
via a non-linear function, creates significant complications when attempting to characterize the
equilibrium behavior of the competition model.
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Several papers have addressed he equilibrium behavior in MNL-type models, but all under the
assumption that the utility measures’ price dependence is confined to a dependence on the the
product’s own and absolute price. It is well known that an equilibrium exists, in the standard
MNL model, see Anderson et al. [2001], Bernstein and Federgruen [2004] and Gallego et al. [2006].
However, an equilibrium may fail to exist in various generalizations of the basic MNL model,
for example Mixed MNL models (MMNL) where the market is segmented and the structure of
the utility functions varies by segment.(In the latter case, Allon et al. [2013] have shown that an
equilibrium may fail to exist while providing specific market share conditions under which the
existence question can be answered in the affirmative.) Liu [2006], Li and Huh [2011], and Gallego
and Wang [2014] study various conditions under which an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in a
nested logit model.
Federgruen and Lu [2016a] have characterized the equilibrium behavior in general MNL models,
in which the products’ utility measure depends on its relative rather than its absolute price and
this according to a general non-linear response function and various reference value schemes. The
authors document that this structure is pervasive in many marketing, operations management and
prospect theoretical industrial organization models. The analysis in this paper makes explicit use
of several of the results in Federgruen and Lu [2016a].
Another recent stream of papers address how insurance firms adjust their nominal premia in
response to changes to the pre-specified capitation rate levels. More specifically, several prominent
recent studies, e.g., Song et al. [2012b], Song et al. [2013], Cabral et al. [2014], Duggan et al. [2014]
and Curto et al. [2015] have applied regression models to estimate the pass-through rates, i.e., the
absolute change in the premia due to changes in the capitation rates. These studies reach rather
different conclusions, with estimated pass through rates varying between 37% and 100% across the
different studies, leaving policy makers with a great deal of ambiguity. Moreover, these reduced form
approaches assume a specific structural form, for example linear or log-linear, for the dependency
of the firms’ premia on the subsidy (capitation) levels, which may not be consistent with any
plausible underlying price competition models. As an alternative to these reduced form approaches,
we employ a structural estimation approach; more specifically, we conduct counterfactual studies
within the above estimated or calibrated competition models for the Medicare markets, to estimate
these pass-through rates.
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In Section 1.1, we cited Song et al. [2012a] and Congressional Budget Office (2013) as two studies
attempting to estimate the impacts of reform plans which replace the constant exogenous capitation
rate with one that is endogenously determined (e.g., the second lowest bid or a weighted average of
the bids.) As mentioned, these studies assume that the firms’ nominal premia and market shares
are not affected by this structural change.
Our paper may also be viewed as a contribution to the emerging operations research and
economics literature employing game-theoretical models to understand the impact of competitive
schemes on the performance of (specific segments of) the healthcare industry. See Lu and Donaldson
[2000] for a survey of the 20th century economics literature on performance-based contracting.
Fuloria and Zenios [2001] develop a dynamic principal-agent model to determine contract terms
for providers and purchasers contingent on observed outcomes, such as mortality and medical
complications. So and Tang [2000] constructed a Medicare contract for the reimbursement of drug
prescriptions with a clinical outcome-based performance metric. Lee and Zenios [2012] studied
evidence-based incentive systems in the context of dialysis treatment for patients with end-stage
renal disease. Jiang et al. [2012] uses a principal-agent game-theoretical model to build performance-
based contracts for outpatient medical service.
2.3 The Medicare Market
Most beneficiaries in the Medicare program face the choice between the government run traditional
Medicare program or any one of a set of private Medicare Advantage plans. The traditional program
allows its enrollees to select their providers, at their will, among all those accepting this Medicare
insurance program. No premium is charged beyond the base premium charged to all beneficiaries,
regardless of their plan choice. For example, in 2014, the base premium per individual was $104.90
per month, assuming the individual was married with an annual income below $170,000.
The private MA plans are typically offered by Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO) or
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO). Except for certain emergencies, a HMO usually limits
coverage to health care providers who work for or contract with the HMO. A PPO also specifies a
network of providers but affords its members the option to select providers from outside the network.
However, when an enrollee of a PPO plan uses an out-of-network provider, she is reimbursed
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at a lower rate and may face higher deductables and co-payments. The MA plans differentiate
themselves along various dimensions: first, they charge a (positive or negative) net premium to
each enrollee, above and beyond the base premium that is charged to all Medicare beneficiaries.
This net premium (or rebate) was mentioned in the Introduction, and is explained in more detail
below. In addition, MA plans may offer additional benefits (vision, dental coverage) beyond those
offered by the traditional Medicare program. The plans offer different provider networks, have
different quality of service standards, co-payments, etcetera.
In addition, there are often several plans known as “private-fee-for-service” (PFFS) plans. These
plans offer terms that are identical or virtually identical to the traditional government-run Medicare
program. While somewhat prevalent at the start of the century, their market share has dropped to
7% in 2011. For all these reasons, we aggregate these PFFS plans with the traditional government-
run FFS plans.
The private MA insurance companies submit plans to the CMS with a nominal premium bid.
When approved by the CMS, the plan is offered to the beneficiaries in the relevant county, along
with all other approved MA plans and the traditional Medicare program. The Medicare program
subsidizes a large part of the nominal premium by establishing a uniform, though county-specific,
capitation rate. A beneficiary is thus affected only by the net premium, i.e., difference between the
nominal premium and the capitation rate. When the net premium is positive, it is paid, in full, by
the beneficiary, on top of the above mentioned base premium charged to all Medicare participants.
When the net premium is negative, 75% of its absolute value is given to the beneficiary as a rebate;
alternatively, the insurance plan may provide other benefits whose momentary value is equivalent
to the rebate.
As mentioned the capitation rate is currently exogenously specified by CMS and pre-announced
to the insurance companies, before they submit their bids. The capitation rate is the amount paid
by the government to the insurance company for a (normalized) individual with a risk score of
one. The risk score is meant to predict by what factor an individual’s expected annual medical
costs exceeds that of the average beneficiary. As a consequence, an MA insurance plan covering
an arbitrary individual is paid the (normalized) capitation rate multiplied by the individual’s risk
score.
Since 2007, CMS employs a risk score determined by the so-called “Hierarchical Condition
CHAPTER 2. MEDICARE REFORM: ESTIMATION OF THE IMPACTS OF PREMIUM
SUPPORT SYSTEMS 52
Categories” (HCC) model. The score is based on demographic data, as well as the individual’s
disease record, employing seventy disease - category indicator variables, themselves distilled from
roughly 15000 ICD-9 codes that providers list on claims. The predictive accuracy of the HCC
risk score is actively debated and analyzed, see e.g. Brown et al. [2014] and the references therein.
However, as in all prior models of the Medicare market, we assume that the risk score is an unbiased
estimator of the actual cost incurred by the insurance plans, relative to that of a normalized
beneficiary with a risk score of one. Figure 2 in Curto et al. [2015] shows that the market share
of MA plans decreases modestly with the risk score, suggesting that the private MA plans are
disproportionately desired by healthier individuals.
There is abundant evidence that the Medicare market in a typical county, is heavily concen-
trated. This is an important feature in the context of our paper’s objectives since it demonstrates
that changes in the subsidy structure or level can be expected to result in significant changes of
the premium choices of the competing MA plans as well as their market shares, contrary to what
has been assumed in existing studies, e.g., Song et al. [2012b] and Feldman et al. [2012].
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First, Curto et al. [2015] report that, between 2006 and 2011, the average beneficiary had a
choice of some 4 MA plans, typically 3 HMOs and one PPO. (It should be noted that the number
of competing MA plans varies greatly by county. Figure 2.2 exhibits, for the 2010 calendar year,
the number of counties with a given number of MA contracts. ) The same authors also point out
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that in more than 75% of US counties, the three largest plans have more than 90% of the MA
market. In close to half of the counties the two largest plans. attract more than 90% of the total
MA market. Industry concentration tends to be higher in rural as opposed to the urban areas.
See Table A.2 in Curto et al. [2015]. Indeed, in the years 2006-2011, the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) averaged 0.477 for urban areas and 0.547 for rural areas. (The HHI is defined as the
sum of the squares of the individual firms’ market shares.) The US Department of Justice, in its
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines characterized any market with an HHI value of 0.25 or higher
as “highly concentrated”.
Finally, a statistical multi-year study by Song et al. [2012b] shows that the insurance companies
adjust their premia to changes in the capitation rates, even though the latter are only partially
correlated with the actual cost rates per beneficiary. Indeed, their regression model, allowing
for many potential explanatory variables, identifies only the capitation rate, and the number of
competitors in the market as having a statistically significant impact on the premia. The fact,
that the premia decrease significantly as a function of the number of competing plans, is further
evidence for the fact that the market is a concentrated oligopoly with imperfect competition.
As in prior studies, we treat every county as a separate market. This is a slight simplification,
since insurance companies often offer the same plan in a “service area” consisting of several counties.
If so, they select a single (nominal) bid that gets adjusted at the county level based on how the
county capitation rate compares with the average capitation rate in the service area. Like Curto et
al. [2015], for example, we continue to view each county as a separate market because insurers have
the option of specifying “more granular” plans and differentiating their bids on a county-by-county
basis.
Finally, the Medicare industry differentiates between “contracts” and “plans”. An MA insurance
company submits a contract which may consist of several plans, each with slightly differentiated
terms and (nominal) premium bids. In our analysis, we represent each county-contract pair as a
single plan whose attributes are determined as a weighted average of the attributes of the underlying
plans, and with a market share given by the aggregate of the shares of the individual plans. This is
hardly an approximation, as typically a single plan in a multi-plan contract is adopted by the vast
majority of those enrolled in the contract. With this aggregation step, each county is represented
as an oligopoly competition model in which each competitor offers a single “representative plan”.
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This representation is identical to that adopted in almost all of the recent literature, geared towards
an estimation of the demand functions in the Medicare market, see in particular Hall [2007] and
Nosal [2012]. (Curto et al. 2015 is an exception estimating on a plan-level basis.)
2.4 The Competition Model and Its Equilibrium Behavior
Consider a given county in a given calendar year. There are N competing private insurance plans
which are part of the Medicare Advantage Program, along with the traditional government owned
Medicare program. We use the index i to differentiate among the plans and assign index i = 0
to the traditional Medicare program, as mentioned with a declaiming, but still dominant market
share of 61%. The plans are differentiated by their nominal or absolute monthly premium, as well
as various coverage attributes, including the specific provider network, menu of services and devices
covered, as well as any associated copayments, etcetera.
Both in the existing Medicare program, and in any of its reform proposals, a major portion of
the beneficiary’s premium is covered by a government subsidy or capitation rate. Thus, potential
customer react to relative premia, defined as the difference between the nominal premium and the
subsidy. The subsidy may be an exogenously specified, and pre-announced constant value, as in the
existing Medicare program. Alternatively, it may be specified endogenously as a function of the set
of nominal premia in the market; this is the core idea in many of the Medicare reform proposals,
see the Introduction. Of particular interest in these proposals, is a specification of the subsidy as
the lowest, second lowest or a weighted average of the nominal bids.
Each individual beneficiary is assigned a risk score based on her prior medical history. The
subsidy provided by the federal government is the “base” capitation value multiplied by the in-
dividual’s risk score. The cost structure of any given plan is clearly affine in the total number
of beneficiaries covered; aside from administrative costs, that, in the short run, can be treated as
fixed, the plans’ layouts are the sum of the layouts for the various beneficiaries covered by the plan
and therefore, in expectation, strictly proportional to the number of individuals covered.
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We employ the following notations where the index i covers the range i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N :
P = the size of the population of Medicare beneficiaries in the county;
ci = the expected cost incurred by insurance plan i, for a “normalized” beneficiary,
with a risk score of one;
bi = the bid submitted by plan i;
g(b) = the subsidy or capitation rate paid by the Medicare program for any MA-enrolled
beneficiary, with a risk score of one;
pi = the net monthly premium charged by plan i, i.e., pi = bi − g(b)
di = the expected number of beneficiaries in the county who choose plan i;
πi(b) = the expected profit for plan i.
To cover both the existing Medicare structure as well as those embedded in the various reform
proposals, under discussion, we provide a unified treatment by specifying the subsidy or capitation
rate as a general function g(·) of the vector of bid premia b. As we will note, the qualitative
properties of the equilibrium behavior and, in particular, the equilibrium prices themselves depend
significantly on the specification of the function g(·).
The following set of specifications covers the spectrum of proposals:
g(b) =

C, exogenous and constant
b(1), the lowest bid
b(n), the n-th lowest bid, with n ≥ 2∑
j





Structure (2.1a) underlies the common Medicare system, while (2.1c) and (2.1d) have been proposed
in the original Domenici-Rivlin and Wyden-Ryan plan, the 2013 Congress Budget Office’s variant
thereof as well as the proposals in Rivlin and Daniel [2015]. (Thus far, no one appears to have
proposed that the subsidy be specified as the lowest bid; we model this option, however, as there
is no good reason for its exclusion, other than the perhaps politically inconvenient fact that no
beneficiaries receive a rebate, under this structure.)
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Each beneficiary j assigns a utility value to each of the N available private MA plans, specified
as follows
uij = ai − γi · f (bi − g(b)) + εij , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, j = 1, 2, . . . . (2.2)
The intercept ai denotes the aggregate impact of all of plan i’s observable non-price attributes.
Different papers have adopted different specifications for these intercepts. For example, in Curto
et al. [2015], ai = x
T
i η, with xi an M-dimensional vector of plan characteristics. These include
indicator variables for each possible quality score (e.g., 3.5 stars or 5 stars), indicator variables
expressing whether the plan is associated with supplemental benefits (for example, vision or dental
coverage) or whether it is bundled with Part D (i.e., prescription drug) benefits. See Dowd et
al. [2003], Hall [2007], Lustig [2008] and Nosal [2012] for alternative specifications of the intercept
values of {ai, i = 1, 2, . . . , N}.
In the existing Medicare structure, the response function f(·) is a (convex) piecewise linear
function of the form:
f(x) =
 αx, if x > 0βx, if x ≤ 0 , with 0 < β < α. (2.3)
(Indeed, in the existing Medicare structure and all reform proposals we are aware of, α = 1 and
β = 0.75. However, the rebate fraction β may itself be a parameter in the ultimate restructuring
of the Medicare program; we therefore maintain general parameters α and β, as in (2.3).) All of
the results in this paper are anchored on the piecewise linear structure of the response function
f(·), however, extensions to general increasing functions f(·) are entirely feasible given the results
in Federgruen and Lu [2016a].
The last term εij in (2.2) represents a random unobserved component of the customer j’s utility
for plan i, which varies by customer. These random variables {εij} are assumed to be i.i.d across
plans and beneficiaries, following a standard type 1–extreme value or Gumbel distribution, i.e.,
P (εij ≤ x) = exp (− exp(−x+ δ)) where δ is Euler’s constant (0.5772).
The specification of the utility measure in (2.2) implies that all beneficiaries “draw” a utility
value for any given plan, from the same common distribution. However, the population of bene-
ficiaries may need to be partitioned into several segments, each with its own specification of the
parameter vector and price sensitivity coefficient {γi}. Inertia and switching costs, may need to be
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added to reflect that the odds of a beneficiary choosing plan j = 1, 2, . . . , N is significantly larger
among prior enrollees of this plan, as compared to those that were enrolled in a different plan.
Similarly, the weight attributed to various plan characteristics may depend on the beneficiary’s risk
score, necessitating a segmentation according to this risk score measure. Finally, as mentioned,
some of the above mentioned papers treat part of the parameters in (2.3) as random, resulting in
another type of segmentation and a so-called Mixed MultiNomialLogit consumer choice model.
Our base model and analysis are anchored on the (unsegmented) specification in (2.2), however,
in Section 2.4.1, we pursue a segmented representation, that incorporates the above switching costs.
Since all US residents, of age 65 and older, are eligible for Medicare coverage, the traditional
Medicare program functions as the “outside good”, We specify its utility measure:
u0j = a0 − γ0f (b0 − g(b)) + ε0j , j = 1, 2, . . . , (2.4)
In the current Medicare structure, enrollees in the traditional program pay nothing (beyond the
base premium charged to all beneficiaries.). Several of the reform proposals maintain this feature:
Rivlin and Daniel [2015] refer to these a Plan I-proposals. Others, for example, the original W-R
plan, have the traditional plan participate in the competitive bidding process. Both types can be
accommodated by appropriate choices of the price sensitivity coefficients {γi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N}.
Plan I: γ0 = 0, γ1 = γ2 = · · · = γN = γ.
Plan II: γ0 = γ1 = γ2 = · · · = γN = γ.
In (2.4), the {ε0j}-term again represents random unobserved terms assumed to be i.i.d with the
same distribution as the noise terms in (2.2).
Since our consumer choice model is of the MNL-type, we obtain the following well-known
expression for the expected number of beneficiaries that are enrolled in each plan i = 0, 1, . . . , N :
di(b) = P ·
exp (ai − γi · f (bi − g(b)))∑N
j=0 exp (aj − γj · f (bj − g(b)))
, (2.5)
see for e.g., Anderson et al. [2001]. We thus obtain the following expression for the expected profit
earned by the various plans.
Lemma 4 Plan i’s profit is given by
πi(b) = (bi − ci)di(b), i = 0, 1, . . . N. (2.6)
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Proof. Let Di(b) denote the number of county beneficiaries that enroll in plan i, with di(b) as its




(rlg((b)) + pi − rlci) ,
with rl the random risk score for individual l, since Medicare’s subsidy for individual l to insurance
plan i is given by rlg(b) and the expected costs incurred for this beneficiary is rlci. Since E[rl] = 1
and Di(b) is independent of {rl}, the conditions for Wald’s Lemma are satisfied and, thus, one
obtains (2.6).
The expected profit functions thus satisfy the general structure analyzed in Federgruen and Lu
[2016a]. We review key equilibrium results derived there, as needed in our subsequent analysis:
Proposition 5 (Existence of a pure Nash equilibrium) A pure Nash Equilibrium exists
under any of the following structures:
(i) an exogenous constant capitation rate, see (2.1a).
(ii) a capitation rate given by the lowest or n-th lowest bid and γ0 = γ1 = · · · = γN (Plan II).















is quasi-convex in bi ∈ [ci, b−i(1)). (M)
(iv) a capitation rate given by the n − th lowest bid (n ≥ 2) and γ0 = 0 < γ1 = γ2 = · · · = γN
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Proof. Part (i) follows from Theorem 1 in Federgruen and Lu [2016a], part (ii) from Theorem 4
and Lemma 2, there. Part (iii) and (iv) follows from Theorem 4 and Theorem 6, respectively.
Condition (D′) is a variant of the classic dominant diagonal condition. This condition merely
precludes that a uniform premium increase by all plans would result in an increase of any of the
plans’ enrollment volumes. The diagonal dominant condition goes back to Arrow et al. [1959] and
Hadar [1965] and is a standard assumption in many price competition models, see e.g., Vives [2001],
Bernstein and Federgruen [2004], Farahat and Perakis [2011] and Allon et al. [2013]. As innocuous
as it appears, it may nevertheless be violated in special instances. Note that condition (D̃) is an
(even) weaker variant of the dominant diagonal condition; it requires that any plan i’s enrollment
volume does not increase when all plans increase their (nominal) premium by the same amount,
but only when plan i’s premium is the lowest in the market.
The case where the capitation rate is determined as a weighted average of the premia, i.e.,
structure (2.1d), fails to be covered by Proposition 5. Indeed, under this subsidy structure, plans
may cease to be substitutes, i.e., it is possible that a unilateral premium increase by a given plan
i causes the sales volume of some other plan j 6= i to go down. Since the plans are no longer
guaranteed to be substitutes, the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium can not be guaranteed
either, a well known phenomenon, see e.g., Section 2.3.2 in Vives [2001] and Section 8 in Federgruen
and Lu [2016a] for a more detailed discussion.
When the capitation rate is exogenously specified as a constant value, see (2.1a), as well as when
it is endogenously determined as the lowest bid, it is, in fact, possible to prove that the competition
model has the additional structure of (log-)super-modularity, see Vives [2001] and Topkis [1998].
(Log-)super-modularity implies that the set of pure Nash equilibrium, if not a singleton, is a lattice
with a component-wise smallest and a component-wise largest element:
Proposition 6 The competition model is (log-)super-modular when
(i) the capitation rate is exogenously determined, see (2.1a).
(ii) the capitation rate is endogenously determined as the lowest bid in a Plan II-setting i.e., when
γ0 = γ1 = · · · = γN .
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow from Theorem 1 and 5 in Federgruen and Lu [2016a], respectively.
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An additional implication of the price game being (log-)supermodular is the fact that an e-
quilibrium may be computed with a simple tatônnement scheme: starting with an arbitrary price
vector b(0), one iteratively computes a best response price for each of the N firms to the most
recently generated prices of the competitors. The scheme is guaranteed to converge to an equilibri-
um. Moreover, when the tatônnement scheme is started at bmin[bmax], it is guaranteed to converge
to b∗[b̄∗]. It is therefore possible to unequivocally determine whether the game has a unique equi-
librium by starting the tatônnement scheme, both at bmin and at bmax, and checking whether the
two schemes converge to the same limit point.
2.4.1 Competition Model with Switching Costs
The utility measures in (2.2) and (2.4) while random, are identically distributed. As explained
above, there are several considerations that challenge this homogeneity assumption. As a conse-
quence, the market may need to be partitioned into a set of K ≥ 2 segments, each with its own
population size Pk and its own specification of the random utility measures in (2.2) and (2.4), giving
rise to an MMNL model, as follows:
uijk = aik − γif(bi − g(b)) + εijk; i = 1, 2, . . . , N ; k = 1, 2, . . . ,K; j = 1, . . . (2.7a)
u0jk = a0k − γ0f(b0 − g(b)) + ε0jk; k = 1, 2, . . . ,K; j = 1, . . . (2.7b)
Here uijk denotes the utility attributed by the j-th potential customer in segment k to plan i
(k = 1, 2, . . . ,K; i = 0, 1, . . . , N). {εijk}, again, represent a set of i.i.d. random variables with
the Gumbel distribution. The MMNL model, without subsidization, i.e., with g(b) ≡ 0, has been
employed in countless studies in industrial organization, marketing and operations management,
among many other areas, see e.g. Caplin and Nalebuff [1991] and Allon et al. [2013]. Even in the
base model, without subsidization [g(b) = 0], a pure Nash equilibrium may fail to exist, see Allon et
al. [2013]. The latter have developed a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure Nash
equilibrium or its uniqueness. It remains an open question how these conditions can be generalized
for our model with a general subsidy structure g(·), specified as one of the cases (2.1a) - (2.1c).
As mentioned above, we have applied this model to incorporate the impact of switching costs.
To this end, we partition the population of all beneficiaries in a given county into two segments:
segment k = 1 represents beneficiaries, who are enrolled in the traditional Medicare program, in the
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prior year; segment k = 2 represents the remainder of the market. A switching cost S1 is incurred
when a beneficiary switches from the traditional Medicare program to a MA plan, and S2 when
the switch is in the opposite direction, see Figure 2.3 for a pictorial representation of the market
segmentation and switching costs.











The general utility measures, thus, take the form,
uij1 = ai − S1I(i 6= 0)− γi · f (bi − g(b)) + εij1; i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N ; j = 1, . . . (2.8)
uij2 = ai − S2I(i = 0)− γi · f (bi − g(b)) + εij2, ; i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N ; j = 1, . . . (2.9)
For each MA plan i = 1, . . . , N , its market share in segment k = 1, 2 is given by
di1(b) = P1
exp (ai − γi · f (bi − g(b))− S1)
exp (a0 − γ0 · f (b0 − g(b))) +
∑N
k=1 exp (ak − γk · f (bk − g(b))− S1)
,
= P1
exp (ai − γi · f (bi − g(b)))
exp (a0 − γ0 · f (b0 − g(b)) + S1) +
∑N
k=1 exp (ak − γk · f (bk − g(b)))
, (2.10)
di2(b) = P2
exp (ai − γi · f (bi − g(b)))
exp (a0 − γ0 · f (b0 − g(b))− S2) +
∑N
k=1 exp (ak − γk · f (bk − g(b)))
, (2.11)
Similarly, the market share of the FFS plan 0 in each segment is given by
d01(b) = P1
exp (a0 − γ0 · f (b0 − g(b)))
exp (a0 − γ0 · f (b0 − g(b))) +
∑N
k=1 exp (ak − γk · f (bk − g(b))− S1)
,
= P1
exp (a0 − γ0 · f (b0 − g(b)) + S1)
exp (a0 − γ0 · f (b0 − g(b)) + S1) +
∑N
k=1 exp (ak − γk · f (bk − g(b)))
, (2.12)
d02(b) = P2
exp (a0 − γ0 · f (b0 − g(b))− S2)
exp (a0 − γ0 · f (b0 − g(b))− S2) +
∑N
k=1 exp (ak − γk · f (bk − g(b)))
, (2.13)
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The total number of beneficiaries enrolled in plan i is given by di(b) = di1(b) + di2(b), and its
profit function by πi(bi, b−i) = (bi − ci)di(b).
Without loss of generality, we normalize S2 = 0, otherwise, if S2 6= 0, (2.10)–(2.13) may be
normalized via the following transformations
ā1 = a1 − S2 and S̄1 = S1 + S2.
We analyze the model for a given switching cost value S1 and a given estimate γ̂ for the price
sensitivity coefficient γi = γ.
2.5 Estimating the Impact of Medicare Reform Proposals: A Cal-
ibration Model
We are now ready to pursue the main questions of our study, i.e., the estimation of the impact
various reform plans would have on the principal performance measures of interest, in particular,
(i) the cost savings to the Medicare program; (ii) the out-of-pocket expenses for the beneficiaries;
(iii) the premium bids; (iv) the market shares of the traditional Medicare program and the MA
program; as well as (v) an aggregate welfare measure.
In this section, we derive these estimates based on models of the type developed in Section
2.4.1, that are calibrated to publicly available county-by-county data for the calendar year 2010.
As explained, we treat each county as a separate market. We start with the base model as specified
by the demand volume and profit equations in (2.5) and (2.6) with g(b) = C and C the county’s
prevailing benchmark or capitation rate, in 2010 (for a normalized beneficiary with a risk score of
one.) Furthermore, in the 2010 and current structure, the traditional Medicare program does not
participate in the competitive bidding process; in other words, the existing structure is a Plan-I
type and has γ1 = γ2 = · · · = γN = γ and γ0 = 0. In addition, without loss of generality, we
normalize a0 = 0. With these specifications, only (2N + 1) parameters need to be specified in a
county with N competing MA contracts, more specifically, the parameters:
{a1, a2, . . . , aN , c1, c2, . . . , cN , γ.} (2.14)
There are two possible approaches for the determination of these parameters. The first approach,
employs the publicly available data for the plans’ premium bids, as well as the number of enrollees
CHAPTER 2. MEDICARE REFORM: ESTIMATION OF THE IMPACTS OF PREMIUM
SUPPORT SYSTEMS 63
in the different plans and the county’s capitation rate. As we will demonstrate, these data allow
us to specify a system of equations and inequalities from which the unknown model parameters in
(2.14) can be backed out, with two qualifications: first, the system of equations (and inequalities)
has one more unknown parameter compared to the number of equations/ inequalities. Second, it is
theoretically possible that some of the plans’ cost rates can only be specified within a given interval,
rather than their exact value being computable. However, this theoretical complication never arose,
in practice. We therefore show that all of the model parameters in (2.14) can be determined from
the system of equations/inequalities by “importing” an exogenous estimate for a single parameter.
The second approach is more traditional: it calls for a precise specification of the intercept value
in terms of plan-and-county attributes. Such a specification typically employs a common structure
for all counties to reduce the number of parameters that need to be identified. Thereafter the
parameters are estimated with an appropriate estimation method. In Sections 1.1 and 2.2, we have
discussed several such estimated models.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. The (first) calibration approach
has the advantage of offering relative robustness. Its methodology does not depend on a precise
specification of the relevant plan-and-county attributes or the specific way in which they impact
on the plan’s utility measure. Note that all of our ultimate performance measures only depend
on the aggregate intercept values {ai} rather than the underlying detailed specification of these
quantities. The calibration method is, in addition, computationally much simpler than any of the
above estimation methods, for example, a Generalized Method of Moments, and it generates a
unique set of values rather than a combination of confidence intervals. A disadvantage, however,
is that it relies on an exogenously imported parameter, while the second, traditional estimation
method is fully self contained.
In view of these various advantages and disadvantages, we have pursued both approaches. In this
section, we develop estimates based on a calibration method. In the next section, we do so based
on the second method where parameter combinations are drawn from joint distributions extracted
from the estimated results in Curto et al. [2015], arguably the most recent and comprehensive
estimated model, and, to our knowledge, the only one which has adopted the precise non-linear
way in which our-of-pocket expenses depend on the nominal premium bids.
Once a model has been specified, via either of the above methods, we pursue the same coun-
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terfactual studies to assess the consequences of any alternative capitation structure, all of which
amount to an alternative specification of the function g(·), see (2.1a)–(2.1d), or an alternative choice
for the response function f(·).
2.5.1 The Calibration Method
Our study is based on the county-by-county data in 2010. For this calendar year, private insurance
companies submitted 14576 so-called “contracts”, nationwide. This implies that, in an average
county, 5.35 companies compete with each other as well as the traditional FFS plan, for the pa-
tronage of the county’s beneficiaries. We have focused on all counties with 2 or more contracts;
this represents 2478 out of the total of 2727 counties in the United States, covering approximately
41 million beneficiaries, with a total 14327 contracts.
Enrollment data for each plan-county combination, are publicly available, from the CMS.4 Table
2.1 summarizes statistics for key factors in this study, the capitation rate, the (nominal) premium
bids of the MA plans, cost rates for the FFS plans, and the market shares of these plans. Note that
the capitation rates offered to the MA plans were, on average 10% higher than the cost rates under
the traditional FFS plan. Also, while the MA plans attracted 24% of the national population, their
average market share across the different counties was 15%. Thus, discrepancy is due to the fact
that the MA plans are particularly prominent in relative few, but densely populated counties, see
Figure 2.4 for state-by-state comparison.
Substituting g(b) = C, γi = γ for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and γ0 = 0 into (2.5), it follows that:
log(di(b))− log(d0(b)) = ai − γf(bi − C), i = 1, 2, . . . , N, or
ai = log(di(b))− log(d0(b)) + γf(bi − C), i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (2.15)
In addition, it was shown in Federgruen and Lu [2016a] that under an exogenous constant capitation
rate, (any) equilibrium bid vector b∗ is always an interior part of the feasible price cube [bmin, bmax].
Moreover, each of the profit functions, πi(b), i = 1, 2, . . . , N , defined by (2.6), is differentiable
everywhere with respect to bi, with the exception of the value bi = C. Finally, Proposition 1 in
4The enrollment data for each MA plan in each county can be obtained from the Contract/Plan/State/County
enrollment data. The number of beneficiaries enrolled in the FFS plan, in each county, are contained in FFS Data
2010.
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Figure 2.4: Private MA Market Shares
Federgruen and Lu [2016a] shows that the profit function πi(·) is quasi-concave in its own price















− γf ′(b∗i − C)(1− di). (2.16)





γf ′(b∗i − C)(1− di)
, where b∗i 6= C. (2.17)
Only when the firm decides to set its premium exactly equal to the capitation rate, i.e., b∗i = C,
does (2.17) fail to hold. (Indeed, the response function f(·) fails to be differentiable.) However,































− γα(1− di) ≤ 0. (2.19)
Where ∂− and ∂+ denote the left-hand and right-hand derivative, respectively. Thus, when b∗i = C,
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Thus, when no plan selects a premium bid that is exactly equal to the capitation rate, (2.15) and
(2.17) provide a system of equations from which the unknown {ai, ci, i = 1, 2, . . . , N} in (2.14) can
be determined directly, assuming an estimate for the price sensitivity coefficient γ can be obtained.
(Note that the capitation rate C is publicly available.) For the latter, we have imported the price
sensitivity coefficient obtained in Nosal [2012], i.e., γ̂ = 0.013. Similar estimates for this coefficient
were obtained in other MNL models, in particular, Dowd et al. [2003] with γ̂ = 0.019 and in Curto
et al. [2015] with γ̂ = 0.014 (See specification (4) in Table 5.)
When b∗i = C, (2.20) provides an interval in which the plan’s cost rate ci falls. The width of
this interval is determined by the rebate percentage; the closer the rebate percentage is to 100%,
the smaller the interval is, approaching a single point value when a full rebate is provided for the
cost saving. We have observed that no insurance plan specified a premium that was exactly equal
to the exogenously specified capitation rate.
In conclusion, the observed premia and market shares provide enough information to determine
all of the parameters in the competition model, modulo a singular degree of freedom. As mentioned,
to remove the latter we have adopted Nosal [2012]’s estimate of the price sensitivity coefficient γ.
With all model parameters specified, we have computed the price equilibrium that arises when the
capitation rate is set endogenously as the lowest or second lowest bid or a weighted average of the
bids, similar to several reform plans discussed in Section 1.1 and Section 2.3.
While the above describes our basic model for the Medicare Advantage market, we have also
investigated a variant where the market is segmented into two customer classes: The first segment
consists of those beneficiaries who, in the prior calendar year 2009, subscribed to the traditional
FFS plan. The second segment consists of the remaining eligible Medicare participants, i.e., those
who in 2009 enrolled in a private MA plan. We applied this segmentation to insert a search or
inertia cost in the plans’ utility measures, whenever an individual considers switching from the FFS
plan to a private MA plan or vice versa. The presence of such inertia costs has been widely observed
in the marketing literature, for example Dube et al. [2009]; it is all the more likely to prevail in
the MA market with an elderly population choosing among fairly complex alternatives. Indeed,
Nosal [2012] has focused on estimating the magnitude of this inertia effect and has found it to be
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significant. The segmentation gives rise to a Mixed MultiNomial model (MMNL), of course with
the additional complication of utility measures being dependent on net rather than gross premia via
a non-linear response function f(·). In the Appendix, we explain, how the remaining parameters in
the demand functions, as well as the marginal cost rates can be determined in this MMNL model,
assuming, once again, that the observed price vector is an equilibrium under exogenously specified
capitation rates. With these parameters specified, we, again, compute the equilibrium that arises
when the capitation rate is determined under various endogenously determined capitation rates.
We have computed the equilibria by applying the tatônnement scheme specified in Section 2.4.1,
starting from a randomly selected price vector in the feasible price space. While, as mentioned,
we cannot guarantee, on theoretical grounds, that the equilibrium is unique, we have verified this
numerically, by repeating the tatonnement scheme from many randomly selected starting points,
observing convergence to a unique price vector, throughout.
2.5.2 Results
We have computed the price equilibrium in each of the 2478 counties, that arises when the capitation
rate is determined as the lowest, or second lowest bid, and compared these equilibria with the premia
that prevailed (in 2010) under the existing system. The equilibria were computed, both under Plan
I (γ0 = 0) and Plan II (γ0 = γ). In this subsection, we report on results for Plan II only.
Table B.1 in Appendix B reports on the average price results, across all 2478 counties, of the
above described equilibrium calculations. We have computed a weighted average of the counties’
results, with the counties’ number of eligible participants as the weight factor. The first segment of
the Table displays the results in the absence of search or inertia costs; the second (third) segment
displays the same, assuming this cost value equals 2 and 4, respectively. (Nosal [2012] obtained
an estimate of approximately 4 for this parameter, but reports on counterfactual studies based on
various values between 0 and 4.) Each segment exhibits, first of all, the actual market results in
2010, which may also be interpreted as the equilibrium under the prevailing exogenous capitation
rates. The second and third column in each table segment displays the same results, when the
capitation rate is specified endogenously as the lowest and second lowest premium, respectively.
In addition to displaying the average cost value of the FFS plans and the average capitation
rates under the three subsidy schemes, Table B.1 exhibits the average premium of the lowest, second
CHAPTER 2. MEDICARE REFORM: ESTIMATION OF THE IMPACTS OF PREMIUM
SUPPORT SYSTEMS 69
lowest and third lowest plans, as well as the overall average premium, again under each of the three
subsidy schemes. In addition to the absolute premium values, it is also of interest to display the
various premium values as a percentage of the prevailing FFS cost value. Figure 2.5 exhibits the
weighted average value of these percentages, for the lowest, second lowest and third lowest bid plan,
as well as the capitation rate.








1st MA plan 2nd MA plan 3rd MA plan capitation rate
Price as % of FFS cost
Exogenous Lowest Second Lowest benchmark ‐ 50
Table B.2 in Appendix B shows that the intensified competition among the private insurers,
under an endogenously specified capitation rate, translates into a reduction of the market share of
the traditional Medicare (FFS) plans from 78% to 73%, but only in the absence of switching costs;
under an inertia cost value of 4, the average FFS market share drops by one percentage point only.
The lowest priced plans increase their market share from 2.58% to 3.17%, but each individual MA
plan continues to have a relatively small market share. Thus, market concentration remains low,
boding well for the continuation of a healthy competitive environment. The results also indicate
that beneficiaries consider many non-price related attributes in their plan choices. The same results
are shown graphically in Figure 2.6.
Focusing on the case without search/inertia costs, we observe that the average capitation rate is
reduced from $838 to $641 or $683, depending upon whether it is specified as the lowest or second
lowest bid. Since both the Wyden-Ryan, the Domenici-Rivlin, and the Rivlin-Daniel plans adopt
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the latter scheme, we confine our summary conclusions to the latter. The reduction of the capitation
rates amounts to a cost saving for the government of no less than 16.5%.5 (The average capitation
rate exceeded the average cost in FFS plans by close to 10%.) Under the existing capitation scheme,
the average of the second lowest premia amounted to $706, a 15.8% reduction compared with the
average prevailing capitation rate. This demonstrates that the standard way of estimating the
cost savings results in a significant underestimation of the savings potential: As may be expected,
insurance companies react to the new subsidy scheme by bidding more aggressively and reducing
their premia. Indeed, as shown in Figure 2.5, the average second lowest premium goes down from
94% to 91% of the average FFS cost value.
For those beneficiaries who choose to stay with, or newly enroll in a traditional FFS plan, the
average of their out of pocket costs would amount to $70 per month or $840 per year, similar to
earlier estimates in Song et al.(2012). Similarly, the average out of pocket costs among all Medicare
beneficiaries would be $64 per month or $768 per year, see Table B.3 in Appendix B. These results
are very similar, when incorporating an assumed search/inertia cost of 2 or 4; the prevalence of an
inertia cost component increases the premia, and hence the capitation rates, slightly, as it mitigates
the competitive intensity.
Finally, Table B.3 shows what percentage of all beneficiaries incurs an out of pocket expense in
five specific cost buckets. Under the second lowest bid scheme, a majority would continue to pay
5The percentage saved is double that estimated by Feldman et al. [2012].
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less than $40 per month, while 97% do under the current exogenous subsidy scheme. Twenty-nine
percent of beneficiaries would continue to pay nothing or get a rebate. Figure 2.7 displays the
cumulative percentage of beneficiaries who pay less than a given amount. For example, about 50%
(or 65%) of beneficiaries pay less than $40 (or $75) per month under the payment scheme under
which the capitation rate is determined by the second-lowest bid.
2.6 Estimating the Impact of Medicare Reform Proposals: An
Estimation Model
Our second set of counterfactual studies is based on a model contained in Curto et al. [2015];
specifically, model 4 in Panel A of Table 5, ibid. This is a MNL model with utility measures
specified as in (2.2). In this model, the price sensitivity coefficient is estimated as γ̃ = 0.014, very
close to the value γ̃ = 0.013 used in the calibration model in Section 2.5.1, itself “imported” from
the estimation model in Nosal [2012]. In this model, the intercept coefficients {ai} are specified as
a linear combination of the plan quality scores, indicator variables describing whether the contract
covers Part D benefits, and supplemental benefits such as vision or dental coverage, as well as
indicator variables for the calendar year and the contract number. See equations (11) and (12) in
Curto et al. [2015] for more details. Curto et al. [2015] have estimated a nested sequence of models,
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with progressively more explanatory (non-price) variables added to the utility measures. Model (4)
represents the richest of these five specifications, except for the omission of indicator variables for
county-contract combinations.
Due to the confidentiality agreement between Curto et al. [2015] and the consulting firm which
provided them with the data, we were unable to obtain the actual intercept and cost rate values
{ai, ci} for each contract in the various counties. Instead, Curto et al. [2015] kindly shared with
us the joint distribution of the parameter pair {ai, ci} and this differentiated by the number of
contracts N in the county, and one of 5 consecutive ranges for the capitation rate. More specifically,
we focused on all counties with N ≥ 2 contracts and divided them into 10 categories: (1)N = 2,
(2)N = 3, . . ., (8)N = 9, (9)10 ≤ N ≤ 14 and (10)N ≥ 15. Each of these counties are further
subdivided into 4 subsets corresponding with the largest, second largest, third largest, and smallest
inter-quintile range of the capitation rate value C. For each of these 40 sets, we obtained a 5× 5-
table with the joint pdf of the {ai, ci} parameters, discretized on a two-dimensional grid generated
by the quintiles of the two parameters in the set. (Curto et al. 2015 also provided us with the
quintiles of nominal bid values {bi} as benchmarks, to compare our results with.)
Based on these 40 joint distributions, we simulated for each of the 2478 counties with N ≥ 2
contracts, a sample of 1000 market instances and computed the (unique) equilibrium for each
instance. To generate an instance, for a given county, we endowed each of the competing contracts
with an {ai, ci} pair of parameters. These pairs were generated independently from the above joint
distribution pertaining to the set corresponding to the county’s known number of contracts N and
capitation rate C. More specifically, the parameter pair {ai, ci} for each contract was generated by
the following two step procedure: (a) in the first stage, one of the 25 above described rectangles in
the two-dimensional parameter space is generated from the joint distribution, (b) a specific point
within the generated rectangle is drawn from the two-dimensional uniform distribution on this
rectangle.
Our results are summarized in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 (for Plan II (γ0 = γ) and Plan I (γ0 = 0)
respectively) and show results to that are consistent with those derived from an calibration model
(Both tables reflect scenarios without switching costs, i.e., S = 0, Tables B.5-B.6 in Appendix show
the same results for the case where S = 2 and S = 4, under Plan I and Plan II.) We display the
equilibrium results when the capitation rate is determined endogenously as the lowest or second
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lowest bid, or exogenously at $50 below the actual 2010 value.
Focusing on Table 2.2, the equilibrium results obtained from the estimated model shows that the
capitation rates are somewhat smaller than those obtained from the calibrated models. For example,
if the capitation rate is determined as the second lowest premium bid, the average capitation rate
is $645 as opposed to $683. Based on the estimated model, the government’s cost would be reduced
by close to 21% as opposed to the 16.5% estimate we obtained from our calibrated model. The
average FFS bid under this scheme is estimated to be $10, or 1.3% lower than the estimate we
obtained in the calibrated model. Moreover, the average premium bid is virtually identical under
the estimated vs calibrated model ($745 vs $742). Under the estimated model, the average market
share of the traditional FFS program is predicted to increase by 5%, while it is predicted to decrease
by the same in the calibrated model. In the calibrated model, the average monthly out-of-pocket
cost is calculated at $64 in the estimated model, versus $103 in the calibrated model. Note that,
under Plan II, all participants in the traditional FFS program pay an out-of-pocket cost, similar to
these enrolled in the MA plans.
Under Plan I, see table 2.3, there is similar consistency between the results obtained from the
estimated versus the calibrated models. The average premium bid is $755 in the estimated model
and $745 in the calibrated model. The average capitation rate reduction is again approximately
23% and 18.5% in the two respective models. The market share percentage of the FFS program
now increases to the mid 90s, because, under Plan I, with a 20% decrease in the capitation rate,
there is a major difference in the net premium for MA plan enrollees versus those opting for the
traditional FFS program. The average out-of-pocket cost among all beneficiaries is now $2.82 in
the estimated model, and $4.27 in the calibrated model. Last but not least, government costs are
estimated to decrease by 8%, irrespective of whether the estimate are based on the estimated or
the calibrated models.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have applied a new type of price competition model to the Medicare market. The
main distinguishing features of the competition model includes the fact that the utility measures
associated with the competing plans depend on the net premium, which equals the nominal premium
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minus the government’s subsidy or capitation rate; moreover, utilities depend in a non-linear way
on the net premium. In the current system, the capitation rates are exogenous specified and pre-
announced; in various reform plans, they would be replaced by an endogenously subsidy, determined
as the lowest or second lowest bid, or a weighted average of all bids. Finally, the utility measures
may include a “switching cost” incurred when a beneficiary switches between a traditional FFS
plan and a Medicare Advantage plan, or vice versa.
We have applied these models to the 2010 county-by-county data. We employed two different
methodologies to derive the parameters in the various competitive models: one method employs
a calibration technique and the other parameter distributions that were estimated by Curto et al.
[2015]. Computing the price equilibria in the various models under various subsidy structures,
we have been able to estimate the impacts on price equilibria, capitation rates, market shares,
government expenditures, and out-of-pocket costs. Our results exhibit major government cost
savings under several of these reform plans, with modest increases in out-of-pocket costs.
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Background and motivation
Governments around the world spend billions of dollars every year buying a wide range of products
and services from private firms. While standard auctions are often used to allocate contracts in
these procurement processes, recent years have seen a tremendous increase in the adoption of an
alternative class of mechanisms in various public procurement settings: the so-called framework
agreements (FAs), also called indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contracts in the United
States. FAs award tens of billions of dollars worth of contracts annually around the globe and
constitute a steadily increasing fraction of governments’ procurement processes. For example, FAs
awarded e85 billion in 2010 in the European Union only, accounting for 17% of the total value of
all contracts awarded, and their use has increased in the EU at an average rate of 18% since 2006.1
Broadly speaking, FAs are anticipated arrangements for the delivery of goods and services over
a certain period of time.2 Motivated by the increasing adoption of this class of mechanisms in
practice, we aim at providing a better understanding of FAs by introducing a novel auction model
to study a salient feature of these mechanisms, and proposing concrete design recommendations to
improve their performance. This work is the result of a collaboration with the Chilean government
procurement agency Dirección ChileCompra (ChileCompra for short) that buys around 10 billion
dollars worth of products and services every year, of which 2 billion are bought using FAs.
What are FAs? Consider a government that is interested in buying computers for its public
agencies (e.g., schools, hospitals) for the next two years, a time period during which many demand
requests can be expected. On one hand, running an auction whenever such a request arises is
administratively expensive, considering that requests may be frequent and of a small volume. On
the other hand, letting each agency run its own procurement process does not exploit the central
government’s bargaining power and buying know-how. FAs strike a balance between a decentralized
1Data from “Public Procurement in Europe,” http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising rules/cost-
effectiveness en.pdf.
2The European Parliament defined FAs as “an agreement between one or more contracting authorities and one or
more economic operators, the purpose of which is to establish the terms governing contracts to be awarded during
a given period, in particular with regard to price and, where appropriate, the quantity envisaged”. (The Directive
2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the council of March 31, 2004.)
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procurement process and the central government’s bargaining power. Suppliers, on their end, are
motivated to participate in FAs due to the large demand that might be associated with them.
A typical FA is composed of two stages: in the auction stage, an auction-type mechanism,
typically first-price, takes place to select one supplier as the FA winner for a given product or
service. The FA winner is required to sell over the time horizon of the FA at the bid price determined
at this first stage. Then, in the buying stage, various government agencies may buy the product
from the FA winner as needs arise. It is common that government agencies have the obligation to
buy from the FA winner unless they can provide evidence of a more convenient procurement option
in the open market (that we also refer to as the outside or the spot market). Overall, an FA can
be viewed as a government call option to buy at a predetermined price over the time horizon.
In this paper we focus on a distinctive feature that FAs exhibit relative to running a standard
first-price auction whenever a need arises. FA bidders face significant cost uncertainty; while the
price of a product or service is locked at the auction stage, the suppliers’ costs may change over
the buying stage. Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that providers “charge” for this
uncertainty through higher bids. Guillermo Burr, head of Research at ChileCompra, says “we
wanted to better understand why in some categories standard auctions resulted in lower prices
relative to FAs, and how to alleviate this problem and reduce ChileCompra’s buying prices.”
3.1.2 Main contributions
Despite their practical importance, there is little academic research on FAs. In the current paper
we develop a model for FAs that considers the cost uncertainty faced by suppliers and the resulting
bidding incentives. Our paper contributes to the literature on procurement mechanisms in the in-
terface between operations and economics, and at the same time has concrete practical implications.
The contributions of the paper can be categorized along the following three dimensions.
(i) Modeling and bidding incentives. We introduce an auction model for FAs that generalizes
standard auction models to incorporate cost uncertainties faced by suppliers at the auction stage.
In our model all suppliers face a common cost that is unknown at the auction stage and is realized
at the buying stage (for instance, the cost of gas in a transportation service). Then, a buyer has
the option to buy from the FA winner at the agreed price, or to buy from the outside market that
exhibits a similar structure to the bidders’ costs; specifically, it also incorporates the common cost
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component, as outside providers may also need to incurr this cost to provide the good. Given this
structure, we identify that FAs are subject to a sort of winner’s curse (cf. Krishna 2002), because
the events under which the FA winner sells the product are positively correlated with high cost
realizations. Intuitively, the FA option is exercised when the locked-in price is attractive relative to
the spot market price; this coincides with large cost realizations for suppliers. The manner bidders
react to the FA curse in equilibrium formalizes practitioners’ intuition that FAs may result in larger
prices relative to running standard first-price auctions as needs arise. With this motivation, we
introduce various variants of FAs that alleviate the strategic response to the FA curse, reducing
expected payments to suppliers.
(ii) Analysis. We study the Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the game of incomplete information
between sellers induced by different FA variants. We compare the expected buying prices among
these FA variants (as well as first price auctions) using an envelope theorem approach. By itself,
the latter analysis has novelties relative to standard mechanism design, as the outside option given
by the spot market price is endogenous and depends on suppliers’ private information, resulting in
technical challenges when applying standard approaches. In addition, the analysis of the restricted-
flexible FA discussed below is novel as it requires solving a dynamic programming problem embedded
in an auction model. We complement our theoretical results by supporting numerical experiments
that demonstrate the robustness of our findings.
(iii) Practical Design Prescriptions. A significant contribution that particularly distinguishes
this paper from previous related work in auctions is a series of practical suggestions for the design
of FAs that arise from our results and that we summarize below.
We show that monitoring the price offered by the FA winner in the outside market and forcing
the FA winner to match it whenever it is lower than the winning bid, significantly reduces expected
buying prices. Hence, governments may capture significant value by centrally monitoring prices
charged by FA winners in the open market. Considering that thousands of products are bought
through FAs, central monitoring operations might be associated with practical challenges that may
prevent their adoption by procurement agencies despite the price reduction associated with it. As
an alternative, we show that using a perfect price index in which the auctioneer perfectly observes
the realization of the common cost and indexes the bid of the FA winner to its changes lowers
expected buying prices in many settings of practical interest. Hence, if possible, governments
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should make an effort to invest in finding and implementing price indexes for the random common
part of suppliers’ costs.
Price indexes are typically available in practice when the common cost is associated with a
commodity (such as gas). However, for many of the goods and services procured through FAs (e.g.,
computers, office equipment) such indexes do not exist or are hard to build. Thus motivated, we
study a new practical variant of the standard FA, the flexible FA. Here, if the FA winner has a
bid larger than the spot market price offered by a different supplier, the FA winner is allowed to
match it and sell the product. While it does not require central monitoring operations nor price
indexes, we show that the flexible FA achieves expected buying prices that are often comparable
with ones obtained by using monitoring operations, perfect price indexes, or even running first-price
auctions as needs arise. Motivated by practical considerations, we also study the performance of
the restricted-flexible FA, in which once the FA winner reduces its price to match the spot market
price, he cannot increase it back again. We show that this restriction, that may be appealing for
buying agencies because of the transparency it induces, does not significantly hurt expected buying
prices in many scenarios of interest.
These prescriptions are already being applied by ChileCompra to improve the design of their
FAs. Mr. Burr says, “These results have provided important insights regarding the design of
our FAs. They have encourage our FA department to make larger efforts to build adequate price
indexes. They have also motivated a larger effort in policing spot market prices FA winners offer, by
allowing buyers to report low spot market prices when they observe them. They have also showed
us the types of pricing flexibility that we should encourage.”
3.1.3 Related literature
Our study relates to several papers in the literature on auction theory. As the spot market in our
model plays a similar role to a random reserve price, our analysis shares some similarities with
Elyakime et al. [1994] that compares seller’s expected revenue when using a secret random reserve
price relative to the optimal public reserve price. In their model, however, there is no correlation
between bidders’ costs and the reserve price, like in our case through the common cost component.
In this sense, our study is more closely related to classic work in common value auctions and the
associated ‘winner’s curse.’ Specifically, our FA model is similar to auction models with both private
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and common values (see, e.g., Goeree and Offerman 2003). Apart from several technical differences
between our work and the papers mentioned above, a key distinction is the operational and practical
contribution that we provide for FAs, particularly those related to monitored and flexible FAs. In
contrast, none of the aforementioned papers focus on FAs nor provide concrete design prescriptions
for them. An additional operational aspect that is emphasized in the current paper is the impact
of restricted price flexibility, which is approached by solving a dynamic programming problem
embedded in an auction model.
Our study relates to a growing stream of work in operations that studies supply chains and
procurement processes under different forms of uncertainty. Several studies have focused on demand
uncertainty that is faced by buyers and/or suppliers: Chen [2007] and Duenyas et al. [2013] study
optimal procurement mechanisms in a newsvendor-like setting where a buyer facing uncertain
demand determines both the quantity and purchasing price through interactions with suppliers;
Li and Huh [2011] consider a buyer facing uncertain demand and suppliers that need to invest in
capacity before the demand uncertainty is resolved, and study whether the buyer should offer a pull
or push contract; Zhang [2010] also studies a procurement mechanism in a supply chain setting,
but includes supplier delivery performance and price-sensitive market demand.
In addition, Schummer and Vohra [2003] study the mechanism design problem of a buyer
that can procure purchase options from capacity constrained sellers to satisfy an unknown future
demand. The focus of their work is to study how options can be used to hedge against random
demand when suppliers have a cost associated to reserving capacity. Instead, in our case FAs can be
viewed as government call options to lock-in a price when suppliers’ costs fluctuate. More broadly,
while these operations papers relate to demand uncertainty, the focus of our work is on studying the
impact of bidders’ cost uncertainty. In that respect, our work also relates to the one of Elmaghraby
and Oh [2013] that study, in a very different setting, how to structure two sequential auctions in
the presence of learning-by-doing, and whether the buyer is better-off by limiting competition and
contracting with a single supplier in the hope of extracting a better future price. These questions
are at some level related to designing the structure of competition with the spot market price in the
buying stage of FAs (e.g., whether to allow the flexibility to match it or not). In another related
paper, Tunca and Zenios [2006] provide conditions under which procurement auctions are preferred
over relational contracts, as similarly to FAs they identify the most cost efficient supplier.
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As mentioned, the literature that directly studies FAs is limited. Subsequent to the first version
of this paper, Saban and Weintraub [2015] studied another distinctive feature of FAs, namely
how to optimize the trade-off between product variety and price competition. Their auction and
mechanism design analysis considers an FA model with multiple imperfect substitute products, but
ignores suppliers’ cost uncertainties.3 In this sense, the two papers are complementary as they
study different aspects of FAs. In this paper we abstract away from key features studied in Saban
and Weintraub [2015], and from other complexities that may arise in FAs (e.g., multiple products,
multiple winners, non-linear costs) in order to focus on cost uncertainties faced by suppliers, their
negative impact, and practical ways of eliminating this impact. However, we believe our design
prescriptions are also valid in these more general settings. We note that we presented preliminary
results of this work in a conference paper that appeared in a practitioners’ outlet [Anonymous,
2012]. However, that paper studies a simpler model and does not contain the theoretical results
that support the managerial insights and design prescriptions of the current work.
Structure of paper. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In §2 we present an auction-
based model for FAs. In §3 we develop BNE bidding functions for important cases of interest. In §4
we compare the expected buying prices among various mechanisms. In §5 we introduce flexible FAs
and study their performance. In §6 we provide numerical analysis that complements the theoretical
results of the previous sections. In §7 we conclude with key design prescriptions. Selected proofs
and material appear in Appendices A and B. Additional proofs and auxiliary results are deferred
to a series of Appendices that appear in an online companion.
3.2 The Framework Agreement Model
We model a framework agreement (FA) as a game of incomplete information between suppliers,
similarly to the classical modeling approach in auction theory (see Krishna 2002, Milgrom 2004),
and use pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) as solution concept (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et
al. 1995). Consider a buyer that is interested in procuring a product/service to satisfy demand over
an horizon of T time periods. We assume that demand quantities are deterministic and normalized
to one in each time period. Under the assumptions of our model with risk-neutral agents, all of our
3Albano and Sparro [2008] studies a similar trade-off to Saban and Weintraub [2015] under complete information.
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results are also valid for a sequence of i.i.d. demand quantities. To simplify notation we assume
that agents do not discount future payments, but our analysis can be extended to accommodate
discounting.
Suppliers and cost structure. We denote by M the set of M risk-neutral potential suppliers
that could provide the good or service being procured. The set of potential suppliers is assumed
to be fixed throughout the FA horizon. The constant marginal cost faced by bidder i ∈ M when
providing the good at time period t ∈ {1, . . . , T} is given by the sum of two components: ci +Xt.
The first component, ci, is bidder i’s private cost, known only to himself at t = 0. The private
costs {ci : i ∈ M} are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables, each with distribution function F ,
continuous density function f , and finite, non-negative support [c, c̄]. The second cost component,
Xt, is common to all bidders and its realization for all t ≥ 1 is unknown at t = 0. The marginal
distribution function of Xt is denoted by FXt , with continuous density function fXt , and a finite,
non-negative support [x, x̄], for all t. The stochastic process X = {Xt : t ≥ 1} is independent of
the private costs {ci : i ∈M}.
The private cost ci represents idiosyncratic characteristics of supplier i, such as managerial
ability, logistics and production costs, which for the most part do not change over time. On the
other hand, the cost Xt is common, and interpreted as being related to the price of inputs that all
suppliers require in order to provide the product or service. The process X is random as these prices
may change over time. To illustrate this cost structure, consider the provision of a transportation
service at period t ≥ 1. Costs associated with the logistics of the firm and its transportation
network are private and assumed to be fixed over time; these costs are represented by ci.
4 On the
other hand, the costs of some inputs such as gas are common to all firms and subject to random
fluctuations between t = 0 and time period t; these costs are represented by Xt.
Auction stage. At time t = 0, a subset N ⊆M of N suppliers participate in the auction stage and
simultaneously submit sealed bids. The lowest bid wins, and we refer to the supplier with the lowest
bid as the FA winner. We do not model entry decisions explicitly; for simplicity, we take the auctions
participants as exogenously given and we remain agnostic about this entry process. For example,
4This may be a particularly reasonable assumption for relatively mature offerings, such as transportation services
or office supplies. While in reality, a fraction of the private costs may also be subject to uncertainty between t = 0
and some period t, we abstract away from this effect, focusing on the impact of the common cost uncertainty.
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it may be that among the M suppliers, the N that participate in this stage have the lowest private
cost realizations; in such case the FA attracts the most cost efficient providers. For example, in the
context of ChileCompra, for a given product category such as food, few suppliers that recurrently
participate in FAs are typically believed to be cost efficient in providing the products or services
required by the FA relative to other suppliers that operate in the open market.
Buying stage. At any time period t ≥ 1, after the realization of the common cost Xt, the buyer
can buy from the FA winner at a price equal to the winning bid, or can buy from the spot or open
market as an outside option. We assume that at every t ≥ 1 the buyer buys from the open market
if and only if the realized price of this option is lower than the winning bid.
Spot market prices. The bid of the FA winner is compared against an outside option, which is
driven by the prices that are charged in the spot market. We assume this market consists of the
aforementioned setM of potential suppliers, and that the terms of the FA mechanism do not affect
prices in the open market.5 In what follows we describe how spot market prices are formed, and
then describe different outside options that may be considered as a function of these prices.
We assume that the price supplier i ∈ M sets in the spot market at time t ≥ 1 is given by
ci+Xt+Zi,t, where Zi,t is an additive markup charged by firm i at time t. Typically, these markups
are set as an equilibrium outcome resulting from competition among suppliers in the open market.
The type of additive markups we assume arise, for example, from a price competition equilibrium
in a classic model of monopolistic competition with a logit demand system (see Besanko et al. 1990
for details). In this case, Zi,t = Zt for all i, where Zt can be interpreted as a diversity parameter;
the greater its value, the more weight consumers assign to idiosyncratic taste factors in the logit
demand system. While more complex competition models can be considered for the spot market,
we believe this additive model with firm-specific markups Zi,t provides basic richness without over
complicating the analysis of bidding incentives and the FA auction outcome, which is our main
focus.
5This assumption is reasonable for most products bought by ChileCompra based on the observation that the
volume of sales transacted through FAs is typically small relative to the overall volume transacted in the open national
market. While there are exceptions (for example, in Chile the majority of the volume associated with certain health
services such as dialysis is transacted through FAs), in most of FA categories (e.g., electronic devices, furniture, food,
office supplies) the volume transacted through FAs is much smaller than the overall national transacted volume. In
these cases, it may not be realistic to assume that suppliers will strategize in the spot market because of the FA.
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We assume that for each i ∈ M the markups {Zi,t; t ≥ 1} are unknown at time period t = 0
and that Zi,t gets realized at time t. To simplify the analysis we assume that the stochastic
processes {Zt = (Z1,t, . . . , ZM,t); t ≥ 1} and {Xt; t ≥ 1} are independent. (We use boldfaces to
denote vectors throughout the paper.) However, our model does not rule out time correlation on
these processes. For each t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, we also allow correlations among the random variables
{Zi,t; i ∈M}, but assume they share the same marginal distribution function FZt with continuous
density fZt , and finite, non-negative support [z, z].
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Figure 3.1: Cases of interest for spot market price.
Outside Option. Given the prices at the open market, there are different ways of determining the
outside option against which the bid of the FA winner is compared. We give special attention to the
following cases of interest, that are summarized in Figure 3.1. On one extreme is the monitored FA,
in which the outside option is always determined by the price charged in the open market by the FA
winner. Monitoring the spot market price of the FA winner is an approach taken by buying agencies
that play a pro-active role not only in the initial tendering stage at t = 0, but also in providing
outside options at the buying stage. For example, the Korean procurement agency has embraced
this approach and is continuously monitoring FA winners’ prices in the open market [Kang, 2013].
An attractive feature of the monitored FA is that it guarantees that the procurement agency never
buys at a price that is larger than the FA winner spot market price. Note that if both bids and
outside prices are ordered according to costs (i.e., more efficient suppliers are more competitive in
the auction and in the spot market), then the FA winner exhibits the lowest expected spot market
price among all FA participants. Moreover, if the most cost efficient suppliers participate in the
FA, then the FA winner charges the lowest average spot market price among all suppliers.
Due to the high costs associated with monitoring prices of numerous goods that are being
CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS IN PROCUREMENT: AN AUCTION MODEL
AND DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS 87
bought through FAs, ChileCompra and other agencies have not pro-actively monitored spot market
prices of FA winners. In this case, while open market prices are not monitored in a centralized
manner, the individual agencies themselves may still compare FA prices with prices they find in
the open market. ChileCompra, for example, allows agencies to purchase from suppliers that did
not win the FA if their price in the open market is lower than the FA winning bid. Thus, market
prices may still be monitored in a decentralized manner by the agencies themselves. However, it is
reasonable to assume (and also commonly observed in practice) that due to idiosyncratic reasons
such decentralized monitoring may not use the FA winner spot market price as point of comparison,
or more generally, may not identify the lowest price in the open market. For example, individual
agencies may be more sensitive to their own search costs than to reducing public spending, and
therefore might compare the FA price only with a single or few ‘local’ suppliers that are selected
based on geographical proximity or convenience.
A simple model that captures such decentralized monitoring is a naive FA, in which the spot
market price is sampled among the set of potential suppliers randomly. More precisely, we assume
that each potential supplier i ∈M is sampled independently from any other random quantity with
probability qi,M and the outside option is given by the spot market price of the sampled supplier. It
is worth highlighting that all the asymptotic results that compare the performance of naive FAs in
diffuse markets with other types of FAs and with first price auctions presented in §3.4 and §3.5 are
valid for more general sampling mechanisms in the spot market. For example, one valid alternative
would be to sample a finite set of potential suppliers from the open market and set the price of the
outside option equal to the lowest sampled price. To simplify notation and exposition we prove our
results with the base model in which only one firm is randomly sampled at the spot market, and
in §3.6 we present numerical experiments showing comparative statics regarding different sampling
mechanisms and levels of prices in the spot market.
When considering the naive FA it is worthwhile to distinguish between two different kinds of
markets: (i) concentrated markets, in which M is relatively small and each bidder has a relatively
large probability of being sampled as the outside option at the buying stage; and (ii) diffused
markets, in which M is large and each bidder has a relatively small probability of being sampled
as the outside option at the buying stage. Formally, in diffuse markets, we assume qi,M → 0 as
M → ∞ for any i ∈ M, and
∑M
i=1 qi,M = 1, for all M . The histogram in Figure 3.2 depicts a
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distribution of the number of suppliers competing in FAs in Chile (the number of FA participants
may be seen as a lower bound for the number of potential suppliers). Many FA markets in Chile
include numerous suppliers (e.g., food, computers) while other markets are concentrated (e.g.,
airlines, dialysis services).
Figure 3.2: The histogram summarizes the number of competitors in 83 different product categories of FAs
taken place between 2007 and 2011 in Chile. We note that in some categories it may be the case that some
suppliers bid only for a subset of products/services in the category. Source: Dirección ChileCompra.
In the following sections we analyze the above cases of interest and show that these distinctions
significantly impact both bidding behavior as well as expected payments for the procurement agency.
3.3 BNE Bidding Strategies
In §2 we distinguished between naive and monitored FAs, where a key difference between the two
lies in the construction of the outside option against which the FA winning bid is compared at the
buying stage. In the case of naive FAs we also distinguished between diffused and concentrated
markets, where the difference between the two lies in the extent of competition in the open market.
As we mentioned, all these regimes are of practical relevance. In this section we characterize BNE
bidding functions for these cases of interest, and discuss their main elements to provide intuition on
suppliers’ bidding incentives in FAs. To simplify expressions in a manner that clarifies intuition we
focus here on the case T = 1; in §4 we will return to consider the general case T ≥ 1, when analyzing
expected payments under various FAs. In this section we study symmetric, continuous, and strictly
increasing BNE strategies. The bidding strategy of supplier i is a mapping βi : [c, c̄] → A, where
A is an interval of <+. We denote by β−i = {βj , j 6= i} as the vector of bidding strategies of i′s
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competitors. Throughout this section we assume the existence of such equilibria; BNE existence is
concisely discussed at the end of the section (for an extended discussion see Appendix C.7).
3.3.1 Naive FA
In the naive FA to construct the outside option in the buying stage, a supplier is randomly sampled
from the M potential suppliers in the spot market. The spot market for supplier i at time t = 1 is
given by ci +X + Zi, where we ignored the time index because we are considering T = 1.
Diffused Markets. In a diffused market the number of suppliers that compete in the open market
from which an outside option is drawn, M , is very large, while the number of firms participating in
the FA, N , remains finite (and potentially small). Hence, the chance that a given FA participant
is sampled at the spot market stage becomes negligible. We denote by c(1:N),−i the lowest order
statistic among the costs of the suppliers that compete with i in the auction stage. Given a strictly
increasing competitors’ strategy β, the expected profit of seller i with private cost ci and bid price
bi in the naive FA with diffused markets is given by:
πNDFAi (bi, ci, β) = lim
M→∞
E
I{bi ≤ β(c(1:N),−i)} ·
 M∑
j=1
qj,M I{bi ≤ cj +X + Zj}
 · (bi − ci −X)

= F̄N−1(β−1(bi))E [I{bi ≤ cj +X + Zj} · (bi − ci −X)] ,
for any i ∈ N , where F̄ (x) = 1 − F (x), and I {·} denotes the indicator function. Recall that
the bidder sells the good if he defeats his competitors at the auction stage and also the randomly
sampled spot market price at the buying stage. Because M → ∞, the bidder ignores the event
in which himself is sampled in the spot market, and the cost of the sampled supplier in the spot
market (cj) becomes independent from the costs of the FA participants. Note that at the auction
stage (t = 0), X and Z are random and Zj ’s share the same marginal distributions.
To study the equilibrium strategies we could solve the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
derived from the first-order condition associated to the maximization of the profit function above.
However, differently to standard first price auctions, to the best of our knowledge, this ODE does
not have a closed-form solution, because of the presence of the random spot market price.6 Instead,
we derive the integral equation that describes the BNE strategy, by using the envelope theorem
6Elyakime et al. [1994] provide a related discussion when studying random secret reserve prices in a first-price
auction, deriving a somewhat similar integral equation to the one below.
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(see, e.g., chapter 4 in Milgrom 2004 for a treatment of this approach). This equation provides
more intuition regarding the equilibrium relative to the ODE. We have the following result.
Proposition 7 (BNE bids in naive FA with diffused markets) Suppose that T = 1. Let
βNDFA(·) be a strictly increasing, continuous, and symmetric BNE strategy profile for the naive FA
in diffused markets. Then, βNDFA(·) satisfies the following integral equation for all ci ∈ [c, c̄]:





βNDFA(ci) ≤ cj +X + Zj
}]





F̄N−1 (c) · P
{
βNDFA(c) ≤ cj +X + Zj
}
dc
F̄N−1 (ci) · P {βNDFA(ci) ≤ cj +X + Zj}︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
.
We refer to the first two components (A) of the right-hand-side of the equation above as the
implied cost : the expected cost of the bidder, conditional on offering a better price than the spot
market. We refer to the third term (B) as the markup the bidder charges on top of the implied
cost for having a private cost lower than c. The last term is similar to the “information rent” term
in a standard first price auction; however, in our model the bidder needs to defeat not only all the
other bidders but also the spot market. Considering term (A), one may obtain:
E
[
XI{βNDFA(ci) ≤ cj +X + Zj}
]




∣∣∣βNDFA(ci) ≤ cj +X + Zj] ≥ E [X] , (3.1)
for any realized private cost ci.
7 This expression captures the strategic equilibrium reaction of
rational bidders to an important feature of FAs we refer to as the FA curse for its similarity with
the winner’s curse in common value auctions [Krishna, 2002]. The FA curse captures the fact that
for the FA winner selling the good is in some sense ‘bad news’, as the selling event is positively
correlated with the event in which costs are high. This is driven by the dependence of both the
spot market price and the supplier’s costs on X. In equilibrium, rational bidders respond to avoid
the FA curse by charging the conditional expectation in (3.1), which is larger than the expected
value of X. To illustrate the role of this correlation in the FA outcome we describe in Figure 3.3
the three different scenarios the FA winner may face depending on the outcome of X. For a given
realization cj + zj , the spot market price is X + cj + zj . If the realization of X is low enough,
the spot market price is lower than the winning bid, and demand is satisfied in the spot market.
For a moderate realization of X, the winning bid may be lower than the spot market price, but
larger than the realized costs ci+X; hence, the FA winner provides the product and makes positive
profits. If the realization of X is large enough, the FA winner provides the product with negative
profits.
7This is a direct generalization of the result E[X|X ≥ a] ≥ E[X] for some random variable X and constant a.
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Figure 3.3: The “FA curse”.
The manner in which strategic suppliers react to the FA curse formalizes the observation by
practitioners described in §1 that bid prices may be higher in a FA relative to a standard first-price
auction run at the time the good is needed after observing the realization of X (see Theorem 10
below). An important objective of the rest of the paper will be to derive mechanisms that alleviate
the impact of the strategic response to the FA curse on buying prices.
Concentrated Markets. In concentrated markets we assume the number of suppliers in the open
market is small, and thus bidders do not neglect the possibility of being sampled from the open
market in the buying stage. Assuming a strictly increasing competitors’ strategy β, the expected
profit of supplier i with private cost ci and bid price bi is given by:





qj,M I{bi ≤ cj +X + Zj}
 · (bi − ci −X)
+ qi,M I{bi ≤ β(c(1:N),−i)}(min{bi, ci +X + Zi} − ci −X)
+ qi,M I{bi > β(c(1:N),−i) > ci +X + Zi}Zi
]
. (3.2)
The first term captures the potential profit from winning the FA with a bid that is lower than
the sampled spot market price. The second term captures profits captured by the FA potentially
through the spot market; hence, revenues are the minimum between the bid submitted by i at t = 0
and the spot market price of i at t = 1. The third term captures profits from losing the FA, but
being sampled at the spot market (with a price that lower than the winning bid).
Proposition 8 (BNE bids in naive FA with concentrated markets) Suppose that T = 1.
Let βNFA(·) be a strictly increasing, continuous, and symmetric BNE strategy profile for the naive
FA. Then, βNFA(·) satisfies the following integral equation for all ci ∈ [c, c̄]:
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Term (A) captures the strategic reaction to the FA curse as before. Term (B) is the information
rent term considering that the FA winner may or may not be selected as the outside option in the
spot market when the market is concentrated; the structure of the partial derivative is specified
in the proof of the proposition in Appendix C.3. Term (C) captures the spot market opportunity
effect, representing additional margin the FA winner may get if selected from the spot market, while
adjusting for the respective margin the least efficient supplier realizes. Because of the spot market
opportunity effect, the analysis of the concentrated market regime is significantly more challenging
than that of the diffused market. Hence, some of our results will specialize for the latter regime,
which as we already argued, is by itself relevant in practice.
The procurement agency would like to minimize the expected payment (or buying price) corre-
sponding to the overall sourcing cost, which considers the possibility to buy from the FA winner or














In the monitored FA, the price set in the auction stage is compared with the one charged by the FA
winner in the open market and the buying price is set to be the lowest of the two, where demand
is always satisfied by the FA winner. Assuming a strictly increasing competitors’ strategy β, the
expected profit of supplier i with private cost ci and bid price bi is given by:
πi(bi, ci, β) = E
[
I{bi ≤ β(c(1:N),−i)} · (min{bi, ci +X + Zi} − ci −X)
]
,
where Zi is the random markup that i charges in the spot market. The expression above considers
that bidder i wins the FA if and only if he has the lowest bid, and that in that case, the transacted
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payment is the lowest between the bid submitted by i at t = 0 and his spot market price at t = 1.
Proposition 9 (BNE bids in monitored FA) Suppose that T = 1. Let βMFA(·) be a strictly
increasing, continuous, and symmetric BNE strategy profile for the monitored FA. Then, βMFA(·)
satisfies the following integral equation for all ci ∈ [c, c̄]:
βMFA(ci) = ci +
E
[
XI{βMFA(ci) ≤ ci +X + Zi}
]







I{βMFA(c) ≤ c+X + Zi}
]
dc





ZiI{βMFA(ci) > α(ci +X + Zi)}
]
E [I{βMFA(ci) ≤ ci +X + Zi}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
.
As previously, term (A) captures the bidders’ strategic reaction to the FA curse. Term (B) is the
information rent and term (C) captures the market opportunity effect: the added value of delivering
the good from the open market. In monitored FAs this value is captured by the FA winner and









βMFA(c(i:N)), c(i:N) +X + Z(i:N)
}]
, (3.4)
where Z(i:N) is the markup charged in the open market by the lowest cost supplier in the FA.
Comparing equations (3.3) and (3.4), it is immediate that the expected value of the right-hand side
of the latter is smaller than the expected value of the right-hand side of the former; this is a direct
effect of monitoring the market price of the most efficient FA participant. However, comparing the
left-hand sides is not trivial as the equations for the BNE bidding strategies in Propositions 8 and 9
do not admit closed-form solutions. Further, in §6 we demonstrate through numerical experiments
that equilibrium bids between monitored and naive FAs cannot be ordered in general. In §4 we
propose a mechanism design approach that will more easily allow us to compare the expected
buying prices between the different FAs and also with other benchmarks that we introduce below.
Existence of Equilibrium. Due to the correlation between the random common cost and the
spot market price existence does not follow from standard first price auction existence results. In
Appendix C.7 we study the existence of BNE bidding strategies in two cases of interest. Considering
a finite action set, in Proposition C7 we prove the existence of symmetric BNE in increasing
strategies for the naive FA in diffused markets and for the monitored FA, and this result is then
extended to continuous and compact action sets. In Proposition C8 we show that in these settings
any increasing symmetric BNE must be strictly increasing and identify sufficient conditions for it
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to be continuous. Similar results can be proved for the ‘flexible FA’ that will be introduced in §5.
Our approach uses the techniques from Athey [2001].
3.4 Mechanism Design Approach
The bidding analysis in §3 was aimed at developing intuition regarding the various elements that
affect bidding behavior of suppliers in FAs, with emphasis on the equilibrium response to the FA
curse. In this section, we adopt a mechanism design approach to derive the expected buying price
for various designs of FAs that were discussed in the previous sections, and that will more easily
allow a comparison between them. In this section we come back to the original multi-period setting.
The analysis in this section has some novelties relative to existing mechanism design literature
(e.g., Myerson 1981) as we now explain. Recall that the spot market price of supplier i at time t is
given by ci +Xt + Zi,t. The price of the outside option is a function of these market prices; in the
monitored FA it is the market price of the FA winner, and in the naive FA it is a random sample
from all potential suppliers. Hence, the price of the outside option is a function of the actual private
cost realizations c in addition to the realizations of Xt and Zt. As a result, the allocation rules that
determine whether a good is bought from the FA winner at the winning bid price depend on the
private cost realizations of suppliers through the spot market prices. In other words, the outside
option for the auctioneer is not exogenous but rather depends on the actual cost realizations, which
differs from the classical mechanism design setup. This dependence yields additional terms when
applying the envelope theorem to express the payments as a function of the allocation rule; despite
this challenge, we derive useful expressions to compare expected buying prices.
3.4.1 Preliminaries
We consider the following class of first-price FA mechanisms that include the monitored and naive
FAs as special cases. At time t = 0, the auctioneer receives bids from the FA participants and
decides the FA winner. At time period t = 1, 2, . . . , T , the auctioneer observes the realized spot
market price and decides whether to buy from the FA winner or to buy from the spot market at
period t. Formally, we define the allocation function ri,t : AN× [pt, p̄t]→ [0, 1], where ri,t(bi, b−i, pt)
is the probability bidder i sells the good through the FA if he submits a bid bi, his competitors
submit bids b−i, and the realization of the spot market price at period t is given by pt. The interval
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[p
t
, p̄t] is the range of feasible spot market prices. We denote rt = (r1,t, ..., rN,t) and r = (r1, . . . , rT )
as the vectors of the allocation probabilities. In what follows we only consider allocation rules that
satisfy
∑N
i=1 ri,t(b, p) ≤ 1, for all b, p, t.
Similarly, define the payment function mi,t : AN × [pt, p̄t] → <, where mi,t(bi, b−i, pt) is the
expected FA payment bidder i receives for given bids (bi, b−i) and a given realization of pt. We let
mt = (m1,t, ...,mN,t) and m = (m1, . . . ,mT ). Because we consider first-price FA mechanisms, it
may also be convenient to write mi,t(b, p) = biri,t(b, p), where bi is the bid submitted by bidder i
at t = 0. An FA mechanism is given by the functions w = (r,m).
Let Aj be the event in which bidder j is selected in the spot market; when sampling randomly
under the naive FA; Aj = 1 with probability qj,M . Then, the spot market price is given by
pt(c, Xt,Zt) =
∑M
i=1Aipi,t(ci, Xt, Zi,t), where pi,t(ci, Xt, Zi,t) is the price charged at time t by firm
i at the spot market. For the monitored FA, the allocation function is:
ri,t(bi, b−i, pt) = I {bi ≤ bj ,∀j 6= i} I {bi ≤ pi,t(ci, Xt, Zi,t)} ,
and for the naive FA, the allocation function is:
ri,t(bi, b−i, pt) = I {bi ≤ bj ,∀j 6= i} I {bi ≤ pt(c, Xt,Zt)} .
While to simplify the exposition we ignore ties, we note that all the results in this section hold
even if ties are allowed. In both cases above the FA winner is determined by the lowest submitted
bid; in the monitored FA the winning bid is compared against the FA winner’s own spot market
price, and in the naive FA it is compared against a randomly sampled spot market price. In both
cases, the allocation function is equal to one if the good is allocated through the FA at the winning
bid. However, FA winner’s profits also consider the event of supplying the good through the spot
market. For example, in the monitored FA, the allocation function is equal to one if the FA winner
sells the good at his winning bid bi. The FA winner profit function also considers the event of
selling the good at his own spot market price when the latter is lower than bi.
We benchmark the expected payments under the monitored FA and the naive FA against
the expected payment in a procurement mechanism where a first price auction (FPA) is held at
every time period t after Xt gets realized, and then the winner (the supplier with the lowest bid)
immediately delivers the good. In these FPAs, bidders do not face cost uncertainty. In such a
mechanism, the profit with bid bi, cost ci, and realization xt is given by:
πi,t(bi, ci, β) = P {bi ≤ β(cj),∀j 6= i} · (bi − ci − xt) .
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We denote the payment in the mechanism in which a FPA is run at every time period by PFPA.











c(1:N) +Xt + F (c(1:N))/f(c(1:N))
]
, (3.5)
where c(1:N) is the lowest order statistic among the private costs. The function β
FPA
N,t (·) is the BNE
strategy of the FPA with N bidders. The second equality holds by standard mechanism design
arguments based on the envelope theorem [Milgrom, 2004]. In the next subsection, we compare the
payments in the naive FA with those of FPA to quantify the impact of the equilibrium response to
the FA curse.
A natural alternative benchmark one may consider is a first price auction with a random reserve
price that is set to be equal to the spot market price (randomly sampled like in the diffused market
naive FA); in Appendix C.4 we show that expected payments under the two FPAs (with and without
the reserve price) are asymptotically equivalent as the number of bidders grows large. Hence, the
comparison result shown in the following subsection also holds for FPA with an outside option that
is given by the spot market price.
3.4.2 The Naive FA
We next provide a lower bound for expected payments in the naive FA that only depends on the
allocation rule and will allow for easier comparisons with other mechanisms.
Proposition 10 (Bound on the expected buying price in naive FA) Let β(·) be a strictly
increasing symmetric BNE strategy profile induced by a naive FA mechanism w = (r,m). Then,

















ri,t(β(c), pt) (v(ci) +Xt − q̃0(c, Xt))
]
,
where q̃0(c, Xt) =
∑M
i=1Ai(ci +Xt), and v(ci) = ci +
F (ci)
f(ci)
is the virtual cost.
We next compare the expected payments under naive FA with those obtained under FPA. To derive
the result we consider an asymptotic regime in which the number of participant firms in the FA is
large. This simplifies the analysis as it allows to get a better handle on the FA equilibrium bids
(which are complex objects without closed-form expressions for every finite number of participants),
yet leads to meaningful results as expected payments can be strictly ordered.
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Theorem 10 (Asymptotic performance of naive FA) Assume minc∈[c,c̄] f(c) > 0. Then:








2. (Comparison to first price actions in diffused markets) If z+x < E[Xt] for all t, and the spot








In §6 we provide numerical results for small values of N that support the validity of the asymp-
totic results for small markets. As running a first price auction after the common cost is realized
eliminates the FA curse associated with cost uncertainty, Theorem 10 demonstrates the impact of
bidders’ strategic response to the FA curse on expected payments. In concentrated markets, the
expected payments of the naive FA are larger than those of the FPA, where this inequality is strict
in diffused markets. Note that governments may still prefer to use FAs because running auctions as
needs arise has administrative costs associated to setting up the auctions, receiving bids, processing
them, and so forth, that scale with the total number of demand periods. In contrast, when running
an FA the administrative cost associated to running it is only payed once, at t = 0.
3.4.3 The Monitored FA
We next demonstrate that one may improve the performance of FAs by monitoring the spot market
price of the FA winner. We first derive an expression for the expected payments in monitored FAs.
Proposition 11 (Expected buying price in monitored FA) Let β(·) be a strictly increasing
symmetric BNE strategy profile induced by a monitored FA mechanism w = (r,m). Then, the









ri,t(β(c), pt(c, Xt,Zt)) (v(ci) +Xt − q0(c, Xt))
]
,
with q0(c, x) = c(1:N) + x, v(ci) = ci +
F (ci)
f(ci)
, and c(1:N),−i is the lowest order statistic among the
cost realizations of firm i’s competitors.
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In Proposition 11 we derive an expression for the expected payment that depends only on the
allocation rule, even though the allocation rule itself also depends on the actual realizations of
costs through the spot market price. A key idea in this derivation is to exploit the fact that
some of the additional terms appearing in the envelope expression cancel out. In what follows
we leverage this result to show that when the number of suppliers is large the monitored FA is
payment equivalent to running FPAs as needs arise. As a corollary from this result and Theorem
10 we obtain an order between the expected payments under monitored FA and naive FA.
Theorem 11 (Asymptotic performance of monitored FA) Assume minc∈[c,c̄] f(c) > 0.
















3. (Comparison to naive FA in diffused markets) Assume z + x < E[Xt] for all t, and that the








Theorem 11 shows that the monitored FA alleviates the impact of bidders’ reaction to the
FA curse. This conclusion might be somewhat intuitive: the monitored FA should provide lower
expected buying prices relative to the naive FA, because it uses a better outside option (the FA
winner spot market price as oppose to a randomly sampled spot market price). However, the
analysis is not direct, because the expected buying price also depends on the equilibrium bids, which
are hard to characterize. By taking N →∞ we can simplify the dependence of the expected buying
prices on equilibrium bids and prove the result. In §6 we provide numerical analysis demonstrating
that the monitored FA typically performs better than the naive FA even when N is small.
A key for establishing Theorems 10 and 11 is to show that the per period asymptotic expected
payment under the monitored FA and first-price auction are no larger than c+E[Xt]. This follows
because as N grows the lowest cost supplier achieves c and competition dissipates all markups. In
contrast, one can also show that the expected payment under the naive FA is strictly larger than
this quantity due to the strategic response to the FA curse, even in the regime of large N .
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3.5 Price Flexibility in FAs
The results we have established so far suggest that monitoring spot prices of FA winners may
improve the performance of FAs. Nevertheless, as discussed before such an approach involves
practical challenges (such as centralized monitoring costs) and therefore may not be necessarily
followed by procurement agencies (as is the case for ChileCompra). In this section we discuss
practical alternative approaches to improve the performance of FAs. We study FA designs that
alleviate the common cost uncertainty and therefore achieve lower payments relative to naive FAs.
We show that the optimal mechanism eliminates the common cost uncertainty by indexing payments
to the common cost. One limitation of using this type of mechanisms in practice, though, is that
it may be hard to establish prices indexes for many of the goods and services procured through
FAs (e.g., computers, office equipment, services). Thus motivated, we introduce practical variants
of the naive FA design, a class of flexible FAs, which under some conditions achieve payments that
are similar to the ones under the optimal mechanism and the monitored FA, without requiring a
price index nor centralized monitoring of spot market prices.
To facilitate the analysis we focus on diffused markets, where the price of the outside option
at each period t is given by pt =
∑M
j=1Aj(cj + Xt + Zj,t). It is simple to show that pt converges
in distribution to Xt + Zt as M → ∞, where we abuse notation assuming that Zt has the same
distribution as cj + Zj,t. (Recall that in diffused markets Zt is independent of ci, for all i ∈ N .)
3.5.1 The Flexible and Restricted-Flexible FA
One proxy for the realization of the common cost (which in general, is not directly observed by
the procurement agency) is the realization of the spot market price. Hence, a practical FA variant
may use observed spot market prices to partially remove common cost uncertainty. We introduce
a class of flexible FAs, in which at every point in time the FA winner has the option to decrease
his bid to match the observed spot market price (in case the latter is lower than the winning bid).
When lowering price to match the spot market price the FA winner is guaranteed to supply the
good at that period. We study two practically relevant variants of this new class of FAs.
First, we consider a flexible FA in which the decision to lower the price is done independently
each period. In this case, the FA winner can match the spot market price one period, but then
the bid price goes back up to its original value at the next period. A flexible FA may result in a
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wiggly time-series of payments to the FA winner. Discussions with ChileCompra suggested that
for transparency reasons it could be preferred that the FA winner does not increase prices during
the FA time horizon. In fact, in practice it is often the case that if the FA winner reduces its
price for one buyer, then the procurement agency expects the supplier to make the reduced price
available for all future buyers as a way of encouraging transparency and competitive prices. For
these reasons, an appealing variant is a restricted-flexible FA, in which once the FA winner reduces
his price to match the spot market price, he cannot increase it back again. In this case, payments
to the FA winner are always non-increasing, which is an appealing practical feature.
Note that adopting a multi-period model is key to study the restricted-flexible FA, because it
induces the following dynamic trade-off for the FA winner that needs to be taken into account. On
one hand, matching the spot market price today may increase current profits. On the other hand,
since the FA winner would not be able to increase the price back in future periods, matching may
reduce future profits (and even cause losses) when realized costs are higher. Note that under a
flexible FA optimal matching decisions are myopic and such a tradeoff does not exist.
Now, we formalize expressions for expected payments. The allocation rule of the flexible FA for
time period t is given by:
ri,t(bi, b−i, zt, xt, ci) = I{bi ≤ bj , j 6= i} · (I {bi ≤ zt + xt}+ I {bi > zt + xt, ci ≤ zt}) .
In this allocation rule the FA winner sells through the FA either when his bid is lower than the
spot market price or when he can afford matching the spot market price (the latter is the case if
ci ≤ zt). The payment function of the flexible FA for time period t is given by:
mi,t(bi, b−i, zt, xt, ci) = I{bi ≤ bj , j 6= i} · (biI {bi ≤ zt + xt}+ (zt + xt)I {bi > zt + xt, ci ≤ zt}) .
Even though the allocation depends on the actual cost realizations, using arguments similar to the
ones used for the monitored FA, we establish the following expected payment characterization.
Proposition 12 (Expected buying price in Flexible FA) Let β(·) be a strictly increasing
symmetric BNE strategy profile induced by the flexible FA. Then, the expected payment in flexible

















β(c(1:N)) ≤ Zt +Xt, c(1:N) > Zt
})]
.
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We now turn to consider the restricted-flexible FA.8 Suppose that at time period t, the FA
winner current bid price is bt, the private cost is c, and xt and zt are realized. Then, the FA winner
faces a dynamic optimization problem with the following Bellman equation:
Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt) =
 max{Vt+1(bt, c, xt), (zt − c) + Vt+1(xt + zt, c, xt)}, if bt > xt + ztbt − c− xt + Vt+1(bt, c, xt), otherwise, (3.6)




. When bt >
xt + zt the FA winner has the option to match the spot market price at time period t, and does
so if and only if Vt+1(bt, c, xt) ≤ (zt − c) + Vt+1(xt + zt, c, xt). In Appendix C.5 (see Proposition
C3), we show that Vt+1(bt, c, xt) is strictly increasing in bt; hence, the FA winner matches if current
realized profits (zt − c) compensate for the decrease on future profits as bt decreases to xt + zt.
Using the dynamic programming formulation and a mechanism design approach, we also provide in
Appendix C.5 an explicit expression for the expected total payments under the restricted-flexible
FA along the entire FA horizon, which we denote by PFLR.
In the following subsection we leverage these expressions to compare the expected payments of
these flexible FAs with those of previously studied mechanisms.
3.5.2 Expected Payments for Flexible FAs
To evaluate the flexible FA we benchmark it against three mechanisms: the monitored FA; the
FPA, in which an auction is run at every time period without cost uncertainty; and a mechanism
that is optimal in a class of mechanisms that generalizes the class defined in §3.4. While the latter
is described in detail in Appendix C.6, in what follows we summarize the setup and main results.
We define the allocation function ri,t : AN × [x, x̄]× [z, z̄]→ [0, 1], where ri,t(bi, b−i, x, z) is the
probability bidder i sells the product in period t if he submit a bid bi, his competitors submit bids
b−i, the common cost realization is x, and the realization of Z is z. We let rt = (r1,t, ..., rN,t) and
r = (r1, ..., rT ). We consider allocation rules that satisfy
∑N
i=1 ri,t(b, x, z) ≤ 1, for all b, x, z,and t.
Similarly, define the payment function mi,t : AN × [x, x̄]× [z, z̄]→ <, where mi,t(bi, b−i, x, z) is the
expected payment bidder i receives in period t for given bids (bi, b−i) and given realizations x and
8For technical simplicity, for the analysis of the restricted-flexible FA we assume that the process {Xt; t ≥ 1} is
Markov and that {Zt; t ≥ 1} are i.i.d.. We could generalize this assumption to the following: the distribution of
(Zt, Xt) depends only on the realization of Xt−1, and Xt and Zt are independent conditional on Xt−1.
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z. We let mt = (m1,t, ...,mN,t) and m = (m1, ...,mT ). An FA mechanism is given by the functions
w = (r,m). This class is more general than the one defined in §3.4, as it allows dependence on
x and z separately, beyond just p = x + z (but it does not include the flexible FA because the
allocation rule of the latter depends on the cost realization).
In Appendix C.6 (see Proposition C6) we characterize the optimal mechanism as a “modified”
second price auction, in which the winner is payed b(2) + xt (where b(2) denotes the second lowest
bid), with an appropriately chosen random reserve price (that depends on zt). Note that under the
optimal mechanism derived in Appendix C.6, payments in every period t are indexed to the realized
common cost xt, effectively creating a price index that eliminates the common cost uncertainty for
the FA winner, and therefore, eliminating the FA curse.
It is important to observe that while the practicality of the price index FA and the monitored
FA lies on the availability of relevant price indexes and centralized monitoring operations, the
flexible FA does not require any of these. In fact, this new class is based on the same decentralized
sampling of spot market prices that is used in the naive FA, and only requires giving the FA winner
the additional option of matching the spot market price at every time period. The following result
shows that the expected buying price under a flexible FA is asymptotically optimal, where we denote
POPT as the expected payments over the horizon under the optimal mechanism. Furthermore, the
expected payments under the flexible FA asymptotically coincide with those of the monitored FA,
as well as running first price auctions as needs arise.























In contrast with Theorems 10 and 11 that show that payments under the naive FA exceed those
of the FPA and the monitored FA for large N , Theorem 12 implies that the flexible FA achieves
low expected payments when the number of bidders is large, comparable to those obtained by the
same benchmarks. Moreover, in the numerical analysis that is be described in §3.6 we show that
expected payments under the flexible FA are typically close to these benchmarks even for small
values of N .
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The next theorem shows that in contrast, the restricted-flexible FA achieves expected payments
that are larger or equal than those of the flexible FA when N is large.








Theorem 13 implies that even though the restricted-flexible FA is appealing in the sense that it
induces non-increasing payments to the FA winner over the FA time horizon, this restriction may
drive higher overall expected payments to the procuring agency when the number of suppliers is
large. The intuition is as follows. Typically, the flexible FA induces lower equilibrium bids, while
the restricted-flexible FA guarantees that once the FA winner matches the spot market price, the
buying price is reduced from there on. When N is large, however, bids are low to start with,
and therefore, the FA winner is less likely to match the spot market price in the restricted-flexible
FA; as a consequence, the flexible FA results in lower expected payments. In the following section
we conduct numerical experiments exploring the implications of the restricted-flexible FA for small
values of N . In this case, we show that the restricted-flexible FA achieves comparable, or sometimes
even better, expected payments relative to the flexible FA, because the FA winner matches the spot
market more often.
3.6 Numerical Experiments
We complement the analytical results obtained in the previous sections with numerical experiments
demonstrating the robustness of the former. Two of the main insights we have derived so far for
the design of FAs are that (1) the flexible FA achieves lower expected payments relative to the
naive FA, and that (2) the performances of the flexible FA and the monitored FA are comparable.
While the main analytical results deriving these insights (in particular Theorems 11 and 12) are
of asymptotic nature, our numerical results validate these conclusions even when the number of
suppliers is relatively small. Our results also demonstrate that the expected payments under the
restricted-flexible FA may be similar and even lower than the ones achieved under the flexible FA,
despite the asymptotic result in Theorem 13.
Setting. To simplify the setting we assume throughout this section that Zi,t = ∆ is a deterministic
parameter. We assume a diffused market, and set the spot market price to be c0 + Xt + ∆ where
CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS IN PROCUREMENT: AN AUCTION MODEL
AND DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS 104
c0 is an exogenous parameter capturing different sampling mechanisms as we explain later. In the
monitored FA the spot market price is set according to the private cost of the FA winner. Further,
we assume that the common costs {Xt : t ≥ 1} are i.i.d. random variables.
Price indexes and flexible FA. Suppose that at some t > 0 the procuring agency can observe the
realized common cost xt. When this is the case (for example, when the common cost component
is a commodity, such as gas), the buyer might use a perfect price index to eliminate the common
cost uncertainty. Using such a price index, when the realized common cost is xt, the payment of a
winning bidder with bid b∗ can be set to b∗+(xt−E[Xt]), in which case costs for the FA winner are
predetermined a priori and equal to c + E[Xt]. One can also show that such “perfect price index
FA” with an appropriate reserve price is optimal among the class of mechanisms introduced in §5
(that is, in the setting of this section, the optimal mechanism can be implemented as a first-price
perfect price index FA). Further, under the assumptions of the present section, the flexible FA
achieves the same expected payments as the perfect price index FA, and as running a first price
auction after Xt has been realized (FPA). Hence, the results obtained below for the flexible FA also
apply to FPA as well as to the first-price perfect price index FA. We next describe the methodology
and setup of our numerical experiments, followed by the main results and key insights.
3.6.1 Methodology
We numerically study the different FA models: naive FA, monitored FA, restricted-flexible FA, and
flexible FA (which, as we mentioned, is payoff equivalent to FPA). One may observe that under
the assumptions above, in the naive FA, monitored FA, and flexible FA it is sufficient to analyze
the expected buying prices at a single period. In the restricted-flexible FA, however, outcomes are
not independent across periods. To simplify the numerical solution of the dynamic program asso-
ciated with the FA winner’s decision problem we assume T = 2. Methodological background for
the experiments is given in Appendix C.2. In particular, Proposition C1 establishes the ordinary
differential equations (ODEs) and the corresponding boundary conditions that characterize sym-
metric BNE strategies for the various FAs. Similarly to asymmetric first-price auctions, our ODEs
are not well-behaved at the boundary. Hubbard and Paarsch [2011] and Fibich and Gavish [2011]
provide useful summaries of the challenges involved in numerically solving ODEs to establish BNE
strategies in asymmetric first-price auctions, as well as ways to overcome these technical challenges
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(see also further discussion in Appendix C.2). We solve the ODEs using a Runge-Kutta method in
Matlab to obtain the BNE bid functions for the various FA mechanisms.
For various instances described below and the different FA mechanisms, we compute the equilib-
rium bid functions using the ODEs, and then we use simulation to determine the expected buying
prices. To do so, we randomly generate the private costs ci for all suppliers and use the BNE bid
functions to obtain the winning bid β(c(1)), where c(1) is the lowest realized private cost. Then, we
randomly generate a common cost Xt. The realized cost of the winning bidder is c(1) + Xt, and
the realized spot market price is c0 + ∆ +Xt for naive FA with diffused market (the parameter c0
can be associated with the level of competitiveness in the open market, or with different sampling
mechanisms, as we further discuss below), flexible FA and restricted-flexible FA, and c(1) + ∆ +Xt
for monitored FA. Given these quantities, buying prices are determined according to the rules of
the different mechanisms. To simulate the expected buying price, we replicate the above procedure
50, 000 times for each problem instance and each FA mechanism; relative errors in the results below
are all less than 0.5% with 98% confidence intervals.
3.6.2 Scenarios and Results




. We assume a uniform
distribution in order to simplify the ODEs; we fix this distribution while varying other parameters.
We consider a common cost Xt that is distributed according to a truncated normal distribution with
mean µx, standard deviation σx, and support [0, 2µx]; we denote by σmax =
2µx√
12
, the value of the
standard deviation under which the distribution of Xt becomes uniform over [0, 2µx]. We consider
all possible combinations of a large range of parameter values that capture different settings: N ∈
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In total, there are 270 model instances. Note that the different values of c0 can represent different
sampling mechanisms from the spot market: c0 = 1/4 corresponds to the expected cost when
sampling one supplier from the spot market, c0 = 1/6 to the expected cost when sampling two and
choosing the minimum, and c0 = 1/8 when sampling three and choosing the minimum.
All numerical results can be obtained from the authors upon request. The plot in the left side
of Figure 3.4 shows the BNE bid functions under the different mechanisms for one representative
instance. The bid functions in the plot are ordered in the “typical order”, which repeated itself
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c0 = 0.25, and ∆ =
1
12 . (Left) BNE bid function under the NDFA, MFA, FLE, and FLR mechanisms
with N = 10 bidding suppliers. (Right) Per-period expected buyer’s payment for different mechanisms as a
function of the number of participating suppliers. Because of payoff equivalence, the flexible FA curve also
represents FPA and the perfect price index FA.
over most instances. The equilibrium bid under naive FA is higher than the equilibrium bid under
flexible and restricted-flexible FAs. There is no universal order between equilibrium bids under
naive FA and monitored FA.9 The plot in the right hand side of Figure 3.4 depicts the buyer’s
expected payment per-period as a function of the number of bidders, illustrating that the established
comparisons in Theorems 10, 11, and 12 may also hold under a relatively small number of bidders.
In the representative example that is showed in the figure, monitored FA dominates naive FA for
any number of bidders, while flexible and restricted-flexible FAs dominate naive FA for any N ≥ 5,
and approach the monitored FA as the number of bidders increases.
We find that in a diffused market with c0 = 1/4, the buyer’s expected payment under monitored
FA is always smaller than the payment under naive FA for all scenarios, and that on average the
prices are 9% lower under monitored FA. Note that this value of c0 represents a sampling of an
average cost seller from the spot market. However, when the spot market is cheaper than the average
seller (that is, c0 < 1/4), there is a small number of instances for which the expected payment under
monitored FA is larger than that of naive FA. However, it is still the case that in most instances the
9We note that the FA winner under the naive FA, flexible FA, or restricted-flexible FA is competing against an
outside market with price c0 + ∆ +X, and as a result bidders with private cost higher than that value never win.
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monitored FA performs better, especially when Xt is volatile (with a larger coefficient of variation),
and when there is more competition (when the number of sellers is relatively large). For example,
with c0 = 1/6 and σx = 3σmax/4, the expected payments of the monitored FA are lower than
those of the naive FA in 31 out of 36 parametric combinations of ∆, µx, and N ≥ 4. These findings
represent the following insight that is consistent with Theorem 11: monitored FAs typically perform
better than naive FAs, except in some cases in which the number of FA participants is small and
relatively efficient suppliers are sampled from the spot market in the naive FA.
Comparing the performance of flexible FA with that of naive FA, we observe that flexible FAs
often dominate naive FAs under sufficient competition. For example, in 88% of the tested instances
(191 of 225) in which N ≥ 4, flexible FA outperformed naive FAs with a buying price that was
on average 3.7% lower than the one obtained under the naive FA. In cases where in addition in
a naive FA an “average cost” supplier was sampled (c0 = 1/4), the flexible FA dominated the
naive FA in an even more consistent manner (in more than 95% of these instances the payments
under the flexible FA were lower). Note that a naive FA may perform better than a flexible FA
when N is small, because in naive FAs bidders face the additional competition of the random spot
market price (which in flexible FAs can always be matched), incentivizing suppliers to bid more
aggressively. This effects get dissipated quickly as N grows.
Comparing the flexible and the monitored FAs, we observe that the competition level that is
required for payments under a flexible FA to approach those under a monitored FA depend on the
cost efficiency of the outside option sampling, which is captured by the value of c0. When c0 has
a low value, we found that the performance of flexible FAs is close to that of monitored FAs even
under moderate competition (for example, considering the cases of c0 ∈ {1/6, 1/8}, when N ≥ 8,
monitored and flexible FAs have similar performances, except in 3 out of 72 instances). However,
when average suppliers are sampled (c0 = 1/4), monitored FAs outperformed flexible FAs in most
of the instances that were tested even for N = 10. In such cases flexible FAs seem to require more
aggressive competition (larger N) in order to achieve a performance comparable to monitored FAs.
(See the right hand side of Figure 3.4 for one such instance.)
Comparing the flexible and the restricted-flexible FAs, we observe that the two mechanisms
perform very similarly in terms of both bid functions as well as expected payments in our scenarios
with N ≤ 10. In contrast with the asymptotic result in Theorem 13, the average expected payments
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over our instances are slightly lower under the restricted-flexible FA relative to the flexible FA.
Generally, the restricted-flexible FA outperforms the flexible FA in scenarios in which the FA
winner is likely to reduce the winning bid under the former, resulting in a lower second period
bid price. For small values of N margins are relatively high and therefore the FA winner is likely
to match the spot market in the first period under the restricted-flexible; this is specially true
for low values of c0. Because all instances are with N ≤ 10, this is also consistent with the plot
depicted on the right side of Figure 3.4, suggesting that the superiority of the flexible FA over the
restricted-flexible FA in this setting becomes more apparent only for large N , and that for small
N they are similar and restricted-flexible FA may even outperform the flexible FA.
3.7 Conclusions
Summary. In this paper we introduced a novel auction model to analyze FAs, procurement
mechanisms that are commonly used around the world. The increasing popularity of FAs can be
attributed, among other things, to the following features: (i) they avoid the administrative costs
of running repeated first-price auctions; and (ii) they tend to screen more cost-efficient suppliers
relative to a setting in which each public organization buys from the spot market. Despite these
advantages, we show that FAs are subject to a sort of winner’s curse that makes expected buying
prices higher relative to running first-price auctions when needs arise.
Design Recommendations. Based on our analysis we suggest the following prescriptions for a
practical design of FAs that alleviate cost uncertainties and reduce buying prices:
1. Monitoring the price that is charged by the FA winner in the open market and using it to
upper bound the buying price significantly reduces procurement costs. Procurement agencies
should engage in this type of monitoring activities in cases where the associated administrative
costs are not too high.
2. Building and implementing perfect price indexes for the common random parts of costs may
reduce buying prices. The potential value of implementing price indexes suggests that pro-
curement agencies should try to be creative in building such indexes even when there are not
obvious ways of doing so, for example, when buying services or non-commodities products.
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3. Allowing FA winners to reduce prices to match spot market prices through flexible FAs may
be an effective way of reducing buying prices even when suppliers are restricted not to increase
the price back after matching the spot market price. Flexible FA is especially effective when
several (more than 2-3) suppliers participate in the FA.
While some of these prescriptions are intuitive, they need to be taken with some caution.
For example, when the number of FA participants is small and the outside option given by the
spot market is attractive, the monitored and flexible FAs may perform worse than naive FAs.
This concern not withstanding, the above prescriptions are likely to be relevant in many cases of
practical interest and have been considered by the Chilean government to improve their procurement
processes. We hope that in the future they will also be considered by other buying agencies.
Future work and open questions. Our work is the first that provides a formal understanding
on how the cost uncertainty suppliers face in FAs affects their bidding behavior and the outcomes
in FAs. We focus on this aspect of FAs but several interesting directions may be worth exploring in
the future. In particular, throughout the paper we assumed risk neutral bidders, and even in this
case, the discussion regarding cost uncertainty was rich and relevant. An interesting extension of
our model would be to consider risk averse bidders. This would introduce additional complications
in the analysis; for example, under risk aversion revenue equivalence-style arguments may no longer
hold. On the other hand, introducing risk averse bidders would allow a meaningful discussion on
bidders’ use of financial instruments such as options to hedge the risk associated to the common
cost. We conjecture that the use of options may play a similar role to a perfect price index in the
case of risk neutral bidders to alleviate the extent of the FA curse.
We have abstracted away from some problem aspects that would become relevant under demand
uncertainty. One natural feature is non-linear suppliers’ costs, capturing their economies of scale.
A related interesting direction is the possibility of pre-commitment decisions suppliers may need
to take before demand is realized. These considerations open a whole new set of issues worth
considering in future work. Overall, we hope that this paper, together with the follow up work it
may generate, will improve the way FAs and other procurement processes are designed in practice.
Chapter 4
On Preferences for Contractual Forms
in Supply Chains
Lijian Lu and Yaozhong Wu
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4.1 Introduction
Contracts are commonly used in supply chains to coordinate the activities of parties whose local
objectives are not always perfectly aligned with one another. It is now well known that the wholesale
price–only contract fails to achieve full supply chain efficiency. In the most common setting of
a single supply chain wherein a supplier makes a contract offer to a retailer, the supplier can
coordinate the supply chain by inducing the retailer to make decisions that are optimal to the supply
chain as a whole. Such contracts may take a nonlinear form (e.g., quantity discount contracts)
or include a fixed–payment component in addition to the wholesale price (e.g., two-part tariff
contracts).
Although contract design has been extensively studied in the supply chain contracting litera-
ture, supply chain members’ contractual form preferences have not. When supply chain members
are profit maximizers, they should prefer a contractual form that yields higher profits. As a conse-
quence, a profit-seeking supplier should prefer more sophisticated coordinating contracts to simple
wholesale price–only contracts; with the former, the supplier can extract the entire supply chain
surplus and leave none to the retailer. The retailer, however, should prefer the wholesale price–only
contract because it allows him to secure a positive surplus (a result of the double marginalization
effect). Thus, existing studies suggest that the supplier and retailer’s contractual form preferences
are not aligned and as a consequence there exist conflicts of interests among supply chain members
with respect to supply chain contract design.
This paper focuses on the congruence of members’ contractual form preferences. In particular,
we focus on a market environment with deterministic demand and study the circumstances in which
suppliers and retailers share the same preferences for a certain type of contract. Our analytical
results suggest that both suppliers and retailers can be simultaneously better off using wholesale
price–only contracts than other contractual forms. Therefore, the supplier and retailer’s preferences
can be coordinated on wholesale price–only contracts. There are also other situations in which both
suppliers and retailers may be better using more complex contracts. We characterize conditions
under which supply chain members share the same preferences for a certain type of contract, either
wholesale price–only contract or quantity discount contract.
Supply chain structure can give members different degrees of market power. In order to un-
derstand how supply chain members’ preferences change across different supply chain settings, we
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consider three forms of supply chain structure, all of which are selling same number of multiple
products but differ in the number of suppliers or retailers as follows: (i) an n-supplier and n-retailer
supply chain in which each supplier has an exclusive retailer; (ii) an n-supplier and 1-retailer supply
chain in which all suppliers sell through a common retailer; and (iii) a 1-supplier and n-retailer
supply chain in which one supplier sells through multiple retailers. The supply chain members in
the three settings hold different levels of market power that is affected by the horizontal competition
of multiple members.
We start by analyzing the optimal decisions at the retailer level. We then analyze the equilibrium
decisions at the supplier level for a given type of contract while taking into account the retailers’
responses. We choose two types of contracts for our analysis: the wholesale price–only contract
and the quantity discount contract. The latter has been proved more efficient and complex by
studies of a single supply chain. Our analysis shows that if all of the supply chains are restricted
to a common contractual form (i.e., either a quantity discount contract or a wholesale price–only
contract), then suppliers and retailers may both prefer the wholesale price–only contract or the
quantity discount contract simultaneously, provided the competition intensity (as measured by the
product substitution rate) falls within a certain range and the number of supply chains is large.
The structure of the supply chain network plays a crucial role in determining which type of contract
is preferred by the supply chain members.
This paper makes the following contributions. First, we develop an industry equilibrium analysis
for competing supply chains under two commonly used contractual forms in three supply chain
settings. More importantly, we show that, unlike the contracting in a 1-supplier and 1-retailer
supply chain, suppliers and retailers may simultaneously prefer the wholesale price–only contract
to more complex and efficient contracts and vice versa depending on the supply chain structure.
Thus, our study offers a theoretical explanation to a long-standing dilemma in the literature that
the wholesale price–only contract is a popular mechanism used in many supply chain transactions
in practice, even though it has been extensively shown that in theory such contracts are clearly
dominated by coordinating contracts. The congruence of such preferences may occur for a wide
range of parameters when the number of competing supply chains is large. In this study, then, key
industrial structure characteristics (e.g., structure of supply chain, product substitution, number
of horizontal competitors) have crucial impacts on the congruence of preferences and the resulting
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prevalence of certain contractual forms.
4.2 Literature Review
Coordination by incentive contracts has been one of the core issues in the area of supply chain man-
agement because maximal profit for an entire supply chain cannot be achieved by commonly used
wholesale price–only contracts in a simple supplier–retailer dyad (see Cachon 2003 and Nagarajan
and Sosic 2008 for a comprehensive review of the literature. An exception that the wholesale price–
only contract coordinates in the infinitely repeated interactions is shown by Sun and Debo 2014 ).
Extensive study has been devoted to a variety of coordinating contracts that can align supply chain
members’ local incentives and thereby maximize supply chain profits. Examples include quantity
discount (Cachon 2003, Tomlin 2003), quantity flexibility (Tsay 1999), sales rebate (Taylor 2002,
Krishnan et al. 2004), two-part tariff (Cachon and Kök 2010), buy-back (Pasternack 1985), and
revenue-sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere 2005a, Kannan and Popiuc 2014).
Although studies have not focused on supply chain members’ contractual form preferences,
existing research clearly suggests uncoordinated preferences for contractual forms of the upstream
supplier and the downstream retailer: whereas the supplier should prefer coordinating contracts to
wholesale price–only contracts, the retailer should prefer wholesale price-only contracts (to avoid
being left with zero surplus, as may occur under coordinating contracts). Therefore, the literature
on supply chain contracting implies an outstanding issue of conflict of interests between the supplier
and the retailer in a supply chain. Furthermore, the wholesale price–only contract, a theoretically
suboptimal contract for profit-maximizing suppliers, has been observed to govern supply chain
transactions in many industries (Lariviere and Porteus 2001).
A recent study by Cachon and Kök [2010] sheds some light on the congruence of contractual
form preferences. These authors consider a supply chain structure with two manufacturers selling
substitutable products through a common retailer and show that, for intermediate levels of product
substitution, manufacturers and retailers share the same preferences for more complex contracts
(e.g., quantity discount and two-part tariff contracts) over wholesale price–only contracts. In a
two-supplier and two-retailer supply chain setting, Feng and Lu [2013] study performance of supply
chain contracting game that can be structured both as a Nash bargaining game and a Stackelberg
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game. They show that the way the contracting game is setup significantly influence supply chain
members’ contract choice.
In this paper, we examine different supply chain settings that involve multiple supply chain
members engaging in horizontal competition at both the retailer and supplier levels. We find that
when the substitution rate is high, suppliers and retailers both prefer wholesale price–only contracts
to quantity discount contracts in an n-supplier and n-retailer setting. Preferences for contractual
forms, however, are reversed when there are n suppliers and 1 retailer: both the suppliers and the
retailer prefer quantity discount contracts to wholesale price–only contracts. This indicates that
supply chain structures affect the congruence of supply chain members’ preferences for contractual
forms.
Our work is also related to studies on the structure of supply chain channels beginning with the
seminal paper of McGuire and Staelin [1983]. Following their basic model of two-stage competition,
we extend the analysis to multiple supply chains and focus on the preferences for contractual forms
in supply chain channels. In addition to analyzing the game with symmetric players, we also analyze
the game with differentiated production costs among suppliers.
Finally, this paper is part of a growing field of research on supply chains with structures that are
more complex than a simple supply chain dyad. In addition to the papers already cited, Bernstein
and Federgruen [2005] and Bernstein et al. [2006] examine coordination in one-manufacturer and
multiple-retailer supply chains with contracts. Netessine and Zhang [2005] consider both positive
and negative externalities among downstream retailers and their effect on supply chain performance.
Corbett and Karmarkar [2001] analyze horizontal competition in multi-stage supply chains with
entry decisions. DeMiguel and Xu [2009] develop an equilibrium analysis of a multiple-leader
and multiple-follower oligopoly game with stochastic demand. Adida and DeMiguel [2011] consider
supply chain competition with uncertain demands and risk-averse decision makers. Federgruen and
Hu [2012] study sequential oligopolies in supply chains featuring multiple echelons and firms that
engage in price competition with other firms of the same echelon as well as in vertical competition
across echelons.
In a setting of competing supply chains, Ha and Tong [2008] investigate suppliers’ investment
decisions on information sharing under different contract types. When the supplier’s production
exhibits diseconomy of scale in competitive supply chains, Ha et al. [2011] further study information
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sharing and its impact on supply chain members’ performances . While our paper also considers
both horizontal and vertical competition among multiple supply chain members, our focus is rather
different. We are interested in when and how the preferences of the upstream supply side for
contractual forms are (mis)aligned with those of the downstream retail side.
4.3 Model and Equilibrium Analysis
4.3.1 Supply Chain Structure
We consider three supply chain structures of n partially substitutable products sold to a common
market in which: (1) there are n suppliers, each of whom is assumed to produce only one product
and have one exclusive retailer; (2) n suppliers sell their products via one common retailer; and
(3) a single supplier produces n products, each of which is sold via an exclusive retailer. Figure
1 illustrates the supply chain structures of this study. While in the n-supplier and 1-retailer and
the 1-supplier and n-retailer supply chains horizontal competition takes place, respectively, at the
supplier and retailer levels only, in the n-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, there are horizontal
competitions among the retailers and among the suppliers (the competition among the suppliers
, however, is indirect because their decisions affect each other only through the their retailer’s
decisions). In all three supply chain structures, the supplier is the Stackelberg leader and offers a
contract to the retailer, taking into consideration the response function of the retailer.1
Product i’s inverse demand function is modeled as
pi = αi − βdi − λ
∑
j 6=i
dj for β > λ > 0 and i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (4.1)
1While the supply chain structures in this study differ in the number of suppliers and retailers, they reflect
different degrees of market power that the suppliers have. A supplier is the most powerful when selling through
multiple competing retailers and facing no competition from other suppliers (i.e., in the 1-supplier and n-retailer
supply chain) and the suppliers are the least powerful when competing with other suppliers to sell through a common
retailer (i.e., in the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain). The suppliers in the n-supplier and n-retailer supply
chain are more powerful than those in the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain because the horizontal competition
at the retailer level alleviates the vertical competition between the suppliers and the retailers. Here, by comparing
results across three different supply chain settings, our analysis illustrates the effects of the market power that is
embedded in a particular supply chain structure on supply chain members’ preferences for contractual forms.
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n suppliers and n retailers n suppliers and 1 retailer 1 supplier and n retailers 
Supplier 
Retailer 
where pi is the retail price of product i and di is the sales volume or equivalently the demand for
that product. The parameter λ represents the degree of product substitutability, which ranges from
0 for independent products to β for perfect substitutes.
Because the suppliers form an oligopoly when there are n suppliers in the n-supplier and n-
retailer and the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain structures, each supplier also takes other
suppliers’ decisions into consideration when making her own contract offer. The retailers in the
n-supplier and n-retailer and the 1-supplier and n-retailer structures also form an oligopoly, and
they engage in Cournot competition.
In our model, the retailer’s decision on retail prices is mathematically equivalent to choosing
the sales volume di. Because the inverse demand functions in (4.1) are linear, product i’s demand
di can be solved as a function of pi as follows:
di =
(β + λ(n− 2)) (αi − pi)− λ
∑
j 6=i(αj − pj)
(β − λ) (β + λ(n− 1))
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (4.2)
Let ti(di) be the transfer payment made by a retailer to supplier i or to the common supplier
based on the sales volume of product i. Product i generates a profit of pidi − ti(di) to the retailer,
either to retailer i of n retailers or to the common retailer.
In the three supply chain structures, each supply chain member’s profit is given as follows.
1. In the n-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, supplier i and retailer i’s profits are
πSi = ti(di)− cidi, πRi = pidi − ti(di). (4.3)
2. In the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain, supplier i and the retailer’s profits are
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, π̃Ri = pidi − ti(di). (4.5)
Here, ci ≥ 0 is the unit production cost of supplier i. We assume that the suppliers’ and
retailers’ objectives are to maximize their profits shown in (4.3) - (4.5), respectively.
4.3.2 Contractual Forms
We consider a family of quantity discount contracts that the supplier can offer to the retailer. The
functional form is the same as that used by Cachon and Kök [2010] and is fully characterized by
parameters wi and υi:
ti(di) =
 widi − υid2i /2, if di ≤ (wi − ci)/υi,ti((wi − ci)/υi) + ci(di − (wi − ci)/υi) otherwise. (4.6)
Here, wi is the wholesale price charged by supplier i, and the discount takes a quadratic form with
discount rate υi ∈ [0, ῡ), which is assumed to be less than ῡ = 2β−λ in the n-supplier and n-retailer
supply chain and in the 1-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, and to be less than ῡ = 2β − 2λ
in the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain. This is not a restrictive assumption because in our
equilibrium analysis, retailer i’s quantity decision di increases in his own wholesale price wi for
υi > ῡ. It is also intuitively true that the supplier incurs a negative profit if the discount rate is
set too high. The wholesale price–only contract is a special case of the quantity discount contract:
if υi = 0, then ti(di) = widi.
We focus on a positive discount rate contract (υi > 0) and a wholesale price–only contract
(υi = 0). Therefore, we treat the discount rate υ as a parameter that denotes the contract type
rather than as a decision variable. Because the wholesale price–only contract is a special case, we
present the general analysis only for the quantity discount contract. The analysis of the wholesale
price–only contract then follows directly by letting υi = 0.
4.3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
4.3.3.1 Supply Chains with n Retailers
When there are n retailers (either in the n-supplier and n-retailer setting or in the 1-supplier and
n-retailer setting), retailer i’s best response function to the other n − 1 retailers’ sales volume
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decisions, conditional on the wholesale price wi, is
di(d−i) =




, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
where d−i = (d1, . . . , di−1, di+1, . . . , dn)
′ are the sales volumes of the other retailers. This system of





























where w = (w1, w2, . . . , wn)
′ and ϕi =
λ
2β−υi , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
In the n-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, supplier i’s profit under the retailer’s equilibrium









In the 1-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, the supplier’s profit under the retailer’s equilibrium











4.3.3.2 Supply Chains with One Retailer
In the n-supplier and 1-retailer setting, the retailer’s profit (4.4) is a concave function of vector
d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn)
′ (i.e., its Hessian matrix is strictly diagonally dominant for υ ≤ ῡ = 2β − 2λ),































2β−υi , for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.









In addition to the uniqueness of the retailer sales decisions in all three supply chain structures,
we also have the uniqueness of the equilibrium wholesale prices of the supplier competition. This
result is stated formally in the following theorem.
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Theorem 14 Equilibrium wholesale prices exist and are unique in all three supply chain structures.
All proofs are given in the Appendix D. Because the selling quantities are uniquely determined
at the retailer level, Theorem 14 implies that the entire two-stage game has a unique equilibrium
for any given discount rate in each of the three supply chain structures.
4.4 Preferences for Contractual Forms
4.4.1 Base Case
We first analyze the base case of a one-supplier–one-retailer dyad. Note that a single supply chain
dyad is a special case of our competing supply chain models with no product substitution (i.e.,
λ = 0). Conditional on a contract offer with a discount rate υ, the retailer’s best-response function
is d = α−w2β−υ . Substituting this into the supplier’s profit function, we obtain the optimal wholesale
price offer w∗ = 2βα+(2β−υ)c4β−υ and thus the equilibrium sales volume d
∗ = α−c4β−υ . In equilibrium, the
supplier earns πS = (α−c)
2




In terms of contractual forms, the supplier always prefers a quantity discount contract because
∂πS
∂υ > 0, and the retailer always prefers a wholesale price–only contract because
∂πR
∂υ < 0. As
described here, supply chain members’ preferences for contractual forms in a single supply chain
are consistent with the implications of the supply chain coordination literature. From the supplier’s
perspective, the quantity discount contract is always preferable. However, the wholesale price–only
contract is preferable from the retailer’s perspective because it yields him the surplus resulting from
double marginalization. Therefore, in the single supply chain setting, the upstream and downstream
parties inevitably have conflicting preferences.
4.4.2 Supply Chains with Upstream or Downstream Competition
We now extend our analysis to allow competition among the multiple supply chain members mod-
elled in the previous section (i.e., λ > 0). To focus on contractual form preferences, we assume
that the n products are symmetric in terms of market size and production cost; that is, αi− ci = ξ
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Even so, the products may differ in both αi and ci. The parameter αi in the
inverse demand function is equivalent to the most a customer is willing to pay for product i; hence
the term αi − ci represents the maximum profit margin that product i can generate. By assuming
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constant αi − ci across products, profit differences under different contracts are driven only by the
contractual type.
Since our focus is on the contractual form preferences, we investigate the case in which all
supply chains use the same type of contract; thus, υi = υ, where υ = 0 represents the simple
wholesale price–only contract and υ > 0 the more complex quantity discount contract.2 This is
not an unusual setting and has been observed in practice. Cachon and Kök [2010] cite “anecdotal
evidence from our conversations with executives from grocery retail chains (H-E-B in Texas and
Stop & Shop in the northeastern United States) that, in most categories, most firms offer the same
type of contracts.” The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium of the entire game.
Lemma 5 (Equilibrium Wholesale Prices and Sales Volumes )
Let υi = υ and αi − ci = ξ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The equilibrium wholesale prices and sales volumes
are then given as follows:
1. For the n-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, let ϕ = λ/(2β − υ), then
w∗i = αi −
(2β − υ)[1 + (n− 2)ϕ][1 + (n− 1)ϕ]ξ
2β[2 + (n− 3)ϕ][1 + (n− 1)ϕ]− υ
[
1 + ϕ[2n− 3 + (n− 3)(n− 1)ϕ]
] , (4.12)
d∗i =
[1 + (n− 2)ϕ]ξ
2β[2 + (n− 3)ϕ][1 + (n− 1)ϕ]− υ
[
1 + ϕ[2n− 3 + (n− 3)(n− 1)ϕ]
] .
2. For the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain, let ϕ̂ = 2λ/(2β − υ), then
ŵ∗i = αi −
(2β − υ)[1 + (n− 2)ϕ̂][1 + (n− 1)ϕ̂]ξ
2β[2 + (n− 3)ϕ̂][1 + (n− 1)ϕ̂]− υ
[
1 + ϕ̂[2n− 3 + (n− 3)(n− 1)ϕ̂]
] ,
d̂∗i =
[1 + (n− 2)ϕ̂]ξ
2β[2 + (n− 3)ϕ̂][1 + (n− 1)ϕ̂]− υ
[
1 + ϕ̂[2n− 3 + (n− 3)(n− 1)ϕ̂]
] .
3. For the 1-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, let ϕ = λ/(2β − υ), then
w̃∗i = αi −
λ(1 + (n− 1)ϕ)




2λ(1 + (−1 + n)ϕ) + υϕ
ξ.
2While we assume that all suppliers are restricted to use either a quantity discount contract or a wholesale price–
only contract, it is possible to allow each supplier to choose the type of contract, in particular in the n-supplier and
n-retailer setting when each supplier sells through an exclusive retailer. The analysis of this case can be found in Lu
and Wu [2013].
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In equilibrium, the supplier and retailer’s profits are given (respectively) as follows.3
1. For the n-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, let ϕ = λ/(2β − υ),
πSi (υ) =
4β(1− ϕ)[1 + (n− 2)ϕ][1 + (n− 1)ϕ]− υ[1 + (n− 2)ϕ]
[




2β[2 + (n− 3)ϕ][1 + (n− 1)ϕ]− υ
(
1 + ϕ[2n− 3 + (n− 3)(n− 1)ϕ]
)]2 ξ2,
πRi (υ) =
(2β − υ)[1 + (n− 2)ϕ]2
2
[
2β[2 + (n− 3)ϕ][1 + (n− 1)ϕ]− υ
(
1 + ϕ[2n− 3 + (n− 3)(n− 1)ϕ]
)]2 ξ2.
2. For the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain, let ϕ̂ = 2λ/(2β − υ),
π̂Si (υ) =
4β(1− ϕ̂)[1 + (n− 2)ϕ̂][1 + (n− 1)ϕ̂]− υ[1 + (n− 2)ϕ̂]
[




2β[2 + (n− 3)ϕ̂][1 + (n− 1)ϕ̂]− υ
(
1 + ϕ̂[2n− 3 + (n− 3)(n− 1)ϕ̂]
)]2 ξ2,
π̂R(υ) =
n(2β − υ)[1 + (n− 2)ϕ̂]2[1 + (n− 1)ϕ]
2
[
2β[2 + (n− 3)ϕ̂][1 + (n− 1)ϕ̂]− υ
(
1 + ϕ̂[2n− 3 + (n− 3)(n− 1)ϕ̂]
)]2 ξ2.
3. For the 1-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, let ϕ = λ/(2β − υ),
π̃S =
nϕ
4λ(1 + (n− 1)ϕ) + 2υϕ
ξ2,
π̃Ri =
ϕ[2λ− ϕ(2β − υ)]
2[2λ(1 + (n− 1)ϕ+ ϕυ)]2
ξ2.
To study contractual form preferences under a given industrial structure, our analysis focuses
mainly on conditions under which the supplier can gain a higher profit by offering a wholesale
price-only contract, and under which the retailer can gain a higher profit by taking a wholesale
price–only contract. The following thorem characterizes these conditions.
Theorem 15 (Preferences of Supply Chain Members)
If all of the supply chain members take either the wholesale price–only contract (υ = 0) or the
quantity discount contract (υ > 0), their contractual form preferences are determined as follows.
1. For the n-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, there exist λS(n), λR(n) ∈ (0, β] such that the
suppliers prefer the wholesale price–only contract when λ ≥ λS(n) and the retailers prefer the
wholesale price–only contract when λ ≤ λR(n). Furthermore, λR(n) = β and λR(n) > λS(n)
for any n ≥ 3.
3In our analysis, it is true that the equilibrium market price is nonnegative and all supply chain members earn
nonnegative profits. Details are shown in the Appendix.
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2. For the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain, there exist λ̂S(n), λ̂R(n) ∈ (0, β − υ/2] such
that the suppliers prefer the wholesale price–only contract when λ ≥ λ̂S(n) and the retailers
prefer the wholesale price–only contract when λ ≤ λ̂R(n). Furthermore, λ̂R(n) < λ̂S(n) for
any n ≥ 2.
3. For the 1-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, the supplier always prefer the quantity-discount
contract and the retailers always prefer the wholesale price–only contract.
This theorem shows that the supply chain structure along with the competition intensity cap-
tured by product substitution play key roles in the contractual preferences of supply chain members.
Members of the 1-supplier and n-retailer supply chain maintain the same preferences as in a single
supply chain dyad. Because the horizontal competition in this setting only occurs at the retailer
level, this result implies that the competition among suppliers is an important driver of suppliers’
contractual form preferences.
In the following analysis, we focus on the other two supply chain settings that have n suppli-
ers. In those two settings, suppliers and retailers’ preferences are both determined mainly by two
forces of competition: the product substitution rate λ and the level of congestion n in the mar-
ket. Suppliers prefer the wholesale price–only contract when the substitution rate is high because
the competition among suppliers alone reduces wholesale price and thus increases order quanti-
ties, in which case it becomes less attractive for suppliers to offer a discount. However, when the
product substitution rate is low, supply chains become more independent. In this case, offering
quantity-based discounts provides an incentive for the retailer to order more and benefit the suppli-
er. Retailers, in contrast, prefer the wholesale price–only contract when the product substitution
rate is low because it allows them to increase profits owing to double marginalization.
Furthermore, we find that in the n-supplier and 1-retailer setting, the threshold of the supplier
is always higher than that of the retailer, i.e., λ̂S(n) > λ̂R(n). This result suggests that in such a
setting, the congruence of preferences can only occur on the quantity discount contract. When there
are n suppliers and n retailers, the thresholds are such that λS(n) < λR(n) for n > 3, suggesting
the congruence of preferences occurs only on the wholesale price–only contract. When n = 2 in the
n-supplier and n-retailer setting, the congruence of preferences can occur either on the wholesale
price–only contract or on the quantity discount contract. We report more detailed results for n = 2
in Section 4.5.
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Figure 4.2(a) illustrates a preference congruence for the n-supplier and n-retailer setting with
the following parameter values: α = β = 1, c = 0.05, and υ = 0.8. If λS(n) < λR(n) (for n ≥ 3),
then suppliers and retailers both prefer the wholesale price–only contract when the substitution
rate λ satisfies λS(n) ≤ λ ≤ λR(n); these cases are indicated by the dark vertical lines in the
figure. If λS(n) > λR(n) (i.e., n = 2), then suppliers and retailers both prefer the quantity discount
contract when λR(n) ≤ λ ≤ λS(n), as indicated by the “dotted” vertical lines. In Figure 4.2(b),
we illustrate the preference congruence of the n-supplier and 1-retailer setting with the same set
of parameters. Here, the congruence occurs on the quantity discount contract, indicated by the
“dotted” vertical lines.
Figure 4.2: Preferences for the supply chain members


























(a) n-supplier and n-retailer


























(b) n-supplier and 1-retailer
In comparing these two settings, surprisingly, we observe preference reversals caused by the
number of retailers: the preference congruence takes place on the wholesale price–only contract
when there are multiple retailers, and on the quantity discount contract when there is a common
retailer. Since the only difference between these two supply chain structures is the existence of
horizontal competition between retailers, this competition drives the common preferences for the
wholesale price–only contract. In particular, the competition among the retailers reduce each other’s
profit compared with the cases of independent retailers. As a consequence, the retailers prefer the
wholesale price–only contract more often under which the double marginalization effect leaves more
profit to them than under the quantity discount contract when multiple retailers compete at the
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retail market (Comparing Figures 2.(a) and 2.(b), we find that the threshold values below which
the retailers prefer wholesale price–only contract are lower in the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply
chain).
As discussed previously, studies on single supply chains indicate that the supplier always prefers
the (more efficient) quantity discount contract, whereas the retailer always prefers the (simpler)
wholesale price–only contract. As a result, the supplier and retailer always conflict in their prefer-
ences for contractual forms. However, in the setting of multiple competing supply chains, we show
that contractual form preferences are not universal over varying degrees of product substitution.
Even more interesting is that a congruence of preferences among different supply chain members
can occur as a result of the underlying competing supply chain structure.
We briefly discuss how the profit of the entire supply chain system is affected by different types of
contract. In the following Figure 3, we illustrate that relative to the wholesale price–only contract,
how the improvement of supply chain profit by using the quantity discount contract depends on the
substitution rate λ in the n-supplier and n-retailer setting. Similar to the supplier’s preference, the
supply chain profit can be improved by using the wholesale price when the product substation rate
is high. In other words, the entire supply chain system benefits from using the wholesale price–
only contact when λ is large. The reason is both sides of the supply chain prefer the wholesale
price–only contract for large λ as stated in Theorem 2. In the other two settings, there is no
congruence of preferences on the wholesale price–only contract, and the quantity discount contract
always improves supply chain profits.
4.4.3 Preferences under Large Number of Products
Figure 4.2 also shows that the thresholds of the supplier λS(n) and λ̂S(n) are decreasing in n,
which means that the suppliers in these two settings prefer simple wholesale price–only contracts
more often when there are more competing supply chains. The following theorem formally states
the preferences when the number of products is large.
Theorem 16 (Preference under Large Number of Products )
1. For the n-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, there exists an N0 ∈ [2,∞) such that suppliers
and retailers both prefer the wholesale price–only contract for any λ > 0 when n ≥ N0.
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Figure 4.3: Supply chain profit gain in the n-supplier and n-retailer setting









































Notes: The parameters for both figures are: α = β = 1, c = 0.05, υ = 0.8. Supply chain profit gain by quantity dis-
count contract is defined as follows: ΠSC(QD)−ΠSC(W )
ΠSC(W )
×100%, where ΠSC(QD) and ΠSC(W ), respectively, represent
supply chain profits by using the quantity discount contract and by using the wholesale price contract.
2. For the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain, there exists an N̂0 ∈ [2,∞) such that suppliers
prefer the wholesale price–only contract for any λ > 0 when n ≥ N̂0.
In terms of the retailer preference in the n-supplier and 1-retailer case, our analysis shows that
when n goes to infinity, the retailer is indifferent between the wholesale price–only and quantity
discount contracts. Our numerical analysis reveals that the threshold for the retailer λ̂R(n) de-
creases in n, which suggests that the retailer prefers the quantity discount contract for large n. The
preferences in the 1-supplier and n-retailer setting are the same as stated in Theorem 15.
This Theorem states that, in a market with a large number of suppliers, the suppliers prefer
the wholesale price–only contract as long as their products are substitutable — no matter how low
the rate is. This result formalizes the observations made in Figure 4.2. If we extend the number of
supply chains in that figure, then the curve continues to decrease and approaches zero as n becomes
very large.
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4.4.4 Preferences under Highest Discount υ
We have analyzed the equilibrium preferences in Theorem 15 under intermediate levels of the
discount rate (i.e., 0 < υ < ῡ). When this discount rate is at its highest possible value, the
thresholds can be expressed in closed-form. The equilibrium profits for each supply chain member
under the wholesale price–only contract (υ = 0) and the quantity discount contract (υ → ῡ)
are reported in Table 1. Theorem 17 further characterizes contractual form preferences when the
discount rate reaches the upper limit of ῡ.




































Notes: (a) Supply chain structure is indicated by the supplier and retailer numbers in brackets. (b) For the
n-supplier and n-retailer and 1-supplier and n-retailer cases, ῡ = 2β − λ. For the n-supplier and 1-retailer case,
ῡ = 2β − 2λ.
Theorem 17 (Preference with Highest Discount)
If the discount rate is set at its highest possible level (i.e., υ ≈ ῡ), then the following statements
hold.
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1. For υ ≈ ῡ = 2β − λ in the n-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, the suppliers prefer the




The retailers prefer the wholesale price–only contract to the quantity discount contract for all
values of λ when n ≥ 3. The retailers prefer the wholesale price–only contract if and only if
λ < (3−
√
5)β when n = 2.
2. For υ ≈ ῡ = 2β − 2λ in the n-supplier and 1-retailer supply chain, the suppliers prefer the




The retailer prefers the wholesale price–only contract to the quantity discount contract if and





3. For υ ≈ ῡ = 2β − λ in the 1-supplier and n-retailer supply chain, the supplier always prefers
the quantity–discount contract. The retailers always prefers the wholesale price–only contract.
These results confirm the insights obtained from Theorem 15. When there are n suppliers, they







n2−5 β in cases 1 and 2 respectively); retailers prefer the wholesale price when the
substitution rate is low (λ < (3 −
√




β in cases 1 and 2 respectively) if
there are two supply chains, and they always prefer it when facing more than two competitors.
In addition, the number of competing supply chains also has an effect similar to that of the
substitution rate; in particular, the threshold values in Theorem 4 are all decreasing in n. Moreover,
the closed-form threshold values for the substitution rate also provide qualitative insights into when
a certain contractual form is prevalent.
4.4.5 A Special Case of n = 2
We further illustrate the effect of supply chain structure on preference congruence via numerical
examples in the settings of n = 2 (we set β = 1 in all examples). Figure 4.4(a) shows a congruence
of supply chain members in the setting of two suppliers and two retailers. If υ = 0.8 (the upper
panel), then λS = 0.898 and λR = 0.793. For 0.793 ≤ λ ≤ 0.898, suppliers and retailers both
prefer the quantity discount contract (indicated by the shaded area). When υ = 1.2 (the middle
panel), we find that λS = 0.750 and λR = 0.770; for any λ that falls between these two thresholds,
both suppliers and retailers prefer the wholesale price–only contract (again indicated by the shaded
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area). When the discount is given by the highest υ ≈ 2β − λ (the lower panel), we find that
the preferences of supply chain members are similar to those in the scenario of υ = 1.2, with
λS = 0.708 and λR = 0.764. Thus, the congruence of contractual form preferences occurs for
intermediate degrees of product substitution, although the contract form that is actually preferred
depends on the values of the other parameters.
Further, the preferences of supply chain members in the 2-supplier and 1-retailer setting are
presented in Figure 4.4(b). Here, the congruence can only be on the more efficient contract, i.e.,
the quantity discount contract (as indicated in the shaded areas in all three figures). Therefore, we
find that the competition intensity and supply chain structures play crucial roles in supply chain
members’ contractual choices.4
4.5 Conclusion
Contracts play a critical role in coordinating the activities of different parties in supply chains.
Various contractual forms have been extensively examined in the supply chain management liter-
ature. It is a well-established theoretical result in the supply chain coordination literature that
simple wholesale price–only contracts fail to achieve the full profit potential of a supply chain dyad
when both the upstream supplier and the downstream retailer maximize their own profits. The
upstream supplier is better off under the (more efficient) quantity discount contract whereas the
downstream retailer is better off under the (less complex) wholesale price–only contract. Hence,
the supply and demand sides of the chain are at odds with respect to preferred contractual forms.
In this paper, we focus on supply chain members’ contractual form preferences in three different
supply chain settings. We choose two contractual forms: the wholesale price–only contract and
the quantity discount contract. We characterize the equilibria of the supply chain system and
4In their 2-supplier and 1-retailer setting, Cachon and Kök (2010) show that the suppliers prefer the wholesale
price–only contract if and only if λ ≥ (3−
√
7)β ≈ 0.354β, and the retailer prefers the wholesale price–only contract




β ≈ 0.177β, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 2.(b). Consequently, the preference
congruence of the supply chain members only occurs such that both prefer the quantity discount contract. Feng
and Lu (2013) show that all supply chain members may prefer the wholesale price-only contract in their 2-supplier
and 2-retailer supply chain setting. Therefore, the supply chain structure has a crucial role in determining contract
preferences among supply chain members.
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(b) The 2-supplier and 1-retailer case
investigate the conditions under which supply chain members prefer a certain contractual form.
Our analysis indicates that the competition among supply chains has a significant effect on each
member’s performance under different contractual forms. Suppliers and retailers can both be better
off with wholesale price–only or quantity–discount contracts, which are systemically affected by the
supply chain structure. The analysis presented here identifies conditions under which supply chain
members’ contractual form preferences are congruent, which, according to existing studies on the
single supply chain, is not possible.
We use a parsimonious competition model to examine preference congruences in supply chain-
s. Extending this model to more complex supply chain systems would test the robustness of our
findings. The literature on supply chain contracting and coordination has shown how differen-
t contractual forms (e.g., two-part tariff, revenue sharing, buy-back, etc.) can achieve the same
system efficiency. It would be interesting to study supply chain member’s preferences when multi-
ple contractual forms are available, or between the wholesale price–only contract and other more
complex contractual forms. Future work can also examine contractual preferences under demand
uncertainty, which would introduce another important factor that may have significant influence
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on the preferences for contracts. We hope that extending the analysis of misaligned interests in a
single supply chain to the competition among multiple supply chains will generate more insights
on the interaction between industrial structure and supply chain contracting.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 131
Bibliography
H. Aaron and A. Frakt. Why now is not the time for premium support. New England Journal of
Medicine, 366:877–879, 2012.
E. Adida and V. DeMiguel. Supply chain competition with multiple manufacturers and retailers.
Operations Research, 59:156–172, 2011.
G. Albano and M. Sparro. A simple model of framework agreements: Competition and efficiency.
Journal of Public Procurement, 8:356–378, 2008.
S. Alizamir, F. de Vericourt, and P. Sun. Efficient feed-in-tariff policies for renewable energy
technologies. To appear in Operations Research, 2016.
G. Allon, A. Federgruen, and M. Pierson. Price competition under multinomial logit demand
functions with random coefficients. Management Science, 59:1817–1835, 2013.
S. Anderson, A. Palma, and J. Thisse. Discrete choice theory of product differentiation. The MIT
Press, 2001.
Anonymous. A procurement auction model for framework agreements. In Charting a Course in
Public Procurement Innovation and Knowledge Sharing. 2012 International Public Procurement
Conference Publications, edited by PrAcademics Press, 2012.
J. Antos. The wyden-ryan proposal–a foundation for realistic medicare reform. New England
Journal of Medicien, 366:879–881, 2012.
K. Arrow, H. Block, and L. Hurwicz. On the stability of competitive equilibrium, ii. Econometrica,
27:82–109, 1959.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 132
S. Athey. Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of
incomplete information. Econometrica, 69:861–889, 2001.
D. Bell and J. Lattin. Looking for loss aversion in scanner panel data: The confounding effect of
price response heterogeneity. Marketing Science, 19:185–200, 2000.
F. Bernstein and A. Federgruen. A general equilibrium model for industries with price and service
competition. Operations Research, 52:868–886, 2004.
F. Bernstein and A. Federgruen. Decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under de-
mand uncertainty. Management Science, 51:18–29, 2005.
F. Bernstein, F. Chen, and A. Federgruen. Coordinating supply chains with simple pricing schemes:
The role of vendor-managed inventories. Management Science, 52:1483–1492, 2006.
J. Bertrand. Review of Cournot’s ‘rechercher sur la theorie mathematique de la richesse’. Journal
des Savants, pages 499–508, 1883.
D. Besanko, M.K. Perry, and R.H. Spady. The logit model of monopolistic competition: Brand
diversity. The Journal of Industrial Economics, pages 397–415, 1990.
R. Briesch, L. Krishnamurthi, T. Mazumdar, and S. Raj. A comparative analysis of reference price
models. Journal of Consumer Research, 24:202–214, 1997.
J. Brown, M. Duggan, I. Kuziemko, and W. Woolston. How does risk selection respond to risk
adjustment? new evidence from the medicare advantage program. American Economic Review,
104:3335–3364, 2014.
L. Cabral and M. Villas-Boas. Bertrand supertraps. Management Science, 51:599–613, 2005.
M. Cabral, M. Geruso, and N. Mahoney. Does privatized medicare benefit patients or producers?
evidence from the benefits improvement and protection act. NBER Working Paper No. 20470,
2014.
G. Cachon and A. Kök. Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain: On contractual form
and coordination. Management Science, 56:571–589, 2010.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 133
G. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:
Strengths and limitations. Management Science, 51:30–44, 2005.
G. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere. Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts:
Strengths and limitations. Management Science, 51:30–44, 2005.
G. Cachon. Supply chain coordination with contracts. A. G. de Kok, S. C. Graves, eds. Handbooks
in Operations Research and Management Science: Supply Chain Management, Chap. 6. Elsevier,
Amsterdam, 2003.
E. Cadotte, R. Woodruff, and R. Jenkins. Expectations and norms in models of consumer satis-
faction. Journal of Marketing Research, 24:305–314, 1987.
L. Cahn. How to combat pharma’s costly coupon programs. Managed Care, 21:22–26, 2012.
A. Caplin and B. Nalebuff. Aggregation and imperfect competition: On the existence of equilibrium.
Econometrica, 59:25–59, 1991.
X. Chen, P. Hu, and Z. Hu. Efficient algorithms for dynamic pricing problem with reference price
effect. To appear in Operations Research, 2016.
F. Chen. Auctioning supply contracts. Management Science, 53:1562–1576, 2007.
M. Cohen, R. Lobel, and G. Perakis. The impact of demand uncertainty on consumer subsidies for
green technology adoption. To appear in Management Science, 2016.
Congressional Budget Office. A premium support system for medicare: analysis of illustrative op-
tions. http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-18-PremiumSupport.pdf,
2013.
C. Corbett and U. Karmarkar. Competition and structure in serial supply chains with deterministic
demand. Management Science, 47:966–978, 2001.
V. Curto, L. Einav, J. Levin, and J. Bhattacharya. Can health insurance competition work?
evidence from medicare advantage. NBER Working Paper No. 20818, 2015.
V. DeMiguel and H. Xu. A stochastic multiple-leader stackelberg model: Analysis, computation,
and application. Operations Research, 57:1220–1235, 2009.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 134
B. Dowd, R. Feldman, and R. Coulam. The effect of health plan characteristics on medicare+choice
enrollment. Health Services Research, 38:113–135, 2003.
J. Dube, G. Hitsch, and P. Rossi. Do switching costs make markets less competitive? Journal of
Marketing Research, 46:435–445, 2009.
I. Duenyas, B. Hu, and D. Beil. Simple auctions for supply contracts. Forthcoming, Management
Science, 2013.
M. Duggan, A. Starc, and B. Vabson. Who benefits when the government pays more? pass-through
in the medicare advantage program. NBER Working Paper No. 19989, 2014.
L. Einav and J. Levin. Managed competition in health insurance. Working Paper, Stanford Uni-
versity, 2015.
G. Ellison. Bounded rationality in industrial organization, in Advances in Economics and Econo-
metrics: Theory and Applications, eds Blundell R., Newey W., and Persson T. Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
W. Elmaghraby and S. Oh. Procurement auctions and eroding price contracts in the presence of
learning by doing. Working Paper, University of Maryland College Park, 2013.
B. Elyakime, J. J. Laffont, P. Loisel, and Q. Vuong. First-price sealed-bid auctions with secret
reservation prices. Annals of Economics and Statistics, 34:115–141, 1994.
A. Farahat and G. Perakis. A comparison of bertrand and cournot profits in oligopolies with
differentiated products. Operations Research, 59:507–513, 2011.
A. Federgruen and M. Hu. Price competition in sequential multi-product oligopolies. Working
paper, Columbia University, New York, NY, 2012.
A. Federgruen and L. Lu. Price competition based on relative prices. Working Paper, Columbia
Business School, 2016a.
A. Federgruen and L. Lu. Medicare reform: Estimation of the impacts of premium support systems.
Working Paper, Columbia Business School, 2016b.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 135
R. Feldman, R. Coulam, and B. Dowd. Competitive bidding can help solve medicare’s fiscal cri-
sis. http://www.aei.org/outlook/health/healthcare-reform/competitive-bidding-can-help-solve-
medicares-fiscal-crisis/. American Enterprise Institute., 2012.
Q. Feng and X. Lu. Supply chain contracting under competition: Bilateral bargaining vs. stackel-
berg. Production and Operations Management, 22:661–675, 2013.
G. Fibich and N. Gavish. Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions. Games and
Economic Behavior, 73:479–495, 2011.
P. Fuloria and S. Zenios. Outcomes-adjusted reimbursement in a health-care delivery system.
Management Science, 47:735–751, 2001.
G. Gallego and R. Wang. Multi-product price optimization and competition under the nested logit
model with product-differentiated price sensitivities. Operations Research, 62:450–461, 2014.
G. Gallego, T. Huh, W. Kang, and R. Phillips. Price competition with the attraction demand
model: Existence of unique equilibrium and its stability. Manufacturing & Service Operations
Management, 8:359–375, 2006.
J. K. Goeree and T. Offerman. Competitive bidding in auctions with private and common values.
The Economic Journal, 113:598–613, 2003.
F. Gonul and A. Smith. A method to infer coupon availability from coupon redemption in the
supermarket scanner panel data. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 6:107–115, 1999.
A. Ha and S. Tong. Contracting and information sharing under supply chain competition. Man-
agement Science, 54:701–715, 2008.
A. Ha, S. Tong, and H. Zhang. Sharing demand information in competing supply chains with
production diseconomies. Management Science, 57:566–581, 2011.
J. Hadar. A note on dominant diagonals in stability analysis. Econometrica, 33:442–444, 1965.
A. Hall. The value of medicare managed care plans and their prescription drug benefits. Finance
and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board of Governers, Washington, D.C., 2007.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 136
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1. It is obvious that β ≤ α from their definitions. Fix i = 0, 1, . . . , n, since gi(p)
is a continuous function, there are finite values Li < Ui, such that −∞ < Li ≡ minpmin≤p≤pmax{pi−
gi(p)} < maxpmin≤p≤pmax{pi− gi(p)} ≡ Ui <∞. Let {ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξm} be the points in P that belong
to [Li, Ui] and that ξ0 = Li and ξm+1 = Ui. Then,





where, at any left (right) end point of an interval [ξr, ξr+1], f
′(u) is replaced by a right- or left-hand
derivative, thus establishing continuous extensions. It follows that the right hand side of (A-1)
is bounded and hence α < ∞. The proof that β > 0 is analogous, creating similar continuous
extension on the partition {ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξm+1}.
Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove the theorem when f is piecewise linear; we then give the
proof for a general function f that satisfies Assumption 1, by approximating this function by a
sequence of piecewise linear functions,
Part 1: Assume, the function f(·), is piecewise linear with M + 1 segments, characterized by
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M break points (x1, x2, . . . , xM ) and M + 1 non-negative slopes (β1, β2, . . . , βM+1) as follows:
f(x) =

f(x1) + β1(x− x1), x ≤ x1
f(x1) + β2(x− x1), x ∈ [x1, x2]
...
...
f(xM−1) + βM (x− xM−1), x ∈ [xM−1, xM ]
f(xM ) + βM+1(x− xM ), x ≥ xM
For any i = 1, 2, . . . , N , and fixed prices pi1 > pi2, we show that the difference in the logarithms
of the profit function for firm i, log (πi(pi1, p−i))− log (πi(pi2, p−i)), is non-decreasing in any com-
petitor’s price pj , j 6= i for any p−i. It suffices to show this property is satisfied in the following
two cases: (i) ∆pi2 < ∆pi1 are contained in the same line segment, i.e., xm−1 ≤ ∆pi2 < ∆pi1 ≤ xm
for some m = 1, 2, . . . ,M + 1; (ii) ∆pi2,∆pi1 are separated by exactly one break point xm, i.e.,
∆pi2 < xm < ∆pi1 for some m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . (If ∆pi2,∆pi1 are separated by more than one break
point, the difference log (πi(pi1, p−i)) − log (πi(pi2, p−i)) can be written as the sum of differences
involving pairs of price levels that are separated by a single break point.) 1
(i) xm−1 ≤ ∆pi2 < ∆pi1 ≤ xm. Note that






since for all pi ∈ (pi1, pi2), ∆pi = pi − C is in the interior of the same line segment, where
the function f(·) is differentiable. Hence, it is sufficient to show that ∂ log πi(pi,p−i)∂pi is non-













− bif ′ (pi − C) (1− di).
Since f ′ (pi − C) = βm for any pi ∈ (C+xm−1, C+xm) and di is non-decreasing in pj , j 6= i,
it follows that ∂ log(πi)∂pi is non-decreasing in pj , j 6= i.
1x0 = −∞, xM+1 = +∞.
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(ii) C + xm−1 < pi2 < C + xm < pi1 < C + xm+1. One has, for δ > 0 sufficiently small, that
log πi(pi1, p−i)− log πi(pi2, p−i) =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
log πi(pi1, p−i)− log πi(C + xm + δ, p−i)
+log πi(C + xm + δ, p−i)− log πi(C + xm − δ, p−i)
+ log πi(C + xm − δ, p−i)− log πi(pi2, p−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
By case (i), it suffices to show that there exists δ > 0 small enough such that
log πi(C + xm + δ, p−i)− log πi(C + xm − δ, p−i) is non-decreasing in pj , j 6= i. (A-2)
We will show this by considering two cases
Case (ii.a): For any ∆pj 6∈ P, let
∆j(δ) =
∂ [log πi(C + xm + δ, p−i)− log πi(C + xm − δ, p−i)]
∂pj
.
In the following, we will show for any j 6= i,
∆j(δ) ≥ 0 for any δ > 0. (A-3)
By the definition of ∆j(δ), one has
∆j(δ) =
∂ [log πi(C + xm + δ, p−i)− log πi(C + xm − δ, p−i)]
∂pj
=
∂ log di(C + xm + δ, p−i)
∂pj




′(pj − C) exp (aj − bjf(pj − C))
exp (ai − bif(xm)− biβm+1δ) + exp (aj − bjf(pj − C)) +
∑N
k 6=i,j exp (ak − bkf (pk − C))
− bjf
′(pj − C) exp (aj − bjf(pj − C))
exp (ai − bif(xm) + biβmδ) + exp (aj − bjf(pj − C)) +
∑
k 6=i,j exp (ak − bkf (pk − C))
=
bjf




































≥ 0, for any δ > 0.
Case (ii.b). In this case, we show (A-2) holds when ∆pj ∈ P. Fixing p−ij , we simplify the notation by writing
di(pi, pj) and πi(pi, pj) instead of di(pi, p−i) and πi(pi, p−i). For δ > 0 small enough, we will show
log πi(C + xm + δ, C + xo + δ)− log πi(C + xm + δ, C + xo − δ)
≥ log πi(C + xm − δ, C + xo + δ)− log πi(C + xm − δ, C + xo − δ). (A-4)
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Substituting the demand equation (1.10) into the profit function, we have
log πi(C + xm + δ, C + xo + δ)− log πi(C + xm + δ, C + xo − δ)
− [log πi(C + xm − δ, C + xo + δ)− log πi(C + xm − δ, C + xo − δ)]
= log di(C + xm + δ, C + xo + δ) + log di(C + xm − δ, C + xo − δ)
− log di(C + xm + δ, C + xo − δ)− log di(C + xm − δ, C + xo + δ)
= log
(
di(C + xm + δ, C + xo + δ)




di(C + xm − δ, C + xo − δ)





























Let Γi(δ) ≡ A1A2 − B1B2. Hence (A-4) is equivalent to Γi(δ) ≥ 0. Since Γi(0) = 0, to show Γi(δ) ≥ 0 for
δ > 0 sufficiently small, it suffices to show limδ↘0 Γ
′
i(δ) = 0 and limδ↘0 Γ
′′
i (δ) > 0. Indeed, taking derivatives




− βmbie(βm+βm+1)biδ − βobje(βo+βo+1)bjδ
+(βmbi + βobj)e







Γ′i(δ) = 0 and lim
δ↘0
Γ′′i (δ) = 2bibj(βo + βo+1)(βm + βm+1)e
ai−bif(xm)+aj−bjf(xo) > 0.
Hence, we have shown that for δ > 0 small enough, (A-4) holds, so that, log(πi) is supermodular.
Part 2: Assume now f is a general continuous and increasing function. It is well-known that there
exists a sequence of increasing piece-wise linear functions {f (k)(·)} such that limk→∞ f (k)(x) = f(x)
for any x. For any i, let π
(k)
i denote firm i’s profit function associated with the function f
(k). For
any given pair of price vectors, p,p′, such that p ≥ p′, we have by part 1, that:
log π
(k)
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By a simple continuity argument, we have, for any price vector p̂, limk−→∞ log π
(k)
i (p̂) = log πi(p̂).
Hence, taking limits in (A-5) yields
log πi(pi, p−i)− log πi(p′i, p−i) ≥ log πi(pi, p′−i)− log πi(p′i, p′−i),
thus, showing that the price game is log-supermodular for a general convex increasing function f .
Proof of Proposition 1. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 1, we first establish the Proposition
when f is piecewise linear; we then extend the proof for a general convex and increasing function
f , by approximating this function by a sequence of piecewise linear functions,
Part 1: Assume, the function f(·) is piecewise linear, as specified in Part 1 of the proof of
Theorem 1, with 0 ≤ β1 ≤ · · · ≤ βM+1 in view of convexity. For any firm i = 1, 2, . . . , N , we show
that the logarithms of the profit function, log(πi), is quasi-concave. In what follows, we show this
property by considering two cases: (1) ∆pi 6∈ P; (2) ∆pi = xm for some m = 1, 2, . . . ,M .
(i) ∆pi 6∈ P, say, ∆pi ∈ (xm−1, xm) for some m = 1, 2, . . . ,M +1. Note that, the function f(∆pi)












− bif ′ (∆pi) (1− di).
Since f ′ (∆pi) = βm when ∆pi ∈ (xm−1, xm) and di is non-increasing in pi, by (1.11), it
follows that ∂ log(πi)∂pi is non-increasing in pi.
(ii) ∆pi = xm for some m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . We show that
∂+ log πi(C+xm,p−i)
∂pi
≤ ∂− log πi(C+xm,p−i)∂pi ,
which is equivalent to ∂+ log di(C+xm,p−i)∂pi ≤
∂− log di(C+xm,p−i)
∂pi
, or, by (1.11),




∂ log di(pi, p−i)
∂pi
= −bif ′+(xm) (1− di(C + xm, p−i))
= −biβm+1 (1− di(C + xm, p−i))
≤ −biβm (1− di(C + xm, p−i)) = −bif ′−(xm) (1− di(C + xm, p−i))
= lim
pi↗C+xm
∂ log di(pi, p−i)
∂pi
≡ ∂− log di(C + xm, p−i)
∂pi
.
Here the inequality follows from the fact that 0 ≤ βm ≤ βm+1 and 1− di(C + xm, p−i) ≥ 0.
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We have thus shown that log πi(pi, p−i) is quasi-concave in pi ≥ ci for any p−i when the response
function f is increasing and convex piecewise linear.
Part 2: Assume now that f is a general increasing and convex function. It is well-known
that there exists a sequence of increasing and convex piece-wise linear functions {f (k)(·)} such that
limk→∞ f
(k)(x) = f(x) for any x. We prove the result by contradiction. Assume that there exists






















for some p1i , p
2
i and λ0 ∈ (0, 1). Let π
(k)
i denote firm i’s profit function associated with the function
f (k). By a simple continuity argument, we have, for any price vector p̂, limk−→∞ log π
(k)
i (p̂) =



























for any k ≥ k0.
This contradicts the quasi-concavity of π
(k)
i in part 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. In Theorem 1, we show that each of the profit functions {πi : i =
1, 2, . . . , N} is log-supermodular. By Theorem 4.3.2 in Topkis [1998], it therefore suffices to prove
that for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N , π̃i = log(πi) is supermodular in the pair (pi, C), or the difference
function π̃i(pi + ∆, p−i)− π̃i(pi, p−i), for any ∆ > 0, is an increasing function of C. Similar to the
proof of Theorem 1, by Assumption 1, it follows that






where in the finitely many points in which the partial derivative in the integral fails to exists, it is







− bif ′(pi − C)(1− di)
Since f is convex, by (A-7), it suffices to show that
For any price vector p, di(p) is almost everywhere non-decreasing in C, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N .(A-8)
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This, however, follows immediately from the dominant-diagonal condition (D), since a marginal
increase of C by a quantity ∆ is equivalent to a simultaneous decrease of all prices by the same




≤ 0, by (D).
Proof of Proposition 2. In view of the proof of Theorem 2, it suffices to show that (1.17) holds,
since as argued, (1.17) is equivalent to (D). To verify (1.17), note that, by (1.11) and (1.12), where








= bf ′(pi − C)di(1− di)−
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
bf ′(pj − C)didj
= bdi
f ′(pi − C)− N∑
j=1
f ′(pj − C)dj

(Eq)








− 1 + d0
)
≥ 0,
where the inequality (Eq) follows from the fact that f ′(x) ∈ [β, α] for any x, and the last inequality
follows by the assumption that d0 ≥ 1− βα .
Proof of Theorem 3. (a) The model may be viewed as a special case of the general attraction
model addressed in Bernstein and Federgruen [2004], with the logarithm of firm i’s attraction value
given by ãi(pi) = ai − bif((1 − δi)pi), which is decreasing in pi since f(·) is increasing. Thus, the
monotonicity condition (7) in Bernstein and Federgruen [2004] is satisfied, and the result follows
from Theorem 2(a), there.
(b) The uniqueness result follows from Gallego et al. [2006], verifying that all conditions, there,
are satisfied: conditions (A1) and (A3) are immediate; for (A2), note that the elasticity function
ηi(pi) = −piã′i(pi) = pibi(1− δi)f ′((1− δi)pi) is a non-decreasing function since the function f(·) is
convex. Conditions (B)-(C) are easily verified, as well.
Proof of Proposition 3. It suffices to show that each of profit function log(πi) is supermodular
in the pair (pi, δ). Since the response function f is linear on the positive half line, and net prices
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are always non-negative, it is easily verified that the profit function, π, is twice order differentiable.
Without loss of generality, set α = 1 in the proof. Since
di =
exp (ai − bi ((1− δ)pi))∑n
k=0 exp (ak − bk ((1− δ)pk))
.





= 1pi−ci − bi(1 − δ)(1 − di) where the last equation follows by




= bi(1− di) + bi(1− δ)
∂di
∂δ











≥ bi(1− di) + bi(1− δ)di ·
[









1− (1− δ)(bp− bp)
]
≥ 0 if δ ≥ 1− 1
bp−bp ,
where inequality (a) follows from the definition that b = min{bi, i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, b = max{bi, i =
0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, p = min{pmini , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, p = max{pmaxi , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n}, and inequality (b)
follows from the fact that di ≤ 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. (a) immediately follows from (1.19) and (1.21) and the paragraph
proceeding Proposition 4.
(b) We distinguish between two cases: (i) pi ≤ p−i(1): the monotone property is immediate from
(1.18). (ii) pi ≥ p−i(1): By (1.20), the monotonicity of di with respect to pj is immediate when
pj > p
−i




exp (ai − bf (pi − pj))
exp (ai − bf (pi − pj)) +
∑
k 6=i exp (ak − bf (pk − pj))
, (A-9)
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= bf ′(pi − pj)di − bdi
∑
k 6=j
f ′+(pk − pj)dk







 ≥ 0. whenever pj = p−i(1). (A-10)
Similarly, when pj is the unique lowest price, i.e., pj < pk for all k 6= j, (A-9) continues to apply















(1) = pl for some l 6= j, i.
In view of (A-10), it suffices to show that ∂+di∂pj ≥ 0, which is immediate from the representation of
di in (1.20).
Proof of Theorem 4. It suffices to show that the function πi(pi, p−i) is quasi-concave in its own
price for each firm i = 1, 2, . . . , N . By (2.6), for firm i = 1, 2, . . . , N , one has
∂πi
∂pi






1− (pi − ci)
∑
k 6=i dkbkf
′ (pk − pi)
)
































 (pi − ci)
∑
k 6=i dkbkf
′ (pk − pi) ≤ 1, pi < p−i(1)




(1− di) ≤ 1, pi > p−i(1)
(A-14)
Next, we will show quasi-concavity of πi(pi, p−i) by showing that
∂πi
∂pi
≥ 0 if and only if pi ≤ p̂i(p−i)
for some threshold value p̂i(p−i). In what follows, we show this property by considering three cases:
(1) pi > p
−i
(1); (2) pi < p
−i
(1); and (3) pi = p
−i
(1).
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(1− di) is increasing in pi. Thus, once the
function reaches a value ≥ 1, i.e., once ∂πi(pi,p−i)∂pi is decreasing in a certain point, the same
applies to any larger price value. This implies that the function πi(pi, p−i) is quasi-concave
on the interval (p−i(1),∞).
(2) If pi < p
−i




′ (pj − pi) didj , for any j 6= i. (A-15)
Let















Then, ∂πi∂pi = −diHi(pi) by (A-11). Obviously, Hi(ci) = −1 < 0 and we show quasi-concavity
of πi by considering two cases: (2a) Hi(p
−i





(1)−) ≤ 0: then Hi(pi) ≤ 0 for all pi ∈ [ci, p
−i
(1)) since Hi(ci) < 0 and Hi(pi) is





(1)−) > 0: by the quasi-convexity of Hi(pi) on [ci, p
−i
(1)) and Hi(ci) < 0, there
exists p̂i(p−i) ∈ (ci, p−i(1)) such that Hi(pi) ≤ 0, thus,
∂πi
∂pi
= −diHi(pi) ≥ 0, if and only if
pi ≤ p̂i(p−i).
Therefore, we have shown πi is quasi-concave in pi on the interval [ci, p
−i
(1)) as well.
Thus, to complete the proof that the function πi(·, p−i) is quasi-concave on the complete interval

















































which is equivalent to (D).
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(1), p−i) ≤ 1− di(p
−i
(1), p−i),
which is trivially true. (a1) holds because bj = b, f
′ (pj − pi) = α for any pi < p−i(1) = min{pk, k 6= i}
and for any j 6= i.
Condition (M): For any i = 1, 2, . . . , N , any given p−i, and any pi ∈ [ci, p−i(1)), let










































































is non-decreasing, which is quasi-convex, in pi
on the interval [ci, p
−i
(1)).
Proof of Theorem 5. As in the proof of Theorem 1, for pi1 > pi2, we show that the difference
in the logarithms of firm i’s profit function, under pi1 versus pi2, is non-decreasing in pj , j 6= i,
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for any p−i. To this end, we distinguish among the following three cases: (i) pi2 < pi1 ≤ p−i(1); (ii)
p−i(1) ≤ pi2 < pi1; (iii) pi2 < p
−i
(1) < pi1.
(i) pi2 < pi1 ≤ p−i(1) or (ii) p
−i
(1) ≤ pi2 < pi1: Note that
log πi(pi1, p−i)− log πi(pi2, p−i) =
∫ pi1
pi2
∂ log πi(pi, p−i)
∂pi
dpi,
since log πi(pi, p−i) is differentiable everywhere on the interval (pi2, pi1). Hence, it is sufficient























(1− di) = 1pi−ci − bα(1− di), if (ii) pi > p
−i
(1)
which is non-decreasing in pj for any j 6= i, by Lemma 2 (b).
(iii) pi2 < p
−i
(1) < pi1: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, fix δ ≤ min
{





log πi(pi1, p−i)− log πi(pi2, p−i) =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
log πi(pi1, p−i)− log πi(p−i(1) + δ, p−i)
+log πi(p
−i
(1) + δ, p−i)− log πi(p
−i
(1) − δ, p−i)
+ log πi(p
−i
(1) − δ, p−i)− log πi(pi2, p−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
By cases (i) and (ii), both the first term and the third term are non-decreasing in pj . It thus
suffices to show that the second term, log πi(p
−i
(1) + δ, p−i)−πi(p
−i
(1)− δ, p−i), is non-decreasing






(1) + δ, p−i)− log πi(p
−i
(1) − δ, p−i)
]
∂pj
≥ 0, for all pj , j 6= i. (A-16)
Unless pj is the unique lowest price among firm i’s alternatives, so that the increase of pj is
accompanied by an increase of p−i(1), the proof of (A-16) is identical to the proof of case (ii.a)
in Theorem 1. The remaining case for (A-16) has pj = p
−i
(1) < pk for all k 6= i, j.
∆j(δ) =



























p−i(1) − δ, p−i
)
≥ 0. by Lemma 2 (b).
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 = bαdidj , for any pi1 > p−i(1) = pj by (A-10) in Appendix,
∂di(pi2, p−i)
∂pj
= bf ′(pj − pi2)didj = bαdidj , for any pi2 < p−i(1) = pj by (1.18). )
Thus, we have shown that the price competition game is log-supermodular.
Proof of Theorem 6. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4; we show that each product i’s
profit function is quasi-concave in its own price, i.e., the function has no local minimum. Note first
from (1.24) that, if pi 6= p−i(n−1), p
−i





















di(1− di), pi > p−i(n)
, (A-17)
Similar to (A-11), we therefore have
∂πi
∂pi


















1− (pi − ci)
∑
k 6=i dkbkf
′ (pk − pi)
)




















is non-decreasing since f(·) is convex. Moreover, 1−di
is non-decreasing in pi since
∂di
∂pi





of two non-negative non-decreasing functions, is non-decreasing in pi. Quasi-concavity of πi
in pi on the interval of [ci, p
−i
(n−1)) follows as in the proof of Theorem 4, see (A-14).
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• If pi = p−i(n−1): Clearly, p
−i
































The last equality follows from the fact that, by (1.24), ∂di∂pi = −di
∑
j 6=i djbjf




′ (pj − pi) when pi ∈ (p−i(n−1), p
−i
(n)). The inequality follows from condition (D
′).
This shows that p−i(n−1) fails to be a local minimum of the profit function πi.
• If pi ∈ (p−i(n−1), p
−i






















follows, as in the proof of Theorem 4, see (A-14).









by (D′) so that p−i(n) fails to be a local minimum.
• If pi > p−i(n). The proof of quasi-concavity of πi on (p
−i
(n), p
max] is identical to the proof of first
case, merely replacing similar p−i(n−1) by p
−i
(n).
Therefore, πi(pi, p−i) is quasi-concave in pi ≥ ci for any p−i.
Proof of Lemma 3. Conditions (D′): By (1.24), we have
∂di
∂pj
= bf ′ (pj − pi) didj for any pi ∈ (p−i(n−1), p
−i
(n)).
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where (e1) holds from the facts that di and dj are continuous in pi, f
′(x) = α if x > 0 and f ′(x) = β






















Hence, the first inequality of (D′) is true. The proof of the second inequality in (D′) is identical to
the Lemma 2.
Condition (M): The proof is identical to the proof in Lemma 2.
Proof of (1.26) of Theorem 7. We consider two cases: (i) pi ≥ C (ii) pi < C.
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(i) pi ≥ C: Let Ai =
∑
k 6=i:pk≥C e

































(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bα(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(















ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bα(pi−C) +Ai +Bi
)
(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bα(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(






















(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bα(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(














(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bα(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(














+ ea0−b0f(p0−C) · eai−bαγipi
(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bα(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(














(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bα(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(













(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bα(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(













· (ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai)
(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bα(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(






≥ 0, thus verifying (1.26).


















where the first inequality follows from
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(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bβ(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(














(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bβ(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(



















(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bβ(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(














(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bβ(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(















(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bβ(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(













· (ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bβ(ci−C))
(ea0−b0f(p0−C) + eai−bβ(pi−C) +Ai +Bi) ·
(







where inequality (c) follows from the fact that pi ≥ ci, γi = 1−δi ≤ β/α and Ai, Bi ≥ 0; inequality



































⇐⇒ C ≤ ci + (bβ)−1
(




















≤ 1− δ, ∀i.
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It then follows from Theorem 7(b) that p∗DISCi ≥ pi∗EXO. The threshold result follows from the
monotonicity of pi
∗EXO in C, see Proposition 2.
Proof of Theorem 8.
(a) Without loss of generality, we set α = 1 in the proof. Since the constant reference value
C ≤ cmin, C ≤ p for any feasible price vector p ∈ [pmin, pmax]. Therefore, one has
dEXOi (p) =
exp (ai − b(pi − C))
ea0 + exp (ai − b(pi − C)) +
∑
k 6=i exp (ak − b(pk − C))
=
eai−bpi

















































Since C ≤ pmin, it follows that, dEXOi (p) ≤ dLOWi (p) for any feasible price vector p. Again,








− bf ′+(pi − C)
(







1− dEXOi (pi, p−i)
)
,








1− dLOWi (pi, p−i)
)
, pi ≥ p−i(1)
b
(
1− dLOWi (pi, p−i)− dLOW0 (pi, p−i)
)















dEXOi (pi, p−i)− dLOWi (pi, p−i)
)
, pi ≥ p−i(1)
b
(
dEXOi (pi, p−i)− dLOWi (pi, p−i)− dLOW0 (pi, p−i)
)
, pi < p
−i
(1)
≤ 0. since dEXOi (p) ≤ dLOWi (p) for any feasible p.
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Therefore, the best response functions satisfy p∗LOWi (p−i) ≥ p∗EXOi (p−i) for any firm i and
any p−i. The remainder of the proof is analogous to that of Theorem 7 (b).
(b) Since d0 ≥ 1 − β/α, it follows from Proposition 2 that both the component-wise smallest
and largest equilibrium p∗EXO and p∗EXO are monotonically increasing in C. The threshold
result follows immediately.








− bf ′+(pi − C)
(
1− dEXOi (pi, p−i)
)
=
 1pi−ci − bα
(
1− dEXOi (pi, p−i)
)




1− dEXOi (pi, p−i)
)
, pi < C

























dEXOi (pi, p−i)− dLOWi (pi, p−i)
)
, pi ≥ C
bα
(




1− dEXOi (pi, p−i)
)
, pi < C
. (A-20)
In the Appendix, we prove that, for C ≤ cmin + ln(α)−ln(β)b(α−β) , the expression in (A-20) is non-
negative. Recall that, both log πLOWi (pi, p−i) and log π
EXO
i (pi, p−i) are quasi-concave by Theorem
4 and Proposition 1, respectively. The non-negativity of (A-20) thus implies



















The inequality follows from the fact that the set to the right contains the set to the left, see (A-20).
The remainder of the proof is analogous to that of Theorem 7 (b).
(b) Follows immediately from part (a) and the monotonicity of p∗EXO(C) and p∗EXO(C) in C,
see Theorem 2.
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Proof of (A-20) in Theorem 9. Note by (1.20) that the sales volume in the lowest price subsidy
model satisfies
dLOWi (p) =
exp (ai − bαpi)
exp (ai − bαpi) +
∑
k 6=i exp (ak − bαpk)
.
We distinguish between the following two cases: (i) p−i(1) ≥ C; (ii) p
−i
(1) < C.
(i) p−i(1) ≥ C. By (1.10), since pk ≥ p
−i
























, pi < C
.
It is obvious that dEXOi (p) = d
LOW
i (p) when pi ≥ C, thus, (A-20) holds. When pi < C,











k 6=i exp (ak − bαpk)
exp (ai − bαpi) +
∑




k 6=i exp (ak − bαpk)
exp (ai − b (βpi + (α− β)C)) +
∑























































































where the first inequality follows from pi ≥ ci, and the second inequality from α ≥ β and
e−b(α−β)(C−ci) ≥ βα since C ≤ cmin +
ln(α)−ln(β)
b(α−β) .
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, pi < C
,
where the inequality follows by replacing, in the denominator, each of the term in the index
set {k 6= i, pk < C} by a larger value, since 0 < β ≤ α. This proves (A-20) when pi ≥ C.











k 6=i exp (ak − bαpk)
exp (ai − bαpi) +
∑
k 6=i exp (ak − bαpk)
−β
∑
k 6=i exp (ak − bαpk)
exp (ai − b (βpi + (α− β)C)) +
∑
k 6=i exp (ak − bαpk)
≥ 0. by (A-22), ( Note that the left hand side coincides with the second expression in (A-22). )
We have thus shown that the inequalities (A-20) apply for any firm i and any p.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs
In this section, we provide a structural estimation methodology to estimate the parameters in the
general competition model with switching cost. For any i = 1, 2, . . . , N , let
∆i = ai − bif(pi − C)− a0 + b0f(p0 − C),
Thus, determining the intercepts {ai} is equivalent to computing the quantities {∆i}Ni=1. (Recall
a0 = 0, by normalization.) We have, by (2.10)–(2.13), for any MA plan i = 1, 2, . . . , N , since we
normalize S2 = 0, that
di = h1
eai−bi·f(pi−g(p))


























































= ∆i −∆1 or ∆i = ∆1 + ln(di)− ln(d1), i = 1, 2, . . . , N. (B-1)
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Thus, all {∆i} are specified once ∆1 is computed. Dividing the market share of MA plan 1 by the




















































































































B̂ = (h1 + h2e
S1)d0 − (h2 + h1eS1)(1− d0)
Thus, by (B-1)–(B-2), for any i = 1, 2, . . . , N , we have
∆i = ln(di)− ln(d0) + ln
−B̂ +
√
B̂2 + 4d0(1− d0)eS1
2(1− d0)
 . (B-3)
With all parameters of the demand functions fully specified, the remaining task is to identify
the marginal cost rates {ci}. As with the models in Sections 2.4, this is accomplished by observing
that the observed price vector p∗ is an interior point of the feasible price space and by assuming
that it is a Nash equilibrium. It is easily verified, as in Section 2.4, that each profit function πi is
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differentiable in its own price pi, unless pi = C, in which case the right and left derivatives
∂+πi
∂pi






∗) + (p∗i − ci)
∂di
∂pi





∗) + (C − ci)
∂+di
∂pi





∗) + (C − ci)
∂−di
∂pi
; if p∗i = C.
Thus, as in the model of Section 2.4, if p∗i 6= C, the marginal cost rate ci is determined as the
unique root of equation (B-4). If p∗i = C, (B-5) determines an interval for the cost rate ci.
B.2 Additional Results
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Selected Proofs
Proof of Proposition 7. Taking derivative with respect to ci, one has:
∂πNDFAi (bi, ci, β)
∂ci
= −F̄N−1(β−1(bi))P {bi ≤ cj +X + Zj}
Applying the envelope theorem [Milgrom, 2004], one has that:






The rest of the proof follows by taking πi(β(c̄), c̄, β) = 0 and equating the above with
πi(β(ci), ci, β) = F̄
N−1(ci)E [I{β(ci) ≤ cj +X + Zj} · (β(ci)− ci −X)] .
Proof of Proposition 8. Taking derivatives of bidder i’s profit with respect to ci, and using
∂E [min{bi, X + ci + Zi} − ci −X]
∂ci
= E [−I{bi ≤ X + ci + Zi}] ,
one obtains the partial derivative specified in the proposition. Applying the envelope theorem, one
has that:






The bidder’s equilibrium profit can be simplified as:
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qj,M I{β(ci) ≤ X + cj + Zj}
 · (β(ci)− ci −X)
+ qi,MZiI{ci ≤ c(1:N),−i, β(ci) > X + ci + Zi}







qj,M I{β(ci) ≤ X + cj + Zj}
 · (β(ci)− ci −X)
+ qi,MZiI{β(min{ci, c(1:N),−i}) > X + ci + Zi}
]
.
Also, the profit associated with the highest cost c̄ is strictly positive because of the potential value
available for suppliers at the spot market: πi(β(c̄), c̄, β) = qi,ME
[
ZiI{β(c(1:N),−i) > X + c̄+ Zi}
]
.
All together, one obtains the integral equations in the proposition. This concludes the proof.




t . By standard argu-
ments based on the envelope theorem [Milgrom, 2004], it can be shown that the expected payment









c(1:N) +Xt + F (c(1:N))/f(c(1:N))
]
. Denote the event of buying from the FA winner
under naive FA by INFA := I{β(c(1:N)) < pt(c, Xt,Zt)}. By Proposition 10, one has (using the





































where (a) follows from πi,t(β(c̄), c̄,β) = E[AiZi,t(1 − INFA)] and ri,t(β(c), pt) = I{β(ci) <
β(cj), ∀j 6= i, β(ci) < pt(c, Xt,Zt)}, and (b) follows by q̃0(c, Xt) =
∑M
i=1Ai(ci +Xt). Substituting
the expression of PFPAt , one has:
PNFAt − PFPAt =
N∑
i=1
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where (a) follows by the fact that
∑M
i=1Ai = 1.






































= 0, because c(1:N), the lowest private cost among the N
participants of the auction stage, converges to c in probability and
F (c(1:N))
f(c(1:N))
→ 0 in probability
when N →∞. The inequality follows from
∑N
i=1Ai(Zi,t + ci)− c =
∑N
i=1Ai(Zi,t + ci − c) ≥ 0 and
1− INFA ≥ 0 for any sample path.
2. Diffused Markets. We note that limM→∞
∑N













where the order of the limits is consistent with the diffused market assumption.
Note that v(c(1:N))−c(1:N) =
F (c(1:N))
f(c(1:N))
converges in probability to 0 (recall that f(c) > 0). Then,







































βNDFA∞ (c) ≥ c+ Zt +Xt
}]
(C-3)
Here, βNDFAM (·) is the bidding strategy under naive FA with M potential suppliers. The second
equation follows since (c, Zt) has the same distribution as (ci, Zi,t), which has the same marginal
distribution for all i, and it is independent of c(1:N) by the diffused market assumption. The last
equation holds by bounded convergence theorem. Extending Proposition 7 to multiple periods:







βNDFA(c) ≤ cj +Xt + Zj,t
}]∑T






N−1 (y) · P
{












βNDFA(c) ≤ cj +Xt + Zj,t
}]
P [βNDFA(c) ≤ cj +Xt + Zj,t]
≥ c+ E[Xt̂], (C-4)



























βNDFA∞ (c) ≥ c+ Zt̂ +Xt̂
}]
≥ E [(c− c) I {c+ E[Xt̂] ≥ c+ Zt̂ +Xt̂}] > 0, (C-5)
where the second expression follows by (C-1), (C-2) and (C-3), the third because c − c ≥ 0, the
fourth by (C-4), and the last because z + x < E[Xt]. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11. The proof follows ideas similar to the ones described in the proof of
Proposition 10. Consider the expected total profits from period 1 to period T for bidder i under





πi,t(bi, ci,β−i) = E−i
[
(bi − ci −Xt) ri,t(bi,β−i(c−i), pi(c, Xt,Zt))
+ [pi(c, Xt, Zi,t)− ci −Xt] I {bi < β(cj),∀j 6= i} I {bi ≥ pi(c, Xt, Zi,t)}
]
,
where the first term is the profit in the event that bidder i is the FA winner and his bid is below
his own spot market price, and the second term is the profit when he is the FA winner but loses to
his own spot market price. Substituting pi(c, Xt,Zt) = ci +Xt + Zi,t into the above, one has:
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πi,t(bi, ci,β−i) = E−i
[
(bi − ci −Xt) I {bi < β(cj), ∀j 6= i} I {bi < ci +Xt + Zi,t}




I {bi < β(cj), ∀j 6= i} ·
∫ (∫
bi−ci−z




















I {ci < cj , ∀j 6= i} ·
(
−F̄Xt (bi − ci − Zi,t) + Zi,tfXt (bi − ci − Zi,t)
)





−I {ci < cj , ∀j 6= i} F̄Xt (bi − ci − Zi,t)
]
= E−i [−I {ci < cj ,∀j 6= i} I {bi < ci +Xt + Zi,t}]
(c)
= E−i [−ri,t(β(c), pi(c, Xt,Zt))] ,
where: (a) follows from applying Leibniz rule; (b) follows by simplifying terms; and (c) follows from
the definition of the equilibrium allocation in a monitored FA, in which the FA winner is the lowest
cost supplier given that equilibrium bids are strictly increasing. Let pi,t = pi(c, Xt,Zt), applying
the envelop theorem yields:






















mi,t(β(c), pi,t)−(ci+Xt)ri,t(β(c), pi,t)+[pi,t − ci −Xt] I {ci < cj , ∀j 6= i} I {β(ci) ≥ pi,t}
]
.
Combining the above two equations, and using the fact that πi,t(β(c̄), c̄,β−i) = 0, one has
T∑
t=1


















If the auctioneer does not buy from one of the FA bidders in the FA, she buys from the spot market.
Therefore, the expected total buying price for the monitored FA from period 1 to period T is:

















































































rj,t(β(c), pi,t))I {ci < cj , ∀j 6= i} = I {β(ci) ≥ pi,t} I {ci < cj ,∀j 6= i} .
Since
∑N
i=1(ci +Xt)I {ci < cj , ∀j 6= i} = c(1:N) +Xt = q0(c, Xt), one has




ri,t(β(c), pi,t) (v(ci) +Xt − q0(c, Xt))
]
.
This concludes the proof.











c(1:N) +Xt + F (c(1:N))/f(c(1:N))
]

































(IMFAt − 1)F (c(1:N))/f(c(1:N))
]
≤ 0,
where IMFAt = I{βMFA(c(1:N)) < c(1:N) + Xt + Z(1:N),t} is the event that FA winner wins over
spot market, and where (a) follows from q0(c, x) = c(1:N) + x, v(ci) = ci + F (ci)/f(ci), and
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ri,t(β(c), pt(c, Xt,Zt)) = I {ci < cj ,∀j 6= i, β(ci) < ci +Xt + Zi,t}. We note that c(1:N), the lowest




converges in probability to 0 (recall that f(c) > 0). Since |IMFA| ≤ 1, by
bounded convergence theorem, we have:
E
[
(IMFAt − 1)F (c(1:N))/f(c(1:N))
]
−→ 0 as N −→∞.
The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 12. From Proposition 11 and Proposition 12, one has E[PFLE − PMFA] =∑T
t=1(P
FLE
t − PMFAt ), where




































βMFA(c(1:N)) ≤ c(1:N) +Xt + Z(1:N),t
}
. Since c(1:N) converges to c in probability as
N → ∞ and c ≤ zt (recall Zt =
∑∞
j=1Aj(cj + Zj,t)), 1 − IFLEt converges in probability to zero,
thus, by bounded convergence theorem, E
[
(1− IFLEt )(Zt − c(1:N))
]




converges in probability to 0 (recall that f(c) > 0), and |IFLEt −IMFAt | ≤
2, by bounded convergence theorem, E
[









t − PFPAt ) → 0 as N → ∞. From the
proof of Theorem 11, one has
PMFAt − PFPAt = E
[
(IMFAt − 1)F (c(1:N))/f(c(1:N))
]
.
Again, as N → ∞, PMFAt − PFPAt → 0 by the bounded convergence theorem. Finally, we show








Zt +Xt + min{0, v(c(1:N))− Zt}
]
.
Together with Proposition 12, one has










(IFLEt − IOPTt )(v(c(1:N))− Zt)
]
,
where IOPTt = I{v(c(1:N)) ≤ Zt}. As N → ∞, since v(c(1:N)) convergence to c in probability, and
c ≤ zt, IOPTt → 1 and IFLEt → 1 in probability. Thus, PFLEt − POPTt → 0, by the bounded
convergence theorem. This completes the proof.
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C.2 Ordinary Differential Equations for Numerical Experiments
The following result establishes the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) and the corresponding
boundary conditions that characterize symmetric BNE strategies.
Proposition C1 (ODEs associated with FA mechanisms) Let z0 = c0 + ∆. Then,














βNDFA(c) ≤ z0 +X
}][
F̄X (βNDFA(c)− z0)− (z0 − c)fX(βNDFA(c)− z0)
] ,
for any c ∈ [c, z0], with the boundary conditions βNDFA(z0) = z0 + x, and dβ
NDFA
dc (z0) = 0.











P[βMFA(c) ≤ c+ ∆ +X]
,
for any c ∈ [c, c̄], with the boundary condition βMFA(c) = c+ ∆ +K, where K = E[X]−∆ if




xfX(x)dx+ ∆ · FX(K) = 0.






· EX [(b− c−X) · I {b ≤ z0 +X}+ (z0 − c) · I {b > z0 +X}]




for any c ∈ [c, z0], with the boundary conditions βFLE(z0) = z0 + x, and dβ
FLE
dc (z0) = 0.
(4) Assume T = 2. Then, a symmetric and differentiable BNE strategy under restricted-flexible




(N − 1)f(c) · V1(β(c), c)








[(z0 − c) + V2(x+ z0, c)− V2(b0, c)]FX(x)dx
+V2(b0, c) + E [(b0 − c−X1) I{b0 ≤ X1 + z0}] ,
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and
V2(b1, c) = E [(b1 − c−X2)I{b1 ≤ X2 + z0}+ (z0 − c)I{b1 > X2 + z0}] ,
B(b0, z0, c) = inf{x ∈ [0, x̄] : V2(b0, c)− (z0 − c)− V2(x+ z0, c) ≤ 0.}.
for any c ∈ [c, z0], with the boundary conditions βFLR(z0) = z0 + x, and dβ
FLR
dc (z0) = 0.
We note that if X is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, x̄], the boundary condition
under monitored FA takes the following closed form expression: βMFA(c̄) = c̄+∆+ x̄−
√
2∆x̄. We
further note that while the FA winner under the naive FA, flexible FA, or restricted-flexible FA is
competing against an outside market with price z0 + X, and as a result bidders with private cost
higher than z0 never win, under the monitored FA the FA winner is competing against his own
spot market price, and therefore the whole interval [c, c] should be considered.
Similarly to asymmetric first-price auctions, our ODEs are not well-behaved at the boundary,
because at the right-hand-side of these we obtain 00 . To avoid the singularity at the boundary,
we make the approximation β(z0 − ε) = β(z0) − ε for a small value ε = 10−5, and a first order
approximation yields β(z0 − ε) = β(z0), when β′(z0) = 0. Since we are looking for BNE in strictly
increasing strategies, and to avoid a flat curve at the boundary, we subtract ε from β(z0) above.
C.3 Additional Proofs
Proof of Proposition 9. Under monitored FA, bidder’s profit can be written as
πi(bi, ci, β) = E
[









(bi − ci − x)) fX(x)fZ(z)dxdz
+ F̄N−1(β−1(bi))
∫ ∫ bi−ci−z
(ci + x+ z)− ci − x) fX(x)fZ(z)dxdz.





= F̄N−1(ci) · E [−I{β(ci) ≤ ci +X + Zi}]
Applying the envelop theorem, one has:
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= πi(β(c̄), c̄, β) +
∫ c̄
ci
F̄N−1(c) · E [I{β(c) ≤ c+X + Zi}] dc.
Bidder’s equilibrium profit is given by:
πi(β(ci), ci, β) = F̄
N−1(ci)E [I{β(ci) ≤ ci +X + Zi}(β(ci)− ci −X)]
+ F̄N−1(ci)E [ZiI{β(ci) > ci +X + Zi}] .
Taking πi(β(c̄), c̄, β) = 0, one obtains:
βMFA(ci) = ci +
E [XI{β(ci) ≤ ci +X + Zi}]




F̄N−1(c) · E [I{β(c) ≤ c+X + Zi}] dc
F̄N−1(ci)E [I{β(ci) ≤ ci +X + Zi}]
− E [ZiI{β(ci) > ci +X + Zi}]
E [I{β(ci) ≤ ci +X + Zi}]
.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10. Note that the total profit for bidder i from periods 1 to period T













Consider the expected profits for bidder i at period t when he bids bi, his cost is ci, and his
competitors use equilibrium strategy β−i:
πi,t(bi, ci,β−i) = E−i
[
(bi − ci −Xt) ri,t(bi,β−i(c−i), pt(c, Xt,Zt))








qj,ME−i [(bi − ci −Xt) I {bi < βt(ct), ∀t 6= i, bi < cj +Xt + Zj,t}]
+ qi,ME−i [Zi,tI {min{bi, βt(ct)}t6=i ≥ ci +Xt + Zi,t}] ,









. Taking derivative with respect to ci, one has:






qj,ME−i [−I {ci < c`,∀` 6= i, β(ci) < cj +Xt + Zj,t}]


































≤ E−i [−ri,t(β(c), pt(c, Xt,Zt))] ,
where (a) follows from the definition of the allocation in the monitored FA (ri,t(b, p) = I {bi < bj , ∀j 6= i, bi < pt}),
which in equilibrium implies the FA winner is the lowest cost suppliers given that equilibrium s-
trategies are strictly increasing, and (b) follows from Zi,tfXt
(







for any sample path. Since (1−
∑N







|bi=β(ci) ≤ E−i [−ri,t(β(c), pt(c, Xt,Zt))] . (C-6)
Thus, applying the envelop theorem to πi yields:






















































If the auctioneer does not buy from one of the FA bidders in the FA, he buys from the spot market.
Therefore, the expected buying price for Naive FA is:











































































































































































































ri,t(β(c), pt) (v(ci) +Xt − q̃0(c, Xt))
]}
,







ri,t(b, p)), (c) follows from the facts that pt(c, Xt,Zt) =
∑M
i=1Aipi(c, Xt,Zt), and (d) follows from




































rj,t(β(c), pt))) · q̃0(c, Xt)
 ,
by the definition of q̃0(c, Xt) =
∑M
i=1Ai(ci +Xt). This concludes the proof.
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πi,t(bi, ci,β−i) = E [(bi − ci −Xt) · I {bi < βj(cj), j 6= i, bi < Zt +Xt}]
+E [(Zt − ci) · I {bi < βj(cj), j 6= i, bi ≥ Zt +Xt ≥ ci +Xt}] .
Taking derivative with respect to ci, one has
∂πi,t(bi, ci,β)
∂ci
|bi=β(ci) = −E [I {ci < cj , j 6= i, β(ci) < Zt +Xt}]
+E [I {ci < cj , j 6= i, β(ci) ≥ Zt +Xt ≥ ci +Xt}] ,
Define the following indicator random variables:
ni(ci, b, Xt, Zt) = I {bi < bj , j 6= i, bi ≥ Zt +Xt ≥ ci +Xt} ,
ri(b, Xt, Zt) = I {bi < bj , j 6= i, bi < Zt +Xt} .
Applying the Envelop Theorem to πi yields












πi,t(β(ci), ci,β−i) = E−i
[
mi(β(c), Xt, Zt)− (ci +Xt)ri(β(c), Xt, Zt) + [Zt − ci]ni(ci,β(c), Xt, Zt)
]
.
Combining the above two equations, and using the fact that πi(β(c̄), c̄,β−i) = 0, one has
T∑
t=1


















If the auctioneer does not buy from the FA winner, she buys from the spot market. Therefore,



















































































(v(ci)− Zt) · (ri(β(c), Xt, Zt) + ni(ci,β(c), Xt, Zt))
]
(b)





(v(ci)− Zt) · I {ci < cj , j 6= i} · (I {β(ci) < Zt +Xt}+ I {β(ci) ≥ Zt +Xt ≥ ci +Xt})
]
,
where (a) follows by the definition v(c) = c + F (c)f(c) , and (b) follows from definition of ri and ni.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 13. In Proposition C4 in Appendix C.5.1, we provide expression for the































































Ex0 [Xt + Zt]
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= 0 for all t. We
show by induction (see proof at end of this proof) that there exists a finite Bt such that
|∂Vt+1(bi, ci, xt)
∂ci
| ≤ Bt for any t. (C-7)
As a result, one has
|õi,t(b,Xt,Zt, ci)| =
∣∣∣∣∂Vt+1(Xt + Zt, ci, Xt)− Vt+1(bi, ci, Xt)∂ci · I{Matching at t}
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2Bt.
Since c(1:N) −→ c in probability as N goes to ∞,
F (c(1:N))
f(c(1:N))
−→ 0 in probability, by Bounded








= 0 for any t =
1, 2, . . . , T .





































Note that r̃i,t(b,Xt,Zt, ci) = I{At(bi, ci, Xt) ≤ Zt < bi−Xt}+I{bi ≤ Xt+Zt} = I{At(bi, ci, Xt) ≤
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E[Xt + Zt] +
T∑
t=1
E [(c− Zt)] .
The two previous expressions together yield:
lim
N→∞























is not equal to 1 almost surely, not
even in the limit, because firms may not match in the restricted-flexible FA because of the dynamic
incentives).
Proof of Equation (C-7). We show (C-7) by backward induction. Obviously, it holds for t = T+1
with BT+1 = 0 since VT+1(b, c, x) = 0. Assume (C-7) holds for t+ 1, for some t ∈ {2, 3, . . . , T + 1},


















≤ 2 + 3Bt+1.
Thus, we have shown that (C-7) holds with Bt = 2 + 3Bt+1 for any t.
Proof of Proposition C1. We show the ODE and boundary conditions for naive FA, monitored
FA, flexible FA, and restricted-flexible FA separately in the follows.
(1) ODE for Naive FA in diffused market. First, we show that the bidding strategy sat-




β′(c) , one has








(β(c)− c− x) fX(x)dx
+F̄N−1(c) ·
[
F̄X (β(c)− z0)− (z0 − c)fX(β(c)− z0)
]
.
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Thus, by first-order-condition
∂πNDFAi (b,c,β)
∂b = 0, we have shown that any symmetric equilibrium
satisfies the ODE (C-6).
Next, we show the boundary condition. In the proof, we will omit the superscript “NDFA”.
Taking limit c↗ z0 in the integral equation in Proposition 7, one obtains
β(z0) = z0 + E
[
X
∣∣∣β(z0) ≤ z0 +X] .
It is easy to verify that the only solution to the above equation is β(z0) = z0 + x̄ by applying







· EX [(β(c)− c−X) · I {β(c) ≤ z0 +X}][




 (N − 1)f(c)
[∫ x̄













β(c)−z0 (β(c)− c− x) fX(x)dx
























where (a) holds since β(z0) = z0 + x̄, and (b) is obtained by L’Hôpital’s rule.
(2) ODE for Monitored FA. Recall that, bidder’s profit is
πi(b, c, β) = E[I{b ≤ β(c(1:N),−i)} · (min{b, c+X + ∆} − c−X)]
= F̄N−1(β−1(b)) ·
[






Taking derivatives w.r.t b, one has
∂πi(b, c, β)
∂b






· EX [min{β(c)− c−X,∆}]
+F̄N−1(c) · P(X ≥ β(c)− c−∆).
Since ∂β
−1(b)
∂b |b=β(c) = 1/β
′(c), ∂πi(b,c,β)∂b |b=β(c) = 0 yields the ODE.
Next, we derive the boundary condition. From Proposition 9, the bidding strategy also satisfies
integral equation, i.e., taking limit at c, one has
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β(c) = c+ E
[
X
∣∣∣∣β(c) ≤ c+X + ∆]−∆1− P(β(c) ≤ c+X + ∆)P(β(c) ≤ c+X + ∆) .
Let β(c) = c + ∆ + K, obviously, K ≤ x̄ since the above equation is not well-defined otherwise,
then K satisfies
K + ∆ = E
[
X
∣∣∣∣K ≤ X]−∆1− P(X ≥ K)P(X ≥ K) .
Let
H(k) =
 k + ∆− E[X], k ≤ 0(k + ∆)F̄X(k)− ∫ x̄k xfX(x)dx+ ∆ · FX(k), k ∈ [0, x̄]
then K ∈ [0, x̄] is solution to H(K) = 0. Note that, H ′(k) = F̄X(k) − (k + ∆)fX(k) + kfX(k) +
∆fX(k) = F̄X(k) > 0, thus, H(k) is increasing when k ≤ x̄ and there is a unique solution to
H(K) = 0. This completes the proof.
(3) ODE for flexible FA. Similar to the naive FA in diffused market, one could show that the
bidding strategy under flexible FA satisfies the respective ODE and boundary conditions; we omit
the details.
(4) ODE for restricted-flexible FA. The bidder’s prifit expression is given in (C-13) in Ap-
pendix C.5, taking derivative w.r.t bi, one gets
∂πi(bi, ci, x0, β)
∂bi
= −(N − 1)FN−2(β−1(bi))f(β−1(bi))
∂β−1(bi)
∂bi







Since β is an equilibrium, the FOC ∂πi(bi,ci,x0,β)∂bi
∣∣∣∣
bi=β(ci)
= 0 implies that
0 = −(N − 1)FN−2(ci)f(ci)
1
β′(ci)








Thus, the equilibrium satisfies the following ODE:
β′(ci) =
(N − 1)f(ci) · V1(β(ci), ci, x0)




Note that for T = 2,
V2(b1, c) = E [(b1 − c−X2)I{b1 ≤ X2 + z0}+ (z0 − c)I{b1 > X2 + z0}] ,
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and the matching condition is equivalent to
V2(b0, c) ≤ (z0 − c) + V2(x1 + z0, c) and b0 > x1 + z0 ⇐⇒ b0 − z0 > x1 ≥ B(b0, z0, c).




[(z0 − c) + V2(x+ z0, c)− V2(b0, c)] g(x)dx+ V2(b0, c)
+E [(b0 − c−X1) I{b0 ≤ X1 + z0}] ,
to obtain the result.
C.4 Revenue Equivalence Between FPA without Reserve Price
and FPA with Reserve Price
In this section we show that FPA without reserve prices is asymptotically equivalent to FPA with
a random reserve price that equals to the spot market price determined as in the diffused naive FA.
Under the FPA with random reserve price (denoted as “RFPA”), the allocation function is
ri,t(bi, b−i, p) = I {bi ≤ bj ,∀j 6= i} I {bi ≤ pt(c, Xt,Zt)} ,
where pt(c, Xt,Zt) = c + Zt + Xt is spot market price under the diffused naive FA, and (c, Zt) is
independent to {(ci, Zi,t), i = 1, 2, . . . , N}, because of the diffused market assumption. However,
note that (c, Zt) has the same marginal distribution to (ci, Zi,t). We have the following result.
Proposition C2 (Revenue Equivalence) The expected buying price (measured at t = 0) for






c(1:N) +Xt + F (c(1:N))/f(c(1:N))
]








c(1:N) + F (c(1:N))/f(c(1:N)) +Xt, c+ Zt +Xt
}]
.
In addition, we have
lim
N→∞
E[PFPA − PRFPA] = 0.
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Proof. By standard arguments based on the envelope theorem, one can easily get the expressions
for E[PFPA] and for E[PRFPA] [Milgrom, 2004]. Next, we show limN→∞ E[PFPA − PRFPA] = 0.
Substituting the equations for E[PFPA] and E[PRFPA], one gets





c(1:N) + F (c(1:N))/f(c(1:N))− c− Zt
]+
.
Since v(c(1:N)) = c(1:N) +
F (c(1:N))
f(c(1:N))





c(1:N) + F (c(1:N))/f(c(1:N))− c− Zt
]+
= 0,
by the bounded convergence theorem. Thus, limN→∞ E[PFPA − PRFPA] = 0.
C.5 Analysis of Flexible-Restricted FA
We assume that {Xt : t ≥ 0} follows a Markov process. To simplify the initial analysis, we assume
T ≥ 2 periods and that {Zt : t ≥ 0} is i.i.d.1 We solve the model by backwards induction. The
state variables are the current bid bt, the previous realization of xt−1, and the firm’s cost c (we
ignore the subindex i for now).
t=T. At the end of the horizon, the FA winner will match if and only if his cost is smaller than
realized zT . Hence, his expected payoff is given by:
VT (bT , c, xT−1) = ExT−1 [(bT − c−XT )I{bT ≤ XT + ZT }+ (ZT − c)I{bT > XT + ZT ≥ XT + c}] ,
(C-9)
where the expectation over XT and ZT is taken conditional on the value xT−1.
t=1,. . . , T-1. For a given realization of Xt and Zt, the bidder needs to decide whether to match
or not. He faces a trade-off between making a sell today and decreasing the price for tomorrow.
He solves the following optimization problem for realizations of Xt and Zt:
Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt) ≡
 max{Vt+1(bt, c, xt), (zt − c) + Vt+1(xt + zt, c, xt)}, if bt > xt + ztbt − c− xt + Vt+1(bt, c, xt), o.w (C-10)
When bt > xt + zt, a seller matches at period t if and only if
Vt+1(bt, c, xt) ≤ (zt − c) + Vt+1(xt + zt, c, xt). (C-11)
1The assumption could be generalized into {(Xt, Zt), t = 0, 1, . . . , T} is a Markov process with distribution of
(Xt, Zt) depends on realization of Xt−1. To be consistent, we assume Xt and Zt are independent conditional on
Xt−1.
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. In the following Proposition, we show that Vt(bt, c, xt−1)
is strictly increasing in bt.
Proposition C3 Assume that Xt and Zt are independent for any given xt−1, then, for any t:
(i) The value function Vt(bt, c, xt−1) is strictly increasing in bt for any (c, xt−1) and bt < x̄+ z̄.
(ii) There exists At(bt, c, xt) such that the FA winner matches spot market if and only if At(bt, c, xt) ≤
zt < bt − xt.
Proof. We prove (i) by backward induction. First, we show that VT (bT , c, xT−1) is strictly increas-
ing in bT . Note that





(bT − c− x)gxT−1(x)dxfxT−1(z)dz +
∫ z̄
c
(z − c)GxT−1(bT − z)fxT−1(z)dz.
Where gxT−1(·), fxT−1(·) are density function for XT , ZT , respectively, conditional on XT−1 = xT−1.
Taking derivative with respective to bT , one gets
∂VT (bT , c, xT−1)
∂bT
= PxT−1 (bT ≤ XT + ZT )−
∫ z̄
z
(z − c)gxT−1(bT − z)fxT−1(z)dz +
∫ z̄
c
(z − c)gxT−1(bT − z)fxT−1(z)dz
= PxT−1 (bT ≤ XT + ZT )−
∫ c
z
(z − c)gxT−1(bT − z)fxT−1(z)dz
≥ PxT−1 (bT ≤ XT + ZT ) > 0.
Next, given that Vt+1(b, c, x) is strictly increasing in b, we show that Vt(bt, c, xt−1) is strictly
increasing in bt. Since Vt+1(b, c, x) is strictly increasing in b, by (C-11), there exists At(bt, c, xt)
such that matching if and only if At(bt, c, xt) ≤ zt < bt − xt.
In the following, we show that, Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt) ≤ Ṽt(b′t, c, xt, zt) for any bt < b′t and for any
realization (Xt, Zt) = (xt, zt) and c, with inequality for samples that with a positive probability.
We consider three cases: (a)bt < b
′
t < zt + xt, (b)bt < zt + xt ≤ b′t, (c)zt + xt ≤ bt < b′t.
(a) Case (a): bt < b
′
t < zt+xt. By (C-10), one has Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt) = bt− c−xt+Vt+1(bt, c, xt) and
Ṽt(b
′
t, c, xt, zt) = b
′
t − c − xt + Vt+1(b′t, c, xt). Since Vt+1(b′t, c, xt) > Vt+1(bt, c, xt) and b′t > bt,
obviously, Ṽt(b
′
t, c, xt, zt) > Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt).
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(b) Case (b): bt < zt + xt ≤ b′t. By (C-10), one has Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt) = bt − c − xt + Vt+1(bt, c, xt)
and Ṽt(b
′
t, c, xt, zt) = max{Vt+1(b′t, c, xt), (zt − c) + Vt+1(xt + zt, c, xt)} ≥ (zt − c) + Vt+1(xt +
zt, c, xt) > bt − c − xt + Vt+1(bt, c, xt), where the last inequality is because zt > bt − xt.
Therefore, one has Ṽt(b
′
t, c, xt, zt) > Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt).
(c) Case (c): zt + xt ≤ bt < b′t. By (C-10), one has Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt) = max{Vt+1(bt, c, xt), (zt −
c)+Vt+1(xt+zt, c, xt)} and Ṽt(b′t, c, xt, zt) = max{Vt+1(b′t, c, xt), (zt−c)+Vt+1(xt+zt, c, xt)} ≥
max{Vt+1(bt, c, xt), (zt−c)+Vt+1(xt+zt, c, xt)}, where the last inequality is because Vt+1(b′t, c, xt) ≥
Vt+1(bt, c, xt). Therefore, one has Ṽt(b
′
t, c, xt, zt) ≥ Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt).
Combining the above three cases, we have shown that Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt) ≤ Ṽt(b′t, c, xt, zt) for any
sample paths and Ṽt(bt, c, xt, zt) < Ṽt(b
′
t, c, xt, zt) when zt > bt − xt. Since Pxt−1(Zt > bt −
Xt) > 0 for any bt < z̄ + x̄, we have thus shown that Vt(b
′













t, c, xt−1), namely, strictly monotonicity of Vt(bt, c, xt−1) in bt.
The (ii) threshold result follows immediately from backward induction proofs in the part (i).
Note that: (a) The bidder matches spot market at period T when c ≤ zT < bT − xT , therefore,
we denote AT (bT , c, xT ) = c for notation convenience. (b) It is obvious from the definition that
At(b, c, x) is continuous in b because of the continuity of Vt(b, c, x) in b.
Thus, the FA winner’s expected total profit is given by: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1,
Vt(bi, c, xt−1)
= Ext−1 [Vt+1(bi, c,Xt)I{Zt ≤ At(bi, c,Xt)}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A) Not match spot market at t
+Ext−1 [((Zt − c) + Vt+1(Xt + Zt, c,Xt)) · I{At(bi, c,Xt) ≤ Zt < bi −Xt}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B) Match spot market at t
+Ext−1 [(bi − c−Xt + Vt+1(bi, c,Xt)) I{bi ≤ Xt + Zt}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C) Beat spot market at t
= Ext−1
((Zt − c) + Vt+1(Xt + Zt, c,Xt)− Vt+1(bi, c,Xt)) · I{At(bi, c,Xt) ≤ Zt < bi −Xt}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Matching spot market at t

+Ext−1 [Vt+1(bi, c,Xt)] + Ext−1 [(bi − c−Xt) I{bi ≤ Xt + Zt}] . (C-12)
For each bidder i, given that his competitors play a strictly increasing strategy profile β, his profit
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with a bid bi is given by
πi(bi, ci, x0, β) = Pr(bi < β(cj),∀j 6= i) · V1(bi, ci, x0) = F
N−1
(β−1(bi)) · V1(bi, ci, x0). (C-13)
Taking derivative with respect to ci, one has














(c) · ∂V1(bi, c, x0)
∂c
dc.
Because πi(β(c), c, x0, β) = 0, one has










C.5.1 Mechanism Design Approach
Using direct revelation, a mechanism is characterized by {ri,t(b,Xt,Zt, ci),mi,t(b,Xt,Zt, ci), i =
1, 2, . . . , N, t = 1, 2, . . . , T.}, where ri,t(b,Xt,Zt, ci) specifies the allocation and mi,t specifies pay-
ment at period t, and b = (b1, b2, . . . , bN ), Xt = (x0, x1, ..., xt), and Zt = (z1, ..., zt). In particular,
for any t = 1, 2, . . . , T , let
ri,t(b,Xt,Zt, ci) = I{bi < bj , j 6= i} · r̃i,t(b,Xt,Zt, ci), (C-16)
oi,t(b, Xt, Zt, ci) = I{bi < bj , j 6= i} · õi,t(b, Xt, Zt, ci). (C-17)
Where
r̃i,t(b,Xt,Zt, ci) = I{At(bi, ci, Xt) ≤ Zt < bi −Xt}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Match at t
+I{bi ≤ Xt + Zt}, ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T,
õi,t(b,Xt,Zt, ci) =
∂Vt+1(Xt + Zt, ci, Xt)− ∂Vt+1(bi, ci, Xt)
∂ci
· I{Match at t}, ∀t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1,
and õi,T (b,XT ,ZT , ci) = 0. Intuitively speaking, ri,t gives allocation rule ex-ante for bidder i and
r̃i,t gives allocation rule ex-post allocation rule for bidder i given he wins the FA at period 0.
Finally, the following proposition provides explicit expression of the buyer’s expected total
prices using mechanism design approach and Theorem 13 (see main text) compares the buyer’s
price under FLR and the one under FLE.
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Ex0 [Xt + Zt]. (C-18)
Proof. Bidder i’s total profit could also be represented by




[mi,t(β(c),Xt,Zt, ci)− (ci +Xt)ri,t(β(c),Xt,Zt, ci)]
]
.


















































































Ext−1 [Xt + Zt].





−1 + ∂Vt+1(Xt + Zt, ci, Xt)− Vt+1(bi, ci, Xt)
∂ci
)













− Ext−1 [I{bi ≤ Xt + Zt}] .
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(−1 + ∂Vt+1(Xt + Zt, ci, Xt)− ∂Vt+1(bi, ci, Xt)
∂ci
)








− Ext−1 [I{bi ≤ Xt + Zt}] .











































[−ri,t(β(c),Xt,Zt, ci) + oi,t(β(c),Xt,Zt, ci)]
]
.
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Ex0 [Xt + Zt],



















C.6 The Optimal Mechanism
We consider the class of mechanisms defined in §3.5. The following analysis is similar to Milgrom [2004]. The following
proposition characterizes the expected buying price in the BNE of a given FA.
Proposition C5 Let β(·) be a BNE strategy profile induced by a mechanism w = (r,m), such that equilibrium











ri,t(β(c), Xt, Zt)(v(ci)− Zt)
]
, (C-20)
where the “virtual cost” function is v(c) = c+ F (c)/f(c).
Proof. Recall that if the auctioneer does not buy from one of the FA bidders, she buys from the spot market.
Therefore, the total expected payments for an FA given its equilibrium strategy can be expressed as:


















where the expectation is taken with respect to the random variables X = (X1, . . . , XT ) and Z = (Z1, . . . , ZT ), and
the random vector c. In addition, throughout this proof we use the notation E−i,t to denote expectation with respect






mi,t(βi(ci),β−i(c−i), Xt, Zt)− (ci +Xt)ri,t(βi(ci),β−i(c−i), Xt, Zt)
]
. (C-22)
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ri,t(βi(y),β−i(c−i)), X, Z)(F (y)/f(y))f(y)dy
]
= E [ri,t(β(c), X, Z)F (ci)/f(ci)] , (C-25)
where the first equation follows by the independence of the private costs and the second by changing the order of


















We next consider the following structural assumption on the virtual cost.
Assumption C1 The virtual cost function v(c) = c+ F (c)/f(c) is strictly increasing in c, for all c ∈ [c, c̄].
In the following result we provide a characterization of mechanisms that minimize the expected buying price of
the auctioneer.
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Proposition C6 Suppose Assumption C1 holds. An augmented mechanism (w,β) minimizes the expected buying
price for the auctioneer among all feasible augmented mechanisms if it satisfies πi(βi(c̄), c̄,β−i) = 0, for all i, and its
allocation rule in period t = 1, 2, . . . , T under the BNE strategy profile β satisfies the following: (1) if v(c(1)) ≤ zt,
then buy from the lowest cost FA supplier; and (2) if v(c(1)) > zt, then buy from the spot market. Moreover, there
exists at least one such augmented mechanism that achieves the optimum.































where the inequality follows because for a feasible mechanism πi(βi(ci), ci,β−i) ≥ 0, for all i and ci, and because∑N
i=1 ri,t(b, x, z) ≤ 1 and ri,t(b, x, z) ≥ 0, for all b, x, z. The right hand side of (C-26) provides a lower bound
on the expected buying price for any feasible mechanism, therefore, a feasible mechanism that achieves it must be
optimal. Hence, using the fact that v(·) is strictly increasing, a feasible augmented mechanism with an allocation rule
in equilibrium like the one proposed in the statement of the proposition and that satisfies πi(βi(c̄), c̄,β−i) = 0, for all
i, must be optimal.
To prove the second part of the proposition we construct a mechanism that achieves the optimum. Consider a
“modified” second-price auction in which every period bidders submit bids bi and the spot market “submits” a bid
equal to bt0 = v
−1(zt) after observing the realization of Zt = zt. The lowest bid among b
t
0, b1, . . . , bN wins and
sells the object. If one of the bidders 1, . . . , N wins, after observing the realization of Xt, the auctioneer pays him
b(2) +xt, where b(2) is the second lower order statistics among b
t
0, b1, . . . , bN . Loosing bidders do not receive payments.
Therefore, the actual payoff for a winning bidder i is given by b(2) + xt − (ci + xt) = b(2) − ci, which for every
period is the same as the payoff in a standard second price auction. Hence, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy,
so that bidder i submitting a bid bi = ci is a BNE. Clearly, a bidder with cost c̄ has no chance of winning and
πi(βi(c̄), c̄,β−i) = 0. Moreover, the winning bidder is determined by the minimum between c(1) and v
−1(zt). Because
v(·) is strictly increasing, it follows that the allocation rule satisfies: (1) if v(c(1)) ≤ zt, then buy from the lowest cost
FA supplier; and (2) if v(c(1)) > zt, then buy from the spot market. These facts prove the result.
C.7 Existence of Equilibrium
We prove the existence of symmetric BNE for the naive FA with diffused markets and the monitored FA. We note
that these results do not follow by standard existence results for first price auctions, because of the presence of the
random common cost component and its correlation with the random spot market price.
Proposition C7 Assume that the action space A is restricted to be finite. (i) The naive FA game in diffused market
admits a symmetric BNE in increasing strategies. (ii) The monitored FA game also admits a symmetric BNE in
increasing strategies.
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We prove this result by applying and specializing the result of Athey [2001] that establishes the existence of BNE
for a large class of games of incomplete information in two steps. For the corresponding game with a finite action
space, the so-called single-crossing condition (SCC) is shown to be sufficient for the existence of an increasing and
symmetric BNE. We note that while Proposition C7 assumes a single period, we can extend the result to multiple
periods.2 For games with continuous and compact action spaces (which include the settings discussed in the current
paper) Athey [2001] also establishes the existence of a symmetric BNE by taking a limit of a sequence of games with
finite action space as the granularity of the action space increases. In Appendix C.7.2 we extend Proposition C7 from
a finite action set to a continuous and compact action space by showing that the regularity conditions required for
the limiting argument are valid for naive FAs.
Now, we provide conditions under which BNE strategies are continuous and strictly increasing. We have the
following result.
Proposition C8 Any symmetric and increasing BNE strategy must satisfy: (i) Under monitored FA, it is continuous
and strictly increasing in c ∈ [c, c̄]; (ii) under naive FA with diffused market, it is strictly increasing in c ∈ [c, c̄].
Further,
if argmax b∈A E [(b− c−X)I {b ≤ X + cj + Zj}] is unique for all c ∈ [c, c̄], it must also be continuous in c ∈ [c, c̄].
A sufficient condition for the argmax to be unique is that E [(b− c−X)I {b ≤ X + cj + Zj}] is strictly quasi-concave
in b, for all c. As an example, one can show this is the case when the common cost X has a uniform distribution and
E[X]− x > z + c.
Finally, we note that similar results to those alluded to in this section can be proved for the ‘flexible FA’. For
brevity, we will omit the proofs of the latter results.
C.7.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition C7. First, we introduce the following definition. A twice-differentiable function h :
R2 −→ R is called supermodular or log-supermodular, respectively, if for all x and θ:
∂2
∂x∂θ
h(x, θ) ≥ 0, or if h > 0 ∂
2
∂x∂θ
ln (h(x, θ)) ≥ 0.
Note that these are sufficient conditions for supermodularity. There are weaker related conditions that do not require
differentiability and use function differences for the case of discrete actions.
Definition C1 (Athey 2001) The Single Crossing Condition (SCC) for games of incomplete information is satisfied
if for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N , whenever every opponent j 6= i uses a strategy βj that is increasing, player i’s profit
function, πi(bi, ci,β−i) is supermodular or log-supermodular in (bi, ci).
Now, we are ready to prove the proposition.
2For a multi-period model with i.i.d {Xt, Zt}, the auction happens only once at the beginning of first period, and
bidder considers total profit, instead of just one-period profit, when submitting his bid. Thus, the multi-period could
be reduced into a one-period model.
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(i) Establishing SCC for monitored FA. By Proposition 9, one has
πi(b, c, β) = P[i wins with b] · E [I{b ≤ (c+X + Zi)}(b− c−X)]
+P[i wins with b] · E [I{b > (c+X + Zi)} ((c+X + Zi)− c−X)] .
Taking derivatives with respect to c, one obtains:
∂πi(b, c, β)
∂c
= P[i wins with b] · E [−I{b ≤ (c+X + Zi)}]
= −P[i wins with b] · [P [b ≤ (c+X + Zi)]]
where P[i wins with b] is the probability bidder i defeats its competitors’ with a bid b:
P[i wins with b]
= P(βj(cj) > b, for all j 6= i)︸ ︷︷ ︸




P(exactly k bidders other than i bid b and the rest higher than b)
k + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
winning probability with ties
.
It can be easily shown that the winning probability P[i wins with b] is decreasing in b, i.e., a higher bid induces a




is increasing in b. Therefore, by Definition C1, SCC is satisfied.
(ii) Establishing SCC for naive FA in diffused market. Recall that the private costs {cj} are
i.i.d. and independent with the common cost X. For any increasing profile β−i, we have
πi(b, c, β−i) = P[i wins with b] · E [(b− c−X)I {b ≤ (X + cj + Zj)}] , (C-27)




= −P[i wins with b] · P(b ≤ (X + cj + Zj)).
Since both P(b ≤ (X+cj+Zj)) and P[i wins with b] are decreasing in b, the partial derivative ∂πi(b,c,β−i)∂c is increasing
in b. Therefore, by Definition C1, SCC is satisfied. The existence of a symmetric BNE in increasing strategies follows
by Theorem 1 in Athey [2001].
Proof of Proposition C8.
(i) Strictly monotonicity and continuity for monitored FA.
• Part 1. Equilibrium is strictly increasing. By Section 3.3.2, one has
πi(β(c), c, β) = P[i wins with β(c)] · E [min{β(c), (c+X + Z)} − c−X] .
Now, we show that the equilibrium is strictly increasing by contradiction. Assume that there is an interval
with positive length [ĉ1, ĉ2], with ĉ2 ≤ c̄, such that β(c) = b̂ for all c ∈ [ĉ1, ĉ2]. We consider two cases. First,
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suppose that πi(b̂, ĉ2, β) > 0. In this case, E
[
min{b̂, (ĉ2 +X + Z)} − ĉ2 −X
]
> 0. It is simple to observe that
the bidder with private cost ĉ2 is strictly better off by unilaterally deviating from b̂ to b̂− δ for small enough
δ > 0. To see this, note that with this deviation, P[i wins with β(c)] increases by a strictly positive discrete
amount and the second term E
[
min{b̂− δ, (ĉ2 +X + Z)} − ĉ2 −X
]
remains essentially unchanged for small
enough δ > 0 by continuity.
The second case we consider is πi(β(ĉ2), ĉ2, β) = 0. In this case, it must be that πi(β(c), c, β) > 0, for
c ∈ [ĉ1, ĉ2), because the previous function is strictly decreasing in c for c ∈ [ĉ1, ĉ2). Then, we can repeat the
previous argument.
• Part 2. Equilibrium is continuous. We show it by contradiction using the first part of the proof. Assume
there is a symmetric and strictly increasing equilibrium β(·) and ĉ1 ∈ [c, c̄] such that β(·) has a jump at ĉ1.
Let the left-limit and right-limit of β at ĉ1 be b− = limc↗ĉ1 β(c) and b+ = limc↘ĉ1 β(c), respectively. Then,
b− < b+. By (C-27) and the fact that the ties happens with probability zero, one has: for any b ∈ [b−, b+]:
πi(b, ĉ1, β) = F̄
N−1(ĉ1) · E [min{b, (c+X + Z)} − c−X] (C-28)
This is impossible because E [min{b, (c+X + Z)} − c−X] is strictly increasing in b. Thus, it must be con-
tinuous.
(ii) Strictly monotonicity and continuity for naive FA.
• Part 1. Equilibrium is strictly increasing. By Section 3.3.1, one has
πi(β(c), c, β) = P[i wins with β(c)] · E [(b− c−X)I {β(c) ≤ cj + Zj +X}] .
Where (cj , Zj) is independent with c,X. In the following, we let Z = cj + Zj . We need the following Lemma
for the proof.
Lemma C1 Let β(·) be a symmetric and increasing BNE strategy of the naive FA model. Then, β(c) < z̄+ x̄,
for all c < z̄.
Proof. We argue by contradiction. Suppose that β(c) = z̄ + x̄, for some c < z̄. Note that in this case,
πi(β(c), c, β) = 0, because bidder i with private cost c has no chance of defeating the spot market. We show
that β′(c) = z̄ + x̄ − ε, for small enough ε > 0 is a profitable unilateral deviation, so the initially proposed
strategy cannot be a BNE. Let {i wins} be the event in which βi(ci) ≤ βj(cj), ∀j and bidder i is selected in
case of a tie. Then,
πi(β
′(c), c, β) = P[i wins] · E
[
(β′(c)− c−X) · I
{
β′(c) ≤ Z +X
}]
= P[i wins] · E
[
((z̄ − c− ε) + (x̄−X)) · I
{
β′(c) ≤ Z +X
}]
= P[i wins] ·
[




β′(c) ≤ Z +X
}]]
.
Clearly, P[i wins] > 0, P[β′(c) ≤ Z + X] > 0, and (x̄ − x) ≥ 0, for all realizations x. Moreover, for small
enough ε, z̄ − c− ε > 0. The result follows.
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Now, we show that the equilibrium is strictly increasing by contradiction. Let us write:





∣∣∣β(c) ≤ Z +X])P[β(c) ≤ Z +X].
Assume that there is an interval with positive length [ĉ1, ĉ2], with ĉ2 < z̄, such that β(c) = b̂ for all c ∈ [ĉ1, ĉ2].
We consider two cases. First, suppose that πi(β(ĉ2), ĉ2, β) > 0. In this case,
(
β(ĉ2)− ĉ2 − EZ,X
[
X
∣∣∣β(ĉ2) ≤ Z +X])P[β(ĉ2) ≤
Z + X] > 0. It is simple to observe that the bidder with private cost ĉ2 is strictly better off by unilaterally
deviating from b̂ to b̂− δ for small enough δ > 0. To see this, note that with this deviation, P[i wins] increases
by a strictly positive discrete amount and the other terms in πi(β(ĉ2), ĉ2, β) remain essentially unchanged for
small enough δ > 0 by continuity.
The second case we consider is πi(β(ĉ2), ĉ2, β) = 0. Because ĉ2 < z̄, β(·) is increasing, and Lemma C1, it must
be that P[i wins] ·P[β(ĉ2) ≤ Z +X] > 0. Hence, it must be that β(ĉ2)− ĉ2−E
[
X
∣∣∣β(ĉ2) ≤ Z +X] = 0. Take
small enough ε, for which β(ĉ2− ε) = β(ĉ2). We have that πi(β(ĉ2− ε), ĉ2− ε, β) > 0, and we can use the same
argument regarding a unilateral deviation like in the first case. The result follows.
• Part 2. Equilibrium is continuous. We show it by contradiction using the first part of the proof. Assume
there is a symmetric and strictly increasing equilibrium β(·) and ĉ1 ∈ [c, z̄] such that β(·) has a jump at ĉ1.
Let the left-limit and right-limit of β at ĉ1 be b− = limc↗ĉ1 β(c) and b+ = limc↘ĉ1 β(c), respectively. Then,
b− < b+. By (C-27) and the fact that the ties happens with probability zero, one has
πi(b, ĉ1, β) = P(b < β(cj), j 6= i) · E [(b− ĉ1 −X)I {b ≤ X + Z}]
= F̄N−1(ĉ1) · E [(b− ĉ1 −X)I {b ≤ X + Z}] , for any b ∈ [b−, b+]. (C-29)
There are two cases to consider. Suppose β(ĉ1) = b−. Then, b− must be the maximum of
E [(b− ĉ1 −X)I {b ≤ X + Z}] by the previous equation. Moreover, by continuity and taking the limit limc↘ĉ1 ,
b+ must also be the maximum of E [(b− ĉ1 −X)I {b ≤ X + Z}]. This contradicts our assumption of the unique
maximum of E [(b− c−X)I {b ≤ X + Z}] for any c. The second case is analogous, proving the result.
C.7.2 Existence of Equilibrium for Compact Space
In this appendix, we extend the existence of the equilibrium under the naive FA with diffused market from a finite
set (in Proposition C7) to a compact space. To that end, we need to verify that our basic FA game satisfies some
technical conditions required for a limiting argument used by Athey [2001] to pass from games with finite action
spaces to games with continuous action space. To simplify, we abuse notation and denote the sum of the random
variables c+ Z as just Z.
Before presenting the existence proof, we present and prove the following lemma that we use below; we also
referred to this result in the main body of the paper.
Lemma C2 For any random variable Y with pdf h(·), cdf H(·) and support [y, ȳ] (possibly y = −∞ and/or ȳ =∞),
let
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B(a, b) = E
[
Y




H(b)−H(a) , y ≤ a < b ≤ ȳ.
Then, B(a, b) is increasing in a and b.



























Thus, we have proved the lemma.
Next, we show that an increasing symmetric pure strategy BNE exists for the naive FA with diffused market, by
applying Theorem 6 in Athey [2001]. For self-completeness, we briefly summarize notation and assumptions made
in Theorem 6 of Athey [2001]. After introducing the theorem, we then show that all conditions are satisfied for the
naive FA model.
Part 1. Restatement of results in Athey [2001]. Consider a game of incomplete information between
I players, i = 1, . . . , I, where each player first observes his own type ti ∈ Ti = [ti, t̄i] and then takes an action ai from
a compact set Ai ∈ R. Let A = A1 × · · · × AI , T = T1 × · · · × TI , ai = minAi, and āi = maxAi. The joint density
over player types is f(·), with the conditional density of t−i given ti denoted f(t−i|ti). Player i’s payoff function is
ui : A ×T → R. Given any set of strategies for the opponents, αj : Tj → Aj , j 6= i, player i’s objective function is
defined as follows (using the notation (ai, α−i(t−i)) = (· · · , αi−1(ti−1), ai, αi+1(ti+1), · · · )):
Ui(ai, ti, α−i(t−i)) =
∫
t−i
ui ((ai, α−i(t−i)) , t) f(t−i|ti)dt−i.




ui ((ai, α−i(t−i)) , t) f(t−i|ti)dt−i exists and is finite for all convex S and all increasing functions
αj : Tj → Aj , j 6= i.
For games with finite action spaces, say Ai = {A0, A1, . . . , AM}, she shows that the Kakutani’s fixed point theorem
is applicable when SCC is satisfied. Thus, a pure strategy BNE exists for games with finite action spaces. For games
with compact action spaces, she assumes that player i’s payoff, given a realization of types and actions, has the
following form
ui(a, t) = ϕi(a) · v̄i(ai, t) + (1− ϕi(a)) · vi(ai, t) = vi(ai, t) + ϕi(a) ·∆vi(ai, t), (C-30)
where ∆vi(ai, t) = v̄i(ai, t)− vi(ai, t). Intuitively, the winners receive payoffs v̄i(ai, t) with probability ϕi(a), while
losers receive payoffs vi(ai, t) with probability 1−ϕi(a). In most auction models, participation is voluntary: there is
some outside option such as not placing a bid that provides a fixed certain utility to the agent, typically normalized
to zero. We refer to this action as Q. We introduce the following assumption.
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Assumption C3 There exists λ > 0 such that, for all i = 1, . . . , I, all ai ∈ [ai, āi] and all t ∈ T: (i) the types have
support T1 × · · · × TI ; (ii) v̄i(ai, t) and vi(ai, t) are bounded and continuous in (ai, t); (iii) v̄i(Q, t) = 0, vi(Q, t) =
0, vi(ai, t) ≤ 0, and ∆vi(āi, t̄) < 0; (iv) ∆vi(ai, t) is strictly increasing in (−ai, ti); (v) for all ε > 0, ∆vi(ai, t−i, ti +
ε)−∆vi(ai, t−i, ti) ≥ λε.
Let Wi(ai, α−i) denote the event that the realization of t−i and the outcome of the tie-breaking mechanism are such
that player i wins with ai, when opponents use strategies α−i with the realization of t−i. Thus,
P (Wi(ai, α−i)|ti) =
∫
ϕi (ai, α−i(t−i)) · f(t−i|ti)dt−i. (C-31)
Assumption C4 For all i = 1, . . . , I, all ai, a
′




∣∣∣∣ti,Wi(a′i, α−i)] is strictly increasing in ti and increasing in a′i.
Theorem C1 (Athey 2001) For all i, let Ai = Q ∪ [ai, āi]. Suppose Assumptios C2, C3, and C4 hold, and that the
game satisfies the SCC. Then, there exists a pure strategy BNE in increasing strategies.
It is simple to to use the previous result to establish the existence of a symmetric BNE for symmetric games with
incomplete information, which is our case of interest.
Part 2. Verifications of the Assumptions C2–C4. Now, we are ready to show the existence of a
BNE in the naive FA model by verifying the conditions in Assumptions C2-C4. This together with the verification
of SCC guarantee the existence of increasing BNE. Our proof is presented for the general case of random Z. For this
we need one additional assumption:
Assumption C5 Assume that the random variables X and Z satisfy: E[X|X + Z > b] is increasing in b, for all
b ≥ 0.
The above assumption is used to guarantee Assumption C4. It can be shown that the condition in the assumption is
satisfied in the following cases: 1) if Z and X are independent and identically distributed; and 2) if Z and X are both
uniformly distributed (with potentially different supports). Since the bid has to be at least the private cost, thus the
lowest possible rational bid is c. For technical reasons, however, we define b = c−∆, ∆ > 0. Also, the bid will not
be higher than z̄ + x̄, namely, b̄ = z̄ + x̄, which is the highest possible price in the spot market. To handle the two
random components in the spot market price, we decompose the sport market into two “virtual” bidders: one has
private cost c10 = x and the other has private cost c
2
0 = z, and they bid their true cost, i.e., b
1
0 = x and b
2
0 = z. The




0. To be consistent
with notations in Athey [2001], we make the following transformation of the private cost and the bids: for all bidders
i = 1, 2, . . . , N with private cost ci and bid bi, let
ai = c̄+ x̄− bi, ai = c̄+ x̄− b̄ = c̄− z0, āi = c̄+ x̄− b = c̄+ x̄− c+ ∆,
ti = c̄+ x̄− ci, ti = x̄, t̄i = c̄+ x̄− c, (C-32)
a10 = t
1
0 = x̄− x, a10 = t
1




0 = x̄− x,
a20 = t
2
0 = c̄− z, a20 = t
2




0 = c̄− z.
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For any given a = (a10, a
2




0, t1, . . . , tN ), corresponding to (C-30), our naive FA model can be
specified as follows: For any i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
ϕi(a) =
 1, if bi < bj ,∀j 6= i0, o.w. = I {bi < bj , ∀j 6= i} = I {ai > aj , ∀j 6= i} , (C-33)
vi(ai, t) = 0, v̄i(ai, t) = bi − ci − x = ti − ai − x = ti − ai − x̄+ t
1
0. (C-34)
For simplification, we ignore ties in the winning probability in (C-33); a similar analysis applies if we consider them.
Proposition C9 Assume that Assumption C5 holds. Then, Assumptions C2-C4 hold for the naive FAs.
Proof. We will check all conditions in Assumptions C2-C4 hold for naive FAs.
• Assumption C2: Assumption C2 is trivially true since ui(a, t) is bounded for any a, t by (C-30)-(C-34) and
the fact that ai, ti is bounded for any i.
• Assumption C3:
– (i) and (ii) are trivial by (C-34) and the fact that ai, ti is bounded for any i.
– (iii). Let Q = c̄ − z̄, i.e., the bid equals to the highest possible spot market price z̄ + x̄. Thus,
by bidding Q, the bidder will never win against spot market and ui(a, t|ai=Q) = 0, thus, ai ≥ Q.
∆vi(āi, t̄) = v̄i(āi, t̄) = t̄i − āi + t̄10 − x̄ = −x−∆ < 0 by (C-32).
– (iv). By (C-34), ∆vi(ai, t) = v̄i(ai, t) = ti − ai + t10 − x̄. Obviously, ∆vi(ai, t) is strictly increasing in
(−ai, ti).
– (v). For all ε > 0, by (C-34), ∆vi(ai, t−i, ti + ε) −∆vi(ai, t−i, ti) = ε. Thus, (v) in Assumption C3 is





∣∣∣∣ti,Wi(a′i, α−i)] = Et−i
[









ti − ai + t10 − x̄)
)







= ti − ai − x̄+
Et−i
[
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where (a2) holds because t−i and ti are independent. By (C-31) and (C-33), we have
Et−i
[









t10 · I {a′i > αj(tj), ∀j 6= i)} f(t−i)dt−i∫
t−i






















































∣∣∣∣a′i > t10 + t20] ,















∣∣∣∣ti,Wi(a′i, α−i)] is strictly increasing in ti. Next, we show that E [t10∣∣∣∣a′i > t10 + t20]








∣∣∣∣a′i > t10 + t20] = E [x̄−X∣∣∣∣a′i > x̄−X + c̄− Z] = x̄− E [X∣∣∣∣X + Z > x̄+ c̄− a′i] .




∣∣∣∣a′i > t10 + t20] is increasing in a′i. Thus, Assumption C4 is true, namely, Et−i [∆vi(ai, t)∣∣∣∣ti,Wi(a′i, α−i)]
is strictly increasing in ti and increasing in a
′
i.
Therefore, we have shown conditions in Assumptions C2-C4 hold for the naive FAs.
Recall that Athey’s method is applicable to establishing the existence of a symmetric BNE when the game is
symmetric. The above analysis establishes the conditions required to use Theorem C1 except SCC. This together
with the SCC property established in Proposition C7 imply that a increasing symmetric BNE for naive FAs exists.
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Appendix D
Appendix for Chapter 4
Proof of Theorem 14. While we provide the proof only for the n-supplier and n-retailer structure, the same
approach applies to establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibria for the other two structures. The function
di(w) is clearly linear in w, decreasing in its own wholesale price wi and increasing in others’ wholesale price wj . By



































as well as ∂
2di
∂w2i
= 0 and ∂
2di
∂wi∂wj
= 0, where ϕi =
λ
2β−υi









































































here, the inequalities follow from 2− vi ∂di∂wi > 0 and 1− vi
∂di
∂wi
> 0, as ∂di
∂wi
< 0. Thus, we have a supermodular game
for which an equilibrium exists.
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Next we prove the equilibrium’s uniqueness by showing that the Hessian matrix is strictly dominant:∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣ ∂2πSi∂wi∂wj
































Here, the inequality (a) follows from 1−vi ∂di∂wi > 0 and (D-1) and the inequality (b) holds owing to the nonnegativity
of − ∂di
∂wi
. The game is therefore supermodular and its Hessian matrix is strictly dominant; hence, there exists a
unique equilibrium to the suppliers’ competition game (see Cachon and Lariviere 2005b).
Proof of Lemma 5. While we provide the proof only for the n-supplier and n-retailer structure, the other two
supply chain structures can be determined with the same approach. Both the existence and uniqueness follow directly




= 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we obtain the solution for w∗i that is given in the first equation in (4.12).
Substituting it into (4.7), we get d∗ in (4.12).
Next, we show that the equilibrium meets the individual rationality (IR) principle; in other words, the profits of
the retailers and suppliers are all nonnegative. It is trivial that d∗ ≥ 0. We have





(2β − v)[1 + (n− 2)ϕ][1 + (n− 1)ϕ] + v
2
[1 + (n− 2)ϕ]
2β[2 + (n− 3)ϕ][1 + (n− 1)ϕ]− v
[
1 + ϕ[2n− 3 + (n− 3)(n− 1)ϕ]
] ≤ 1
⇐⇒ 2β[1 + (n− 2)ϕ− (n− 1)ϕ2]− v
2
[1 + (n− 2)ϕ− 2(n− 1)ϕ2] ≥ 0
⇐⇒ 4β
v
≥ 1 + (n− 2)ϕ− 2(n− 1)ϕ
2
1 + (n− 2)ϕ− (n− 1)ϕ2 ,
where the last inequality holds because 4β
v
> 1 ≥ 1+(n−2)ϕ−2(n−1)ϕ
2
1+(n−2)ϕ−(n−1)ϕ2 . Similarly, π
R∗
i ≥ 0 is equivalent to





(1 + 2ϕ(n− 1))d∗ ≥ 0





(1 + 2ϕ(n− 1))[1 + (n− 2)ϕ]
⇐⇒ 2 + 2ϕ(n− 1) ≥ 1 + 2ϕ(n− 1),
The last inequality is obviously true. Thus, we have proved the proposition.
Proof of Theorem 15. (i) Proof of n-supplier and n-retailer structure. We assume without loss of generality that
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β = 1. From Lemma 5, we obtain
πS∗i (0)− πS∗i (v) =
(2− λ)(2 + λ(n− 2))
(4 + λ(n− 3))2(2 + λ(n− 1))ξ
2
−
(2− v + λ(n− 2))
(




8− 6v + λ(−10 + λ(n− 3)(n− 1) + 6n)− λ(2n− 3)v + v2
)2 ξ2, (D-2)
πR∗i (0)− πR∗i (v) =
(2 + λ(n− 2))2
(4 + λ(n− 3))2(2 + λ(n− 1))2 ξ
2




8− 6v + λ(−10 + λ(n− 3)(n− 1) + 6n)− λ(2n− 3)v + v2
)2 ξ2. (D-3)
In the following, we show the results of suppliers and retailers in the n-supplier and n-retailer structure in Parts 1
and 2, respectively.





5 ≥ 0, where
G0 = −8(4− v)(2− v)2,
G1 = 4(14− 3v − n(6− v))(4− v)(2− v),
G2 = −600 + 2v(204− v39 + 2v2)− (88− 6(8− v)v)n2 − 2n(−248 + 156v − 26v2 + v3),
G3 = −4(−99 + n(119 + (−37 + n)n))− 4(41 + n(−44 + n(10 + n)))v + (15 + n(−13 + n+ n2))v2,
G4 = 2
(
− 66 + 104n− 43n2 − 2n3 + 3n4 − (n− 2)2(n2 + n− 3)v
)
,
G5 = (n− 3)(n− 1)(n3 − n2 − 4n+ 6).
It is easy to verify that G(0) = G0 < 0 for any n ≥ 2 and v ≤ 1, and that G(1) = 2− 7n2 − 5n3 + n4 + n5 + (−4 +
8n+ 14n2 + 2n3− 2n4)v+ (1− 9n− 5n2 +n3)v2 + 2nv3. Because G(1, v = 0) > 0 and G(1, v = 1) > 0 for any n ≥ 2,
it could be verified that G(1) > 0 for any n ≥ 2 and v ∈ [0, 1], and that G(λ) is quasi-convex over [0, 1]. Hence, there
exists a λS(n) ∈ (0, 1) such that G(λ) ≥ 0 if and only if (iff) λ ≥ λS(n).






6 ≥ 0, where
H0 = 8(2− v)2v,
H1 = −8(2− v)[(n− 2)v2 − 2(n− 3)v − 4(n− 1)],
H2 = 2
(





4n(83− 47n+ 8n2)− 2n(69− 41n+ 7n2)v + (−3 + (n− 3)2n)v2 − 22(8− 3v)
)
,
H4 = 4(n− 1)
(




87− 224n+ 199n2 − 72n3 + 9n4
)
v + (3− 4n+ n2)2v2,
H5 = 2(n− 3)(n− 2)(n− 1)(20 + (n− 4)n(6− v)− 3v),
H6 = (−6 + 11n− 6n2 + n3)2.
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It is clear that H(0) > 0 for any v > 0. As in the preceding proof, it can be shown that H(λ) is quasi-concave in λ over
[0, 1]. Moreover, H(1) = (n−1)n(1+n)2(n2−n−4)−2(1+5n−n2−6n3−n4+n5)v+(1+4n−6n2−4n3+n4)v2+2n2v3.
As such if H(1) ≥ 0 then H(λ) ≥ 0 for any λ ∈ [0, 1]; otherwise, there exists a λR(n) ∈ (0, 1) such that H(λ) ≥ 0 iff
λ ≤ λR(n).
By (D-3) to show that λR(n) = 1 for any n ≥ 3, it suffices to prove that H̄ = H(λ = 1) = (n− 1)n(1 + n)2(n2 −
n− 4)− 2(1 + 5n−n2− 6n3−n4 +n5)v+ (1 + 4n− 6n2− 4n3 +n4)v2 + 2n2v3 ≥ 0 for any n ≥ 3. It is easy to verify
that
H̄|v=0 = (n− 1)n(1 + n)2(n2 − n− 4) ≥ 0 for any n ≥ 3,
H̄|v=1 = (n2 − 2n− 1)(n2 − 1)2 ≥ 0,
∂H̄
∂v
|v=0 = −2(1 + n
(





|v=1 = −2n(n− 1)(1 + n)[(n− 2)n− 1] ≤ 0
Because ∂H̄
∂v
(v) is a convex function, it follows that ∂H̄
∂v
(v) ≤ 0 for any v ∈ [0, 1]; hence, H̄ ≥ 0 for any v ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, by case (i), we have πR∗i (0) − πR∗i (v) ≥ 0 for any λ ∈ [0, 1] and v ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the proposition is true
with λR(n) = 1.
(ii) Proof of n-supplier and 1-retailer structure. Similar to case (i), it could be shown that a quasi-convex function
Ĝ(λ) and a quasi-concave function Ĥ(λ) exist such that (a) Ĝ(0) < 0 < Ĥ(0); (b) Ĝ(λ) and Ĥ(λ) have at most
one root on [0, 1 − v/2) (recall that the discount and substitution rates have to satisfy v < v̄ ≡ 2 − 2λ, i.e.,
λ < 1− v/2.), denoted as λ̂S(n) and λ̂R(n), respectively; and (b) π̂S∗i (0)− π̂S∗i (v) ≥ 0 is equivalent to Ĝ(λ) ≥ 0 and
π̂R∗i (0)− π̂R∗i (v) ≥ 0 is equivalent to Ĥ(λ) ≥ 0. Therefore, the first part of the results could be shown in exactly the
same way as case (i).
Next, we show that the threshold values satisfy λ̂S(n) > λ̂R(n) for any n ≥ 2. To this end, it suffices to show
that Ĝ(λ) + Ĥ(λ) < 0 for any λ ∈ [0, 1− v/2) and that any n ≥ 2. After some algebra, one obtains Ĝ(λ) + Ĥ(λ) =
−(2 + λ(n− 3))v · Â(λ), where Â(λ) = Â0 + Â1λ+ Â2λ2 + Â3λ3 + Â4λ4 and
Â0 = (2− v)3, Â1 = (2− v)2(n(7− v)− 13 + 2v),
Â2 = (2− v)[(18− 5v)n2 − (60− 16v)n+ 54− 15v],
Â3 = 4
[
(5− 2v)n3 − (23− 9v)n2 + (38− 15v)n− 22 + 9v
]
,
Â4 = 4(n− 3)(n− 1)(n2 − 2n+ 2).




(n− 1)2(n+ 1)[(2− v)n+
v](2− v)3 > 0 for any n ≥ 2 and v ∈ [0, v̄); and (b) Â(λ) is quasi-concave on the interval [0, 1− v/2). Thus, we show
that Â(λ) > 0 for any n ≥ 2, v ∈ [0, v̄), and λ ∈ [0, 1− v/2). Combined with the fact that (2 + λ(n− 3)) > 0 for any
n ≥ 2 and λ ∈ [0, 1− v/2), we thus show that Ĝ(λ) + Ĥ(λ) < 0 for any n ≥ 2, v ∈ [0, v̄), and λ ∈ [0, 1− v/2). This
proves that λ̂S(n) > λ̂R(n) for any n ≥ 2 and v ∈ [0, v̄).
(iii) The proof of the results for the 1-supplier and n-retailer structure could be shown along the same lines as
the other two cases.
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Proof of Theorem 16. For any λ > 0 and v > 0, by Theorem 15, we have
lim
n→∞































This proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 17. While we provide the proof only for the n-supplier and n-retailer structure, the same
approach applies to the other two structures. From Table 4.1, it is easy to see that a supplier’s equilibrium profit
under a wholesale price–only contract is greater than under a quantity discount contract iff ∆πS(λ) ≡ λ2(n2 − 5) +
12βλ− 8β2 ≥ 0. Note that ∆πS(0) = −8β2 < 0 and that ∆πS(β) = (n2 − 1)β2 > 0 for all n ≥ 2. Two solutions for









n2 − 5 β.
If n = 2, then λ1 = (6 − 2
√
7)β = 0.7085β ∈ (0, β) and λ2 = (6 + 2
√
7)β > β. When n ≥ 3, ∆πS(·) is convex and
λ2 < 0; therefore, ∆π




Next, we show the results for the retailer. According to Table 4.1, it is easily verified that the retailer’s equilibrium
profit under a wholesale price–only contract is larger than under a quantity discount contract if and only if ∆πR(λ) ≡
4β2 + λ2(n − 3)2 + 2βλ(2n − 7) ≥ 0. When n ≥ 4, ∆πR(λ) ≥ 0 because all of its three terms are nonnegative. If
n = 3, then ∆πR(λ) = 4β2 − 2βλ = 2β(2β − λ) > 0 for all λ. If n = 2, we have ∆πR(λ) = 4β2 + λ2 − 6βλ ≥ 0 iff
λ ≤ (3−
√
5)β.
